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STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff-Appel l ant, FILED . CI 
v. 
AlA Services Corpora t ion, et a I, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
VOLUME III 
Appealed from the District Court o f the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho , 
in and for the County of Nez Perce 
The Honorable Jeff M. Brudie 
Supreme Court No. 36916-2009 
RODERICK C. BOND 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
GARY D. BABBITT 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT AlA CORP-RESPONDENTS 
L~======================================= __=_==_==========~ 
II I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 




AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE 
TAYLOR, individually and the community 
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 





CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendant -Respondent -Cross Respondent, 
and 
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, 
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross 
Respondent. 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
F1LED 
70n Fa3 2.7 ptfl 'II- '1-1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY 
MOTION IS ALSO A MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") hereby provides notice for purpose of 
clarity that his Emergency Motion to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors 
NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARlTY THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - I 33~ 
ORIGI Al 
Resolutions, in conformity with footnote 10 to said Motion, is also a Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Defendants from acting in any way contrary to the (1) 
Consent In Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit K to 
the Affidavit of Reed 1. Taylor In Support of Emergency Motion, and (2) Consent In Lieu 
of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit L to the Affidavit of 
Reed 1. Taylor In Support of Emergency Motion, and that Defendants be Ordered to 
comply with the terms of such Consents. 
DATED this 2ih day of February, 2007. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
1 
Pau ressman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the Notice for Purpose of Clarity that Plaintiffs Emergency Motion is 
also a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the following parties via the methodes) 
indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Signed this 2ih day of February, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
NOTICE FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
EMERGENCY MOTION IS ALSO A 





CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
F/L 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Nez Perce 
) ss. 
) 
Case No. CV 07-00208 
AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR IN 
OBJECTION TO "MOTION FOR 
EMERGENCY MOTION" 
CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one ofthe defendants in this action, and make this affidavit from my own personal 
knowledge. 
26 AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
2. John Taylor and I jointly own 1,034,835 shares of AIA Services Corp., which is the sole 
1 
shareholder in AlA Insurance, Inc. Our combined interest in AlA Services Corp. is appraised at 
























corporation with offices also located at Lewis Clark Plaza. The approximate value of our interest 
in that corporation is over $600,000. 
3. I informed counsel for the Plaintiff of my ownership interest in these entities by both 
telephone and e-mail on January 19, 2007. A copy of that e-mail is attached as Exhibit A to this 
Affidavit. 
4. I have never been provided with notice of any of the "special shareholder meetings" 
which Reed Taylor claims to have called, and am extremely concerned with the actions which have 
been taken by Reed Taylor, both individually and though his counsel, which are essentially an 
attempt to make an end-run around the entire legal process without regard to the civil rules. His 
attempt to usurp the power of the court and unilaterally seize control of the AlA offices is alarming, 
and could have an extremely adverse impact on the value of my personal ownership interest in the 
above corporations. If the Preliminary Injunction is removed or changed in any way to allow Reed 
Taylor to assert any type of control over AlA and its properties, the companies will be unable to 
operate and my interest in the shares of these corporations will be irreparably damaged. 
5. I ask that the Court maintain the status quo until these complex factual and legal issues 
can be fully investigated through discovery, briefed thoroughly, and presented to the Court in an 
orderly, professional manner. If the status quo is to be changed in any way, I ask that the Plaintiff 
be required to post a bond sufficient to cover my ownership interest in these corporations. 
6. The Plaintiffs "Motion for Emergency Motion" and the voluminous attachments were 
26 AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 2 
LAW OFFICES OF" 539 
CLARK AND FEENEY 









apparently delivered to my office on Monday, February 26, while I was in Boise for a hearing on a 
birth injury case. I received a copy of Plaintiffs Notice of Hearing late on February 27, 
scheduling a hearing on March 1, 2007. 
7. I cannot be present for that hearing, as I will be in Spokane participating in the mediation 
of a 42 USCA § 1983 wrongful death case which is scheduled for trial in federal court in April. 
Even if I did not have a scheduling conflict, it would be absolutely impossible to prepare for a 
hearing on this extremely short time frame, especially considering the complexity of the issues and 
the law concerned in this matter. 
9 8. I respectfully request that this Court deny the Plaintiffs "Motion for Emergency 




















The Motion fails to cite any civil rule or statute under which it is filed, as is 
required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). I am unaware of any rule or statute which 
allows the extremely broad relief requested; 
The Motion and accompanying documents set forth a great many allegations 
which are incorrect, misleading, and in dispute; 
The Motion essentially is asking that the Court enter an order granting 
Plaintiff all the relief requested in his Amended Complaint, as well as 
additional relief which was not even requested in his Amended Complaint, 
without giving the Defendants the opportunity to respond or engage in any 
discovery whatsoever. 
The Motion for Emergency Motion is in the nature of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which requires at least 28 days notice of hearing and also requires 
26 AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 


























that all facts be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. 
e. The Plaintiff has not provided sufficient time to allow me to defend my 
interests in this matter. 
/J viii 
DATED this _LLl_/ _",Jay of February 
Connie Taylor 
'1 y1i1 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this IAJ day of February, 2007. 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho. 
Residing at ~rl{/t./;JIZD / ,.- / the~ein._~" 
My commission expires: u3! t..)(/..~! () J 
1 
26 AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 4 
LAW OFFICES OF 341 
CLARK AND FEENEY 


























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2fHf day of February, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith and Cannon 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100 
Seattle, WA 98104 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
321 13 th Street 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 7th Street 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
































lar and Feeney 
Q 
I 
Attorneys for Connie W. Taylor 
26 AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 5 
LAW OFFICES OF 3'-12-
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
Page 1 of 1 
Connie 
From: Connie 
Sent: Friday, January 19, 2007 3:29 PM 
To: 'rod@scblegal.com' 
Subject: Reed Taylor - AlA 
Rod: 
I'd like to confirm our conversation of this afternoon, in which I advised you that I still 
own an undivided one-half interest with John Taylor in all shares oCAlA Inc., AlA 
Services, and CROP USA. My approval is required prior to entering into 
any agreement which would impact those shares. I understand you wiII provide me 
with a copy of any documents which are filed with the court. 
Connie 
AFFIDA VIT OF CONNIE TAYLOR 
2/27/2007 
343 .' 




3 CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Defendant Connie Taylor 
4 The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
5 P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 













AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 07-00208 




TO: ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: 
22 This Answer is provided for Connie Taylor individually. 
23 
24 
1. Defendant admits paragraphs 1.1 through 1.4. 
25 
26 ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 1 
LA W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 


























2. Defendant is without sufficient information to determine the truth or falsity of 
paragraphs 1.5 and 1.6 of plaintiff s Amended Complaint and therefore denies the 
same. 
3. Defendant admits paragraphs 1.7 and 1.8. 
4. Defendant denies paragraph 2.1. 
5. Defendant is without sufficient information to determine the truth or falsity of 
paragraphs 2.2 through 2.24 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and therefore denies 
the same. 
6. Defendant denies each and every other allegation set forth in said Amended 
Complaint not specifically admitted herein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
By pleading certain defenses as "affirmative defenses," Defendant Connie Taylor does not 
intend to suggest that she carries the burden of proof for any such defenses. Furthermore, by failing 
to raise any affirmative defenses, Defendant Connie Taylor does not intend to waive such defenses 
and specifically reserves the right to amend her Answer to include additional affirmative defenses 
if such are justified by discovery or by the law in this action. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against the Defendant Connie Taylor upon which 
relief may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Defendant affirmatively alleges that the Plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate his claimed or alleged damages, if any. 
26 ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 2 
LA W OFFICES OF 6~ 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1 
Plaintiff is barred from recovering under any claims based in equity pursuant to the clean-
























FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, laches and failure to 
mitigate damages. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant Connie Taylor has been required to retain counsel to defend her interests in this 
matter and is entitled to the recovery of attorney fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Court enter an order granting the following relief: 
1. That the claims ofthe Plaintiff be dismissed and that he take nothing thereby. 
2. That the relief requested in the Plaintiffs Amended Complaint be denied. 
3. That the Plaintiff s request for costs and fees be denied. 
4. That the Defendant Connie Taylor be reimbursed her costs, expenses and reasonable 
attorney fees necessarily incurred in defending the action. 
5. F or such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances 
of this lawsuit. 
n,-" Iii 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2007. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
. ally, a member ofthe firm. 
orneys for Connie W. Taylor 
26 ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 3 
LA W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2'1#tday of February, 2007, I caused to be served a true 

























Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith and Cannon 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Ave., Ste. 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104 
Attorneys for Reed Taylor 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols 
321 13 th Street 
PO Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
David A. Gittins 
Law Offices of David A. Gittins 
843 7th Street 
PO Box 191 
Clarkston, WA 99403 




































LA W OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
02/28/2007 WED 13:24 FAX 
FI ED 
2l1lI Ffl3 19 PM II 00 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13 th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
\IS. 
AlA SERVrCES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community properly comprised therc:of: 
BR Y AN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF KANSAS ) 
: ss. 
County of Johnson 
















Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDA VIT OF 
KENT A. PETERSEN 
I. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN 
1d!00l!003 
02/28/2007 WED 13: 25 FAX 
2. I am the President and Chief Operating Officer of Crop USA Insuram.:e 
Agency, Inc., an Idaho corporation. CropUSA has offices in Lewiston, Idaho, and 
Overland Park, Kansas. 
3. CropUSA is a Managing General Agency under the federal crop insurance 
program for Cleaf\vater Insurance Company of New York, New York. Clearwater holus 
a Standard Reinsurance Agreement with the Risk Management Agency of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Under the terms of the Standard Reinsurancc Agreement, 
CropUSA has significant duties and responsibilities to those farmers who purchase their 
federal crop insurance through the CropUSA agency. 
4. Our responsibilities include the issuance of policies, taking acreage and 
production repol1s, ildjusting clilims, pilying indemnities, and collecting prcmium on 
behalf of the USDA. 
5. This time of year is a very busy time of year for CropUSA anu it.s farmer 
customers because most farmers must report their intent and select cqverages for their 
crop insurance under the federal program by March 15. 
6. CropUSA is required to process information submitted by the fanners and 
remit the information to the RMA in order for the farmer customers of Crop USA to 
obtain crop insurance coverage. In addition, on behalf of Clearwater Insurance, we must 
make selections for reinsuring all or part of the business submitted by cach farmer by 
April 14. All of the processing for the offices in Overland Park and our agencies 
throughout the country are enabled by servers housed in Lewiston, Idaho at the Lewis 
Clark Plaza, III Main Street. We expect to process business in excess of $30 million 
this year, which is approximately $300 million in potential indemnity for crop losses. 
7. During 2006, CropUSA made payments of $47,800 to ALA Insurance for 
rental space in the Lewis Clark Plaza. Crop USA has exclusive use of an area on the first 
floor of the building, and in conjunction with ALA Insurance, CropUSA uses an area of 
the second floor. If it is determined that for CropUSA is not entitled to this usc of the 
premises, fairness requires that CropUSA be allowed to vacate the premises, in an 
orderly, businesslike fashion during regular business hours to avoid unfair and 
unnecessary disruption of CrapUSA's business and undue interference with CropUSA's 
obligations to its customer farmers and Clearwater Insurance. 
AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN 
~002/003 
V~I .t..UI £.vu I WJ:,U .L.5: L:J r'AX 
8. Many documents, including financial records, computer programs, 
computer equipment, and other personal propeliy (including our sensitive business 
propeIiY) are housed in the Lewis Clark Plaza. 
9. Plaintiff has no interest in CropUSA Insurance. CropUSA is not a paJ1y to 
this lawsuit, but it must protet.:t its properly located in the Lewis Clark Plaza. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this C:)... \) day of February, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN 
IdJ003/003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
NedA. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
_____ u.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED -----
________ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_---'X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDA VIT OF KENT A. PETERSEN 35f 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
















I, Stephanie McFarland, being duly sworn, state: 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHANIE MCFARLAND 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify as a 
witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. I am the Executive Assistant of AlA Insurance, Inc., and my job includes 
greeting AlA's customers from my seat at the front reception desk. 
AFFIDA VIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND 
3. During the summer of2006, I was provided with a can of pepper spray after an 
incident occurred with a vagrant wandering around our building at 111 Main Street, 
Lewiston, Idaho. The can of pepper spray was kept to the right of my desk, behind a 
partition where it was not able to be seen. When Reed Taylor began his demands and 
legal actions against AlA Insurance, Inc., I moved the can of pepper spray directly to the 
front of my desk, in plain sight. 
4. I advised Building Services on Friday, February 2, 2007, that I was afraid of 
Reed Taylor corning to the office for an unscheduled meeting on Monday, February 5, 
2007. Gem State Security was hired to sit in the lobby by my desk from 9:00 a.m. to 
12:00 p.m. The door to AlA's offices on the second floor were locked and the only access 
to our offices was by the elevator, in front of my desk. 
5. I am afraid of Reed Taylor corning to AlA Insurance, Inc. I have advised R. 
John Taylor that I prefer he not leave town for the next few months, as I fear Reed Taylor 
will attempt illegal action against AlA Insurance, Inc. and its employees, should R. John 
Taylor be out of town. 
6. I am afraid that Reed Taylor would use physical force to make AlA employees 
leave the office in an attempt to assume authority over AlA Insurance. 
7. I will not work for Reed Taylor. 
Dated February a7, , 2007. 
!J4rjTln1tJ rrrflMcfm/ 
StepHanie McFarland 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this d g+t= day of February, 2007. 
~!i 1 Ulll:>mCLpL. 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: /t)~ S -uq 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, J r. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
____ U.S. MAIL 
____ HAND DELIVERED 
____ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
_---'X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDA VIT OF STEPHANIE MCFARLAND 
}/ 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13 th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
















Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
AIMEE GORDON 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. I am the Accounting Manager for AlA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance. 
AFFIDAVIT OF AIMEE GORDON 
3. The financial statements of AlA Insurance, Inc. are reviewed and audited 
each year by independent auditors. In my review of the last five years of audit reports, 
AlA has always had a positive net income. The net income of AlA during the last five 
years has ranged from a low of$239,660 to a high of$I,063,520. 
4. Each year, $196,536 is accrued and recorded in an accrued wages account 
on the ledger for John Taylor. Any wages paid to John through payroll or any expenses 
the company pays for his benefit are charged against the accrued wages account and 
recorded as taxable income on his Form W-2. Any accrued wages not used by John are 
carried forward to the next year. In the five years of my employment with AlA the 
amount of accrued wages John has used in a year has ranged from $159,000 to $249,000. 
5. In my review of the history of plaintiff's promissory note (1995 thru 
2006), I show that he has received approximately $8,000,000 in cash and non-cash 
transactions. The current balance due to plaintiff as of December 31, 2006, is 
$8,189,614; this is $6,000,000 in principal and $2,189,614 in accrued interest. In 2002, 
the amount of principal was reduced by $307,271 (application of a payable due to John 
Taylor) from $6,000,000 to $5,692,729. However, John directed me to reverse this entry 
in the fourth quarter of2006, bringing the principal due on the note back to $6,000,000. 
6. In past years, plaintiff has charged AlA for use of his airplane, the last 
charge was in 2005 at a rate of$950 per hour. 
7. AlA has provided both of plaintiffs sons with employment. Jud Taylor is 
currently employed by CropUSA as an agent. Jay Taylor voluntarily terminated his 
employment in July of2005. 
Dated February CJ~ , 2007. 
G1 M, fVl 6y1d~~ 
Aimee Gordon 
roK 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to this d,,,::> day of February, 2007. 
:' :: 'j":' t' r:t ,: 
I','j' 
. n~~\.j; 
AFFIDAVIT OF AIMEE GORDON 
(Q tOO /~L l CltLt:'sYY'c~vL­
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: \O,~?,,:>c..q 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98 I 04-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
____ U.S. MAIL 
____ HAND DELIVERED 
____ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: U&1u«~~ 
Michael E. McNichols 
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AFFIDA VIT OF AIMEE GORDON 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
3 21 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
















Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. I am the Office Manager of the Lewiston, Idaho, offices of AlA Insurance 
and Crop USA Insurance. 
AFFIDA VII OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
3. AlA Insurance and CropUSA both work out the second floor offices in the 
Lewis Clark Plaza at 111 Main Street in Lewiston. The phones are answered 
AlAiCropUSA. Approximately15 individuals perform job responsibilities for both of the 
companies. For example, the accounting department takes care of payroll for AlA 
Insurance and CropUSA. It is my understanding that the companies allocate salaries and 
related expenses, rent, and other shared expenses based on the services provided from 
one to the other on a monthly basis. 
4. The employees in the Lewiston office have a great deal of respect for John 
Taylor as their boss. In fact, a majority of the employees have worked for John for over 
15 years. The plaintiff is not held in high regard by the employees. I polled the 
employees February 27, 2007. If plaintiff were to take possession of AlA, it would have 
a devastating effect on the business because the majority of the current employees would 
refuse to work for the plaintiff. In fact, many of the employees in the Lewiston office are 
afraid of the plaintiff. His reputation with the employees is so poor that I do not believe a 
prosperous business atmosphere would be possible. The plaintiff cannot control and 
operate AlA Insurance without the benefit of the current staff. In my opinion, faced with 
a near-complete exodus of the current staff, plaintiff would not be able to find personnel 
who would be competent in the many processes required to keep AlA functioning on a 
day-to-day basis. 
5. I am the recording secretary for the commodity association Trusts who are 
the major clients of AlA Insurance and its health insurance program. These Trusts are 
the master policyholders for the thousands of insured farmers across the country under 
AlA's insurance programs. John Taylor and I attend meetings of these Trusts on at least 
an annual basis. The members of the Trust boards respect John Taylor. However, I have 
witnessed, on more than one occasion, a director of one of the Trusts being extremely 
angry about contact made by the plaintiff. The Director would tell John Taylor that he 
needed to make sure that the plaintiff never, ever called or made contact with the director 
(or the commodity association he represented). I believe the distrust and dislike that the 
directors on the Trust Boards have for the plaintiff could cause dissolution of the Trust 
relationships with AlA and would be disastrous to AlA's future. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
\ 
6. Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he will operate AlA Insurance in its 
best interests if he is allowed to take control. Having known the plaintiff for many years, 
I do not believe this to be possible. I have witnessed many of the business ideas of the 
plaintiff over the past several years and have seen them fail. I have witnessed his 
relationships with the agent sales forces of AlA and CropUSA. His intimidation tactics 
have not made him a well~liked individual. Plaintiff has burned so many bridges in the 
past, I do not believe he can overcome the problems created by that conduct and operate 
AlA Insurance in its best interests. 
7. In their affidavits in support of the emergency motion, both plaintiff and 
his attorney, Roderick C. Bond, state that I have resigned as a director of AlA Insurance 
and AlA Services Corporation because of "extensive corporate malfeasance." The claim 
of "extensive corporate malfeasance" is absolutely unfounded. I have tendered my 
resignation as a director because I am afraid of the plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiffs attorney states that he has documents which show the 
"alteration of documents." This claim of document alteration is also absolutely 
unfounded and I can explain why. I provided my attorney, David Gittins, an abundance 
of confidential material in order to educate him about this case. We did not review the 
materials together; I simply left them with him to digest and we would discuss at a later 
time. On February 14, Mr. Gittins met with plaintiffs attorney to review documents in 
the possession of plaintiff. During that meeting, Mr. Gittins provided plaintiff s attorney 
with the document identified as Exhibit 2 of Roderick C. Bond's affidavit. Mr. Gittins 
did not ask my permission to give this document to plaintiffs attorney, but more 
importantly, we had never discussed the origin of the document. My attorney had no idea 
what it was. Had he talked to me about the document, I would have advised him that by 
looking at the formatting, spelling errors, and abbreviations, I could easily tell this was 
not an official corporate record, but rather a spreadsheet prepared by John Taylor for his 
personal use during negotiations with plaintiff. 
Dated February ,;:kY ,2007. 
JoJiee K. Duclos 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this agR day of February, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
ctVY1A/LL QJL'<SIrCl v\...d 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: \D~3--cq 
3£,1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, WA 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
_____ u.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED -----
OVERNIGHT MAIL -----
__ X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ill 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: ~~ 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOLEE K. DUCLOS 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
















Case No: CV 07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. I have degrees in accounting and law, and am a member of the Idaho State 
Bar. I have extensive experience with business, government, and governance issues 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
related to charitable organizations. I serve on several Boards of Directors and have been 
appointed by Governors Batt and Kempthorne to the Idaho Investment Fund Endowment 
Board. 
3. For more than twelve years, I have been the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., both of which are Idaho 
corporations. From the time I joined the companies in 1976, I was the Chief Operating 
Officer. 
4. AlA Services Corporation owns all of the issued and outstanding shares of 
stock in AlA Insurance, Inc. AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under 
the terms of a written agreement that has been amended and modified by written and oral 
agreements. One of such modifications is attached as Exhibit A hereto. Plaintiff alleges 
that AlA Services Corporation is in default under the terms of the agreements and 
defendants allege that AlA Services Corporation is not in default The case will involve 
multiple complex legal issues and enormous amounts of money. It will affect the lives 
of not only the litigants, but all employees and agents of AlA, at least two other 
companies that are not involved in this litigation, and most importantly thousands of 
insured persons. 
5. Plaintiffs allegations of misconduct and/or fraud by John Taylor and 
others of the companies are untrue. Plaintiff is well aware of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the transactions described in his emergency motion, but has omitted material 
facts. Defendant will correct the misrepresentations ofthe plaintiff. 
6. The plaintiff has the ability to prosecute his claims without running the 
business of AlA Insurance. The company will continue to operate during the litigation 
for the best interests of the insured farm families and there will be no diminution of the 
value of the company during the period nor will there be extraordinary distributions or 
transactions outside the ordinary course of business. 
7. AlA Insurance has been the agent and third party administrator for the 
health insurance plans of over 30 farm organizations, e.g. the Idaho Grain Producers 
Association and the Texas Wheat Producers Association. 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
8. AlA Insurance is dependent on the revenues and commissions received 
from Trustmark Insurance Company and other life and disability insurers for which AlA 
Insurance acts as the agent of record for its client farm associations. 
9. The current management and staff of AlA Insurance have a long and 
personal relationship with the clients and insurers of the AlA programs. The plaintiff is 
unknown to the current insurance carriers and is disliked and disrespected by the 
company's association clients. His control or management of the business would 
irrevocably harm the relationship with the farm association clients of AlA Insurance. 
10. The plaintiff is known to have a disrespectful, notoriously impolite, and 
brutish attitude toward the employees of AlA Insurance and many of the current 
employees would not work for him. Some employees. actually fear him and our 
receptionist suffers anxiety attacks when I leave town. Since the pendency of this 
litigation, plaintiff has caused to be hand-delivered to employees the letters attached as 
Exhibits B, C and D. 
11. Many of the employees of AlA Insurance also perform tasks for CropUSA 
Insurance Agency, Inc, which is not a party to this suit. CropUSA reimburses to AlA 
Insurance an allocated portion of the employee expenses. 
12. Crop USA and AlA share many services, including the joint utilization of 
office space, computers and furniture. The costs are shared between CropUSA and AlA 
Insurance. This relationship, would be seriously disrupted if the Plaintiff is allowed to 
manage the company. My ability to properly control and supervise the affairs of 
CropUSA, as its CEO, would be disrupted if I was unable to be on the premises. The 
separation of the j oint services would be difficult and time-consuming, even if it could be 
done in an orderly fashion. CropUSA will suffer irreparable harm if its operations were 
disrupted by the imposition of plaintiff s management at AlA Insurance. 
13. AlA Insurance and CropUSA employees in Lewiston jointly provide 
accounting, commission payments to agents, billing services, premium remittals to 
insurers, and other services vital to the insurance needs of several thousand farm families, 
including some area farm families. Any disruption of services, including failure to 
properly process their premium or policy activities could seriously impact the coverages 
and insurance protection for both their medical insurance and crop insurance. The 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
potential liability for their crops alone are estimated to be more than $200,000,000 d?llars 
in the next growing season. 
14. The community utilizes the facilities at the Lewis Clark Plaza for several 
social events, including the upcoming Lewiston Civic Theatre Fine Arts Ball, the 
Lewiston Library Foundation St Patrick's Day Fundraiser, and several weddings to be 
held in next few months. The Plaintiff has stated he will fire the building manager 
immediately upon taking control, which would disrupt or cancel these events and 
irrevocably damage the reputation of AlA Insurance as a contributing corporate citizen. 
The building manager is experienced and knowledgeable about maintenance of the Lewis 
Clark Plaza. The Plaza is an old, fragile building that needs constant care to avoid 
deterioration, which the building manager provides. 
15. Plaintiff lacks the management ability, temperament, and skills to 
retaionally operate AlA Insurance in the best interests of all its stakeholders. He suffers 
from short-term memory loss, excessive uncontrollable anger, and an abusive and abrupt 
personality. 
16. AlA Insurance will provide the court with appropriate assurances that it 
will continue usual and reasonable operations, not transfer assets or funds or engage in 
transactions outside the normal course of business, and will not pay any bonuses or 
unusual compensation to its employees. AlA Insurance will reaffirm its policy to 
maintain the integrity of all the files, work papers, and documents in a manner consistent 
with good business practices, the rules of the USDA, and the rules of the insurance 
Dated February 28, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this {~\g 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
~~\dJL Cu~ .. vL-
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: \0-- 3--01 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day ofF ebruary, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
____ U.S. MAIL 
____ HAND DELIVERED 
____ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
Michael E. McNichols 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
?J.,7 
Donna Taylor 
3730 Nicklaus Drive 
Clarkston, Wa. 99403 
Dear Ms. Taylor, 
February 27,2001 
AlA is developing a new crop insurance program through a 
new company called CropUSA. We will be filing a Form D stock 
registration for the agencies who join with CropUSA. 
The costs of putting the CropUSA program together in Texas 
have been paid. AlA now needs to launch in five new territories next 
Month. 
AlA requests it be allowed to defer the stock redemption payments 
to you for the next five months. Even though redemption is deferred, AlA will 
continue to accrue the interest on the interest payments not made. 
AlA will agree to work with you to restructure your payments so your 
redemption payments are converted to other income so you can set up a SEP or Defined 
Benefit plan. When you become a consultant, we can add you to the current 
AlA health plan. You will have the option to convert some of your Preferred A 
Stock to' CropUSA on the same rate as offered to the C stock 
It will take a few months to set this all up. We will work with your 
Accountant or will introduce you to CPA's here or in Spokane who can set up 
the right tax plan. 
Your preferred A stock has the highest priority, above the payments 
to Reed, the Preferred C, and the common stock .. Reed and John will 
guarantee the deferred payments. 
Accepted L 2. . II' 
/(JiM-










AIA Insurance, Inc. 
111 Main Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Re: Shareholder Meeting 
Dear JoLee: 
ReedJ. Taylor 
7498 Lapwai Road 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 1, 2007. 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Attached is a copy of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement ("Pledge Agreement"). 
Under the Pledge Agreement, AlA Services Corporation pledged all of the shares of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. ("AlA") to me as partial security for its indebtedness to me. 
Please pay particular attention to Section 6 of the Pledge Agreement, which states in part 
Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default, Pledgor's right to exercise 
such voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with 
respect to the Pledged Collateral shall rest solely and exclusively in Secured 
Party. 
AIA Services Corporation was notified in writing of its various defaults on December 12, 
2006. Under the terms of the Pledge Agreement, a default is defined as, among other 
ways, failure to pay principal or interest of the $6 Million Note; failure to comply with 
Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement (including the lock box requirement); 
breach of any covenant, warranty or representation of the Pledge Agreement (e.g., all of 
the requirements under Section 3 and 4); or an event of insolvency. All of the above 
defaults have occurred and AlA Services Corporation has failed to cure the defaults. 
As you can see, you have no right to prevent me from voting the shares and I will seek a 
court order to vote the shares, if necessary. 
In the meantime, I demand to be notified of any shareholder or board meeting, and 
further demand the right to vote my shares to replace AlA's board and appoint new 
officers as is my right. 
Sincerely, 
/(::;:.~ 
AFFIDA VIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
February 1,2007 
10Lee Duclos, Co-Trustee 
AlA Services Corporation 
111 Main Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Reed J. Taylor 
7498 Lapwai Road 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Re: AlA Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan 
Dear 10Lee: 




I am a participant in AlA Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan (the "Plan"). 
Pursuant to ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4), please provide me with the 
following documents: (1) a complete copy of the latest updated summary plan 
description(s); (2) the latest annual report(s); and (3) the bargaining agreements, trust 
agreements, contracts; and (4) other instruments under which this Plan is established or 
operated. With respect to the documents in the last category, please include "any 
document or instrument which specifies procedures, formulas, methodologies, or 
schedules to be applied in determining or calculating a participant's or beneficiary's 
benefit entitlement" under the Plan. See PWBA Opinion Letter No. 96-14A. Because 
the Plan is a 401(k) plan with various investment options, this category of documents 
should include any documents under which those options are established and operated. 
(e.g., prospectuses for the various funds, policies and guidelines under which they were 
selected and monitored; policies and guidelines for making real estate investments). 
To the extent you can do so, please expedite this request and deliver the documents to me 
by overnight mail. I will pay your reasonable copying charges and postage charges upon 
receipt. If you require payment in advance, please contact me at 208-413-1952 to inform 
me of the same, and I will deliver a check to you. 
If you are uncertain about the scope of the request, or dispute some part of this request, 
please, at a minimum, send to me the documents identified in Nos. (1) - (3) above, and 
contact me regarding the documents which are disputed or as to which you believe the 
request is unclear. 
If you have any questions, comments, or concerns about the request, please do not 
hesitate to contact me. Thank you very much for your time and attention to this request. 
Sincerely, 
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February 2,2007 
Board of Directors 
AIA Insurance, Inc. 
111 Main Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Dear Board of Directors: 
Reed J. Taylor 
7498 Lapwai Road. 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
As you know, AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. were in default of 
various agreements and for the failure to pay interest or principal due on my $6,000,000 
Promissory Note at the time of the last annual shareholder meeting. As a result, my right 
to vote all of AlA's outstanding shares was vested in me at the time of the last annual 
meeting, while AlA Services Corporation's right to vote the shares was terminated (see 
Section 6 of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement). Consequently, AlA's present board 
of directors was not properly elected and I do not consent to any action taken by you. I 
reiterate my demand for the special shareholder meeting scheduled for Monday, and your 
refusal to honor my demand will be actionable. If an annual or special meeting takes 
place anytime after this letter (with or without notice to me), I will be voting the shares in 
opposition to you as directors and in support of a slate of directors to be named by me. 
I have recently become aware of many improper transactions and activities at AlA during 
your terms as board members. Because all of the shares of AlA are pledged to me, every 
action taken by you will be highly scrutinized between now and when I am able to vote 
the shares (whether amicably or by court action). This letter is also notice to you that 
when I am able to vote the shares and appoint new directors and officers, you should 
anticipate that AlA will be seeking restitution from each of you personally for all the past 
improper and wrongful transactions and activities which occurred during your terms as 
board members, including acts before and after the date ofthis letter. 
I demand that every dollar of AlA's funds be accounted DJL I dema..'1d that all services 
and expenses incurred or paid by AlA on behalf of CropUSA or any other party be 
itemized and collected. I demand that you comply with all fiduciary duties owed to AlA. 
I demand that AlA not make any loans, advances or other inappropriate payments to any 
of AlA's officers or directors, or any related entity (including payments to John Taylor). 
This letter also serves as demand for you, any officer, any employee or any other party to 
not destroy or alter any documents (including email or other electronic files). On behalf 
of the participants of the plan, I will also be pursing claims against the Trustees of AlA 
Services Corporation's 401(k) Plan, so I expect all of those documents to be preserved. 
Sincerely, 
/~ 
Reed J. Taylor 
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Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13 th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
Corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR AND 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof: 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person: 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
















Case No: CV 07 -00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States of America, competent to testify 
as a witness, and make this affidavit on my personal knowledge. 
2. I have degrees in accounting and law, and am a member of the Idaho State 
Bar. I have extensive experience with business, government, and governance issues 
related to charitable organizations. I serve on several Boards of Directors and have been 
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appointed by Governors Batt and Kempthorne to the Idaho Investment Fund Endowment 
Board. 
3. For more than twelve years, I have been the President and Chief Executive 
Office of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., both of which are Idaho 
corporations. From the time I joined the companies in 1976, I was the Chief Operating 
Officer. 
4. Plaintiff was responsible for the sales side of the company from 1976 to 
1995. 
5. I joined the company, now known as AlA Insurance, in 1976. AlA 
Insurance was an agent and third party administrator for three farm organizations in the 
Northwest at that time. Through my efforts, as Chief Operating Officer, the company 
expended its farmer health insurance plans to over 30 farm organizations, like the North 
Dakota Grain Growers Association, the Arkansas Soybean Growers Association, etc. 
No stock in AlA Insurance or AlA Services was ever issued to or ever gifted to me by 
plaintiff. 
6. In December, 1983, AlA Services Corporation was formed for the purpose 
of assisting in the settlement of Reed Taylor's divorce, which was paid for and financed 
by company funds. AlA Services Corporation owns all of the issued and outstanding 
shares of stock in AlA Insurance, Inc. 
7. In the 1983 reorganization, I received my initial shares of AlA Services 
stock in exchange for my interest in the Life Insurance Company of Idaho, a life 
insurance company. 
8. In 1995, AlA Services Corporation entered into various agreements with 
the Plaintiff to effectuate his retirement and to buyout the Plaintiffs interest in AlA 
Services. The purchase price, including transfer of airplanes, personal debt, and other 
assets totaled nearly $10,000,000. AlA Services issued 295,000 shares of Series C 
Preferred stock, in the amount of $2,950,000 to assist in the financing of this leveraged 
buyout. Due to complex accounting rules, the purchase price caused an immediate 
reduction to the capital of AlA Services. 
9. AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under the terms of a 
written agreement which has been amended and modified by written and oral agreements. 
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One of such modifications is attached as Exhibit A hereto. Plaintiff alleges that AlA 
Services Corporation is in default under the terms of the agreements and defendants 
allege that AlA Services Corporation is not in default. 
10. Throughout the period from the initial leveraged buyout, AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance have been managed properly and profitably, to the extent Plaintiff has 
received over $8,000,000 in payments since the transaction occurred. 
11. Unfortunately for the business, the Plaintiff did not retire. He maintained 
an office at the Company headquarters and had access to all company information, freely 
offering advice and direction. At times he served on the Board of Directors or advisory 
boards of AlA Insurance and AlA Services. He has had a standing offer to rejoin the 
Board, as a member or observer, which was reiterated late last year. No information was 
refused to him or his financial advisors. The financial statements of the operating 
companies have been audited by major, independent Certified Public Accountants. 
12. From 1995 to 1997, nearly all of the commissions and revenues of AlA 
Insurance came from the Universe Life Insurance Company and Centennial Life 
Insurance Company. Like much of the U.S. health insurance industry at that time, they 
became impaired as a result of small group reforms, stiffer capital requirements, rapid 
medical cost inflation, and other reasons. By 1997, Universe Life began steps toward 
liquidation, along with the Centennial Life Insurance Company. With the assistance of 
the Idaho Department of Insurance, much of the grower health insurance business was 
transferred to Trustmark Insurance Company, where it remains today. However, much of 
the business lapsed in the intervening years. 
13. During these times, many of the agents and agencies that traditionally 
represented AlA left the company. The plaintiff exacerbated the sales force decline by 
forming a competing company, which further caused the decimation of the company's 
sales force and independent agency system. Plaintiff actually induced AlA agents to 
leave the company and work for plaintiff. 
14. Begimling in 1999, Cro"pUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. was formed to 
explore the possibility of marketing crop insurance to the same client base. CropUSA 
raised funds independently of AlA Insurance to operate, but agreed to assist AlA 
Insurance with overhead and agency costs and to reimburse AlA Insurance for salaries, 
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rent, office space, and other costs when appropriate. AlA and CropUSA plan to work 
together to build a revitalized sales team. In addition to assisting AlA Insurance in 
rebuilding its agency force and sales staff, AlA would receive an exclusive right to 
market health and disability products to CropUSA crop insurance clients. 
15. From 2000 to 2003, the plaintiff and I negotiated and renegotiated the 
terms of the redemption agreement and payment of the interest and principal to plaintiff. 
Finally, after nearly three years, plaintiff decided to keep his note from AlA Insurance, 
forego any equity position in the companies, and have AlA Services accrue any unpaid 
interest. In addition, plaintiff agreed to accept partial interest payments of $15,000 per 
month, plus other payments on his behalf for his pilot and ranch hand of approximately 
$10,000 per month, for a total of nearly $25,000 per month. We agreed that no principal 
was to be paid to plaintiff on his retirement note until the redemption of all the Series A 
Preferred Stock held by Donna Taylor. (See attached Exhibit A) I further agreed to 
guarantee the redemption of Donna Taylor's debt with plaintiff. During this period, I was 
not taking a monthly salary in order to assist in conserving cash. 
16. Additionally, the plaintiff agreed to defer his receipt of the unpaid 
principal and interest on his note until the companies were financially able to be 
restructured and to redeem his note. He was provided written business plans and budgets 
outlining the plans and he agreed to the objectives. When the plan achieved breakeven 
status, at about $35 million in new business placements, the companies could begin 
catching up on accrued interest payments. When the companies achieved $60 million in 
new business placements, the companies would then be able to retire his note and redeem 
all the outstanding preferred shares of AlA Services. 
17. The companies had hoped to achieve the above goals by this time, but 
Plaintiff s interference with various agents and insurers delayed full implementation of 
the agreed plan for at least three years. 
18. In March of 2006, I ordered the plaintiff not to interfere with or contact 
the agents, employees or sales managers of the companies and not to contact any 
commodity association directors. I further isolated all sales managers from the plaintiff s 
demands, directives, and sales tactics. Further, it became apparent that plaintiff would 
not or could not pass his property and casualty license exams and may have been 
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improperly assisting other agents in the solicitation of insurance, so I forbade Plaintiff 
from contacting any farmer for the purpose of soliciting insurance, as required by law. I 
reiterated that demand to him in a letter in February 2007 which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
19. CropUSA has become very successful. I believe it will meet its goals in 
this first year of operation with Clearwater Insurance Company. To date, it has placed 
nearly $20 million in crop insurance business and is on target to achieve over $30 million 
this crop year. In addition, with a rebuilt sales team, other insurers are now interested in 
providing AlA Insurance with new health insurance products. 
20. Plaintiff now wants to benefit from the success of the companies and 
wants to again renegotiate his retirement note. Soon after securing adequate lines of 
credit to rebuild the agency force, the plaintiff has renewed his determination to 
renegotiate so that he can grab an equity interest in addition to the retirement note. The 
acts outlined by the plaintiffs allegations are untrue and colored by his extreme jealousy. 
21. Plaintiff now alleges, as an egregious event of default, that the company 
failed to provide a lock box that diminished his security. In fact, plaintiff consented to 
and was intricately involved in the termination of the lock box agreement by his efforts 
and consent to assist in the transfer of the AlA Insurance block of health insurance 
business in 1997 from Universe Life and Centennial Life insurance companies to 
Trustmark Insurance Company. Trustmark would not allow a lock box requirement. The 
need for the lockbox was discussed with plaintiff and his advisors and it was jointly 
terminated ten years ago as unnecessary and wasteful, especially since AlA began 
collecting all the premiums in Lewiston on behalf of Trustmark. (Prior to the Trustmark 
transfer, the premiums had been collected in Kansas City) 
22. Plaintiff mischaracterizes the August 2004 transaction between CropUSA 
and AlA Insurance of $1.5 million as a transfer. In fact, as reported to plaintiff at the 
time, AlA took advantage of an opportunity to purchase a substantial amount of the 
Preferred Series C stock of AlA Services Corporation from CropUSA at a substantial 
discount to its par value. The Series C stock had been issued originally to assist with the 
payments to the plaintiff under the 1995 agreements. 
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23. Plaintiff has personal knowledge that all payments among the entities 
controlled by me are accounted for and fully balanced during the course of business and 
detailed in the annual audited statements provided to him. The Plaintiff fails to note any 
of the inter-company payables AlA Insurance owes to the other entities. 
24. After 2005, plaintiff ran out of money and demanded additional payments 
from the company, which I repeatedly resisted. Plaintiff has been pressuring the 
company since that time to make additional payments to him outside of our modified 
agreement in order to support his airplanes and lifestyle. 
25. During 2006, the companies arranged a line of credit from a lender for up 
to $15 million dollars. The previous line of credit with Zions bank was not adequate to 
enable the company to grow as fast as outlined by the company business plan. The 
amount of the loan able to be drawn is dependent on the commissions receivable by 
CropUSA and the amount of certificates of deposits posted by shareholders. Begilming 
this year, the borrowing capacity will enable AlA Insurance to begin carrying its plans to 
reintroduce a new medical product to association members. Plaintiff knew of the terms 
of this agreement, received drafts of the agreement, and eagerly anticipated the new line 
because it so increased his prospects of being paid off. 
26. Since the leveraged buyout and retirement plan for the plaintiff, I have 
limited my salary to less than the level agreed to by the 1995 documents, including 
payments made on his behalf AlA Insurance. The plaintiff knows that I did not receive a 
monthly salary in 2001, and intentionally misleads the court to believe otherwise. 
27. Plaintiff further misinforms the court by characterizing a work sheet 
detailing a line item on a CropUSA financial statement as an inappropriate loan from the 
company 401 (k) plan to CropUSA. The plaintiff has been advised and knows that the 
transaction was a purchase of short term mortgages on commercial properties located in 
Minneapolis and Houston, which is entirely permissible, and for an amount substantially 
less than plaintiff alleges. 
28. For over twelve years, as CEO of AlA Insurance and AlA Services, I have 
made the decisions for the operations, development, and management of the companies in 
their overall best interests for all the stakeholders, consistent with sound business 
principles and business judgment. As a Third Party Administrator, agent, and Managing 
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General Underwriter, the company maintains the highest standards of integrity in all its 
transactions. All activities are intricately reviewed in the CPA audits, by government 
auditors, and by financial institution auditors. 
1 (/{I1. 
Dated February C7 0 ., 2007. 
SUBSCRlVED AND SWORN to this .......:d=-<6 ___ day of February, 2007. 
g,U2U < v\ jl UUJOYYQI\!'-
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, 
Residing at Lewiston, therein. 
My Commission Expires: \0- 3,-DCj 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 7 
37~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the 28th day of February, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Ir. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
_____ U.S. MAIL 
____ HAND DELIVERED 
________ OVERNIGHTMUUL 
__ X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Ionathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
Michael E. McNichols 
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Donna Taylor 
3730 Nicklaus Drive 
Clarkston, Wa. 99403 
Dear Ms. Taylor, 
February 27,2001 
AlA is developing a new crop insurance program through a 
new company called CropUSA. We will be filing a Form D stock 
registration for the agencies who join with CropUSA. 
The costs of putting the CropUSA program together in Texas 
have been paid. AlA now needs to launch in five new territories next 
Month. 
AlA requests it be allowed to defer the stock redemption payments 
to you for the next five months. Even though redemption is deferred, AIA.will 
continue to accrue the interest on the interest payments not made. 
AlA will agree to work with you to restructure your payments so your 
redemption payments are converted to other in,come so you can set up a SEP or Defined 
Benefit plan. When you become a consultant, we can add you to the current 
AlA health plan. You will have the option to convert some of your Preferred A 
Stock to CropUSA on the same rate as offered to the C stock 
It will take a few months to set this all up. We will work with your 
Accountant or will introduce you to CPA's here or in Spokane who can set up 
the right tax plan. 
Your preferred A stock has the highest priority, above the payments 
to Reed, the Preferred C, and the common stock .. Reed and John will 
guarantee the deferred payments. 
Sincerely, 
Reed 1. Tay R. John Taylor 
Accepted iLl :sf~ 




February 1, 2007 
Mr. Reed Taylor 
7498 Lapwai Road 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile transmission: 746-1846 
Dear Mr. Taylor: 
111 Main Street· Po. Box 538 




\·\f\.\fVi. CropUSAinsurancc. com 
Recently you requested business cards from Growers National Co-op. I want to remind you 
again that you are not authorized to solicit insurance on behalf of Growers National or CropUSA 
as you do not have a property & casualty insurance license. You CanJ;1ot accompany other agents 
in any meeting in which they may be soliciting new clients. I have let Lynne and Jud know that 
as well. Thank you for your cooperation. 
CropUSAIGrowers National Co-op 
L 
Jolm Taylor 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF HIS EMERGENCY 
MOTION AND MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION OF 
JOHN TAYLOR, AlA INSURANCE, 
AND AlA SERVICES FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits Memorandum of Law in Support of his 
Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to the Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services"), AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance"), and R. 
...J 
c:( 
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John Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction: 
I. BURDEN OF PROOF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PRELMINARY INJUNCTION 
I.R.C.P. 65(e) specifies the grounds for issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. The rule 
provides as follows in pertinent part: 
(e) Grounds for Preliminary Injunction. 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the 
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period 
or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commISSIOn or 
continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, 
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of 
the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual. 
(4) When it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pendency of the 
action, threatens, or is about to remove, or to dispose of the defendant's property 
with intent to defraud the plaintiff, an injunction order may be granted to restrain 
the removal or disposition. 
(5) A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the defendant 
upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of the grounds 
mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided 
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of the plaintiff. 
I.R.C.P.65(e)(1)-(5). 
The party who seeks an injunction has the burden of proving the right thereto. Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984) (citing Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. 
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965)). 
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Under LR. C.P. 65( e)(1), a party is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he demonstrates 
"substantial likelihood of success" at trial. Harris, 106 Idaho at 518. However, the "substantial 
likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that [the moving parties] are entitled to the relief 
they demanded cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from 
doubt." ld. In the present case, Reed Taylor has demonstrated substantial likelihood of success 
at trial based on the evidence presented below, and for the same reasons, the Defendants have 
failed to show any likelihood that they would obtain any relief at trial. 
Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2), the moving party is entitled to a Preliminary Injunction when "it 
appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act during the 
litigation would produce waste or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff" I.R.C.P.65(e)(2). 
A. A Preliminary Injunction Cannot Undo That Which Has Already Been Done. 
No preliminary injunction may be granted for an action that has already been done. 
Cooper v Milam, 256 S.W.2d 196, 201 (1953)(the Bank's vote of shares cannot be enjoined 
because the vote already took place). 
Here, the Defendants John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are seeking a 
Preliminary Injunction to prevent Reed Taylor from voting the pledged shares. Reed Taylor 
provided notices ofms demand to hold a shareholder meeting to replace the board of directors on 
December 12,2006, and January 25, 2007. See Plaintiffs Ex. G and AG.! The Defendants had 
over 60 days to request a TRO or Preliminary Injunction barring Reed Taylor from voting the 
shares, but the Defendants failed to do so. 
III 
I Plaintiffs Exhibits A-X are identical to Exhibits A-X attached to the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor. 
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Pursuant to the right granted to him under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Reed Taylor voted the pledged shares thereby replacing AlA Insurance's board of 
directors, replacing AlA Insurance's officers, terminated John Taylor's employment, and took 
other appropriate board actions. See Plaintiff's Exs. K_L.2 
B. John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction Should Be Denied. 
John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are not entitled to a preliminary injunction 
enjoining Reed Taylor from enforcing the actions rightfully taken through the Consents dated 
February 22,2007, or from voting the pledged shares in the future as he deems appropriate. 
C. Reed Taylor is Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction. 
For the reasons set forth herein and provided at the time of the hearing, Reed Taylor is 
entitled to a preliminary injunction against AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e)(I), (2), (3), or (4).3 
1. No Bond Is Required for Reed Taylor's Preliminary Injunction. 
The Court has the discretion of not requiring a party to post security for a Preliminary 
Injunction. Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho 360, 364, 509 P.2d 579 (1973). 
Because no net costs, damages or attorneys' fees would result in issuing Reed Taylor's 
Preliminary Injunction, the court should not require any security, particularly in light of the $8.1 
Million admittedly owed to Reed Taylor. 
III 
2 AlA Insurance acknowledged Reed Taylor's right to call a meeting to vote the pledged shares. See 
Plaintiff's Ex. AF. 
3 Contrary to allegations made by the Defendants, Reed Taylor specifically cited I.R.C.P. 65 as authority 
for the Court to grant his requested relief in his Emergency Motion in the form of a TRO. 
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Even if the Court believed security was appropriate, no security should be required 
because of the $8.1 Million admittedly owed to Reed Taylor. This argument is further supported 
by the Affidavit of Connie Taylor, where she alleges the appraised value of Connie Taylor and 
John Taylor's majority ownership in AlA Services and Crop USA is a combined $1.5 Million.4 
AlA Services, by and through its Accounting Manager Aimee Gordon, admits that Reed Taylor 
is owed $8,189,614.5 See Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, p. 2, ~ 5. 
Therefore, security should not be required because any amounts which could be allegedly 
owed by Reed Taylor could simply be credited as an offset to the $8.1 Million owed to him.6 
II. AlA SERVICES IS IN NUMEROUS MATERIAL DEFAULTS 
A. Default is Defined by Section 7 of the Amended and Restated Stock Purchase 
Agreement (Pertinent Portions of Sections 7(a), (b), (c), (d), and (g). 
The Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement is clear in that "[a]ny one of the 
following events shall constitute a default by [AIA Services) under this Agreement." See 
Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 7-8, § 7. More recently, Reed Taylor provided written notice of the 
Defendants' various defaults on December 12, 2006. See Plaintiffs Ex. F. Significantly, the 
Defendants have failed to cure the defaults for over 70 days.7 
4 The value of Connie Taylor or John Taylor's shares in AlA Services is irrelevant. Reed Taylor stands as 
by far the single largest creditor of AlA Services and would be entitled to full payment of the $8.1 Million owed to 
him before shareholders would receive a dime. Furthermore, Connie Taylor has no interest in AlA Insurance and 
has no standing to argue against any court action or preliminary injunction granted against AlA Insurance. 
5 Aimee Gordon admits that payment was made on Reed Taylor's $6 Million Note from $307,271 for 
amounts owed by John Taylor. While this transaction is believed to have occurred in or around 2001-2002, it is 
worthy to note that Aimee Gordon did not add additional interest which would have accrued on the $307,271 over 
several years. 
6 Reed Taylor has not audited the amount owed to him and thus any reference in his pleadings is not an 
admission of the amount being correct, but rather an acknowledgment that he believed the amount is over $8 
Million, as may be allocated among the various defendants. 
7 AlA Services right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance terminated years ago upon AlA Services 
insolvency and other material breaches under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 5 
The various events of default, each of which results in the right to vote the pledged shares 
being terminated for AlA Services and irrevocably vested in Reed Taylor, are addressed 
separately in the following 5 sections: 
1. Defaults under Section 7(a) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services is in Default for the failure to pay Reed Taylor "either directly or through 
Bank ... within ten (10) days of the date due any principal or interest under the Amended Down 
Payment Note or $6M Note. See Plaintiff's Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(a). 
Payments of interest must be made monthly and the entire $6,000,000 principal was due 
on August 1, 2005. See Plaintiffs Ex. A, p. 1. Reed Taylor is presently owed $7,889,843 
according to calculations provided by AlA Services, which have been inappropriately altered 
since December 31, 2006.8 See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Exs. 1-2. 
AlA Services is in default, and has been in default, on the monthly interest payments due 
on the $6,000,000 Promissory Note for years. See Plaintiffs Exs. AJ (Exhibit demonstrates that 
over $1,000,000 in accrued past-due interest was owed for years). In addition, AlA Services is 
in default, and has been in default, for the failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due on August 
1,2005. 
III 
8 In the Reed Taylor Long Term Note Account statement provided by John Taylor shortly after January 1, 
2007, AlA Services' shows that $5,692,729 in principal had been due for over 16 months and accrued interest of 
$2,197,114 was also past due. See Plaintiffs Ex. AJ; Affidavit of Roderick Bond, Exs. 1-2. Reed Taylor recently 
discovered that John Taylor had inappropriately extinguished a personal debt of $307,271 owed to AlA Services by 
crediting Reed Taylor's promissory note with a payment by transferring the $307,271 owed by John Taylor to Reed 
Taylor's $6 Million Promissory Note without Reed Taylor's knowledge or consent. After this inappropriate 
transaction was pled in the First Amended Complaint, a new document surfaced showing that the balance of the note 
was revised back to $6,000,000. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond, Exs. 1-2. This inappropriate action is 
acknowledged in the Affidavit of Aimee Gordon, p. 2, ~ 5. 
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2. Defaults under Section 7(b) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services is also in default for the failure of the Bank to transfer the monthly interest 
payments due on the $6,000,000 and the principal balance. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(b). 
The defaults under Section 7(b) are essentially identical to the defaults in Section 7(a) with the 
difference being that the payments were not made by the Banle 
3. Defaults under Section 7(c) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services is, and has been, in default for its failure to comply with Section 4 of the 
Amended and Restated Security Agreement and the Lockbox Agreement. See Plaintiff sEx. C, 
p. 8, § 7(c). Under the terms of the Amended Security Agreement, Reed Taylor was granted the 
exclusive security interest in all commissions earned by AlA Insurance and AIA Services and all 
such commissions were required to be held in trust for Reed Taylor in a designated Lock Box 
Account. See Plaintiffs Ex. 4, p. 2-3, § 4. AlA Insurance and AlA Services have failed to 
comply with Section 4 of the Amended Security Agreement and have refused to advise Reed 
Taylor of the location of the required lock box. See Plaintiffs Ex. F; Affidavit of Roderick 
Bond, ~ 4 and Ex. 3. 
Because AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to comply with the Lock Box 
provision, Reed Taylor is unable to seize AlA Insurance's commissions for which he holds a 
valid security interest. 
4. Defaults under Section 7(d) of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
In addition to the specific events of default listed under Section 7, an event of default also 
occurs upon the breach of any warranty, representation, covenant, term or condition contained in 
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the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement which materially and adversely impairs the 
value of the commission collateral or the pledged shares or Reed Taylor's ability to enforce his 
rights to the commission collateral or pledged shares. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(d). 
An event of default under Section 7(d) has occurred and not been cured under the 
following sections, each of which terminates AlA Services' right to vote the shares and vests the 
right to vote exclusively with Reed Taylor (See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 7, § 6): 
a) Breaches of Section 3. 7(b) of the Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
Under Section 3.7(b), AlA Services is required to fully and punctually perform any duty 
required of it in connection with the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and the commission 
collateral and will not take any action that will impair, damage or destroy such pledged 
collateral. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(d). 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance have utilized funds which Reed Taylor held a valid 
security interest to invest in companies controlled by John Taylor such as Crop USA Insurance 
Agency, Inc., Pacific Empire Communications Corporation, Pacific Empire Holdings 
Corporation, Sound Insurance, and Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. The names of these 
companies appear on various check registers, financial statements and reports issued by AlA 
Services or AlA Insurance. See Plaintiffs Ex. R, U, V, AL-AV. In addition, AlA Services has 
provided free rent, free labor, free costs and other services to other parties to Reed Taylor'S 
detriment. 
For example, in 2004, AlA Insurance purchased Preferred C Shares of AlA Services for 
over $1,500,000. See Plaintiffs Exs. U, AT, AU, and AV. In another example, AlA Insurance 
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guaranteed a $15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance, Inc. and received no 
consideration, no equity, no collateral-nothing in return. Such actions have significantly and 
materially impaired the value of the shares in AlA Insurance and its commissions-both of 
which Reed Taylor has a valid security interest and, in the case of the shares, the right to vote. 
See Plaintiff's Ex. R. 
The above actions, together with the countless loans and equity infusions into the entities 
listed above and all of the breaches of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
constitute an event of default for the impairment of the value of the pledged shares and 
commission collateral. Moreover, AlA Insurance's guarantee of Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc.'s $15,000,000 loan is material breach of AlA Insurance's Bylaws.9 
b) Breaches of Section 4.3 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services has materially breached the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge 
Agreement by failing to provide Reed Taylor with yearly audited financial statements or 
financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. See Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.3. 
AlA Services has not obtained audited financial statements for 2000 through 2006. See 
Plaintiff's Exs. W, X, and AQ-AT. 
III 
1// 
9 "[AlA Insurance) shall not lend money or to use its credit to assist its directors without authorization in 
the particular case by its stockholders." See Plaintiffs Ex. M, p. 22, § 14.1. AlA Services was also in default when 
the $15,000,000 loan for Crop USA was executed by John Taylor in October 2006. 
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c) Breaches of Section 4.4 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services has materially breached the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge 
Agreement by failing to provide Reed Taylor with monthly income statements. See Plaintiffs 
Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.4. 
d) Breaches of Section 4.5 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services is not providing Reed Taylor with weekly summaries of new insurance 
business submitted or with weekly, month-to-date and year-to-date summaries of such new 
business. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.5. 
Reed Taylor is unable to assess the value of the pledged shares and commission collateral 
without the required financial information. 
e) Breaches of Section 4.6 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services is in material breach for failing to provide Reed Taylor with pertinent 
information regarding the collateral accounts which were required to be maintained to protect 
Reed Taylor's security interest. AlA Services has also failed to identify the banks and account 
numbers to Reed Taylor to allow him to take control of the commission collateral. See 
Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.6. Without this information, Reed Taylor has lost his express right to 
obtain the commission collateral in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's accounts to make 
payments on the millions of dollars owed to him. 
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1) Breaches of Section 4.8 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance have been providing loans, funds, labor, services and 
supplies to affiliated companies who are not owned by AlA Services or AlA Insurance. See 
Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.8. As discussed above, there have been significant loans and funds 
diverted to entities controlled by John Taylor. Significantly, John Taylor went so far as to loan 
money to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. by improperly utilizing funds from the AlA 
Services 401 (k) Plan.1O Again, many of these inappropriate loans or conveyances are improper 
and in clear breach of Section 4.8. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.8. 
g) Breaches of Section 4.9 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services agreed to not subject any of Reed Taylor's commISSIon collateral or 
pledged shares to any encumbrance. See Plaintiff sEx. C, p. 6, § 4.9. AlA Services and John 
Taylor improperly had AlA Insurance guarantee a $15,000,000 revolving line-of-credit for Crop 
USA Insurance Agency, Inc. This loan is subjecting AlA Insurance to significant exposure to 
liabilities of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an entity in which AlA Insurance has no equity 
or ownership interest, and AlA Insurance has nothing to gain for guaranteeing such loan. See 
Plaintiffs Ex. Q. 
Significantly, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. is presently in default on the 
$15,000,000 because of AlA Insurance's inability to service its debts. See Plaintiffs Ex. R, p. 
37, § 7.1 (a)-(b ) (among others). Even though AlA Insurance received no consideration for the 
10 Loans such as this, together with other inappropriate investments, constitute John Taylor's breach of 
fiduciary duties under ERISA, as a Trustee of the Plan. 
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loan guarantee and no benefit, Reed Taylor's pledged shares and commission collateral are now 
impaired because of the guarantee and the likelihood that AlA Insurance will be forced to seek a 
termination of the guarantee under Reed Taylor's direction. 
b) Breaches of Section 4.10 of Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. 
AlA Services was required to allow Reed Taylor or a party designated by him to act as a 
member of the board of directors until his $6,000,000 Promissory Note was paid in full, plus 
accrued interest. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 6, § 4.10. AlA Services has breached its obligation to 
ensure Reed Taylor or his designee is a member of the board since 2001, which was the last year 
Reed Taylor was a member of the Board of Directors of AlA Services. See Plaintiff sEx. AKII 
Although Reed Taylor demanded to be placed upon the board on December 12, 2006 
(See Plaintiffs Ex. F), AlA Services has refused to honor this significant obligation. AlA 
Services failure to ensure that Reed Taylor was a member of the board and the failure to hold 
board meetings constitute an event of default and further prevented Reed Taylor from having 
knowledge of the transfers, advances, and loans which are now subject to claims set forth in the 
First Amended Complaint. 
i) If the Breaches Identified in Subsections (a)-(i) Above Do Not 
Constitute Defaults, the Combination of All of Them Are a 
Material Event of Default. 
If the events of default listed in Sections 4(a)-(h) are not each individually viewed as 
default by the Court, the cumulative effect of all of the above defaults also result in an event of 
11 Although Reed Taylor was listed as a member of the board of directors of AlA Services for 2001, he was 
not invited to or present at any board meetings. 
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default. 
5. Section 7(g) Defaults. 
If either ALA Services or ALA Insurance becomes insolvent, then such insolvency 
constitutes an event of default. See Plaintiffs Ex. C, p. 8, § 7(g). ALA Services has been 
insolvent for years. See Plaintiffs Exs. AJ, AL-AT.12 
III. REED TAYLOR WAS AND IS ENTITLED TO VOTE THE SHARES OF AlA 
INSURANCE WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE FROM THE DEFENDANTS 
Section 6 of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, entered into as of July 
1, 1996, provides in pertinent part: 
So long as no Default under this Agreement has occurred and is continuing, [ALA 
Services] shall be entitled to exercise any voting rights incident to the Pledged 
Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance J . . . . Upon the occurrence and 
continuation of a Default, [ALA Insurance's] right to exercise such voting rights 
shall immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights with respect to the 
Pledged Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance] shall rest solely and 
exclusively in [Reed Taylor]. The foregoing sentence shall constitute a grant to 
[Reed Taylor] an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged 
Collateral [all of the shares of ALA Insurance] upon the occurrence and 
continuation of such a Default, and any officer of.. . [ALA Insurance] ... may rely 
on written notice from [Reed Taylor] as to the existence of a Default and [Reed 
Taylor's] right to vote such Pledged Collateral [all of the shares of ALA 
Insurance] . 
(Emphasis added.) See Plaintiffs Ex. C. 
Based upon the multiple Defaults addressed above, Reed Taylor was at all material times 
entitled to vote the shares of ALA Insurance. 
At the time the original Share Pledge Agreement was executed and at the time the 
12 A "debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets, at a fair 
valuation" or a debtor is also insolvent if he "is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due." See I.e. 
§ 55-911(1)-(2). 
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Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement was executed, 10hn Taylor executed, on behalf 
of AlA Services, Assignments Separate From Certificates, Exhibits A-3 to the respective 
Agreements, which Assignments assigned and transferred all of the common stock of AlA 
Insurance to Reed Taylor. The Assignments provide: 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned [AlA Services] hereby assigns and 
transfers to REED J. TAYLOR 6,219 shares of the cornmon stock standing in the 
name of [AlA Services] on the books of AIA Insurance, Inc. and represented by 
Certificate(s) No. 10 and 11 herewith, and hereby irrevocably constitutes and 
appoints the Secretary of AlA Insurance, Inc. as attorney to transfer that stock on 
the books of such corporate with full power of substitution in the premises. This 
Assignment is made pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Agreement 
dated as the date hereof and in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement 
dated July 22, 1995, between [AlA Services] and Reed 1. Taylor, and may be used 
to transfer the above-described shares of stock after a Default as such is defined 
under said Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement. 
See Plaintiff's Exs. C-D. 
On two occasions, Reed Taylor scheduled meetings of the shareholder of AlA 
Insurance, himself. By letter of December 12, 2006, from attorney Patrick Moran, Reed 
Taylor advised John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, that AlA Services was, and had 
been for some time, in Default under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, among 
other Agreements. Mr. Moran's letter further detailed the various Defaults, and stated: 
Mr. Taylor intends to exercise all voting rights with respect to the Pledged 
Collateral, including, without limitation, election of a revised board of 
directors .... 
Pursuant to this right, Mr. Taylor formally demands as follows: 
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2. AlAI call a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing a 
new board of directors. Mr. Taylor demands that the special shareholder meeting 
occur at the corporate office located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, at 1 pm 
on December 26, 2006. Mr. Taylor shall be attending along with counsel. 
Attached hereto is the notice as provided in I.e. § 30-1-702. The purpose of the 
special meeting of shareholders will be to take action to elect a revised board of 
directors. Immediately after the meeting, the newly elected board shall conduct a 
meeting to elect revised officers of AlAI. 
See Plaintiff's Ex. F. 
Accompanying Mr. Moran's letter was a Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders 
dated December 12,2006, signed by Reed Taylor. See Plaintiff's Ex. G. 
Defendant John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, responded to Mr. Moran's letter by 
his letter of December 21,2006, See Plaintiff's Ex. AE. In his letter, John Taylor stated: 
We acknowledge that Reed Taylor has a security interest in AlA Insurance, Inc. 
and may have the right to take the actions outlined in your letter. 
John Taylor further clearly acknowledged in his letter that he understood that Reed 
Taylor intended to vote all of the shares of AlA Insurance to remove the company's Directors. 
In closing, John Taylor stated: 
The offices of AlA will be closed on December 26, 2006, for the holidays and no 
one is authorized to use the facility without permission. 
By letter of January 3, 2007, Plaintiff's Ex. AF, John Taylor further corresponded with 
Patrick Moran, attorney for Reed Taylor. In his letter, John Taylor acknowledged that he fully 
understood Reed Taylor's intentions with regard to a special shareholder meeting and removal of 
the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance when he stated: 
III 
I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, 
including calling a special shareholders meeting. 
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On February 1,2007, Reed Taylor caused to be delivered to the offices of AlA Insurance 
a second Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, Plaintiffs Ex. AG, this time scheduling the 
meeting for 10 a.m. on February 5,2007, at the offices of AlA Insurance. As with the December 
12,2006, Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, this Notice stated: 
The purpose of the special meeting of shareholders will be to take action to elect a 
revised Board of Directors. Immediately after the meeting, the newly elected 
Board shall conduct a meeting to elect new officers of AlA. 
At all times, Defendants John Taylor, AlA Services, and AlA Insurance were fully aware 
and had been advised in writing of the December 26, 2006, and February 5, 2007, meetings of 
shareholders scheduled by Reed Taylor to dismiss the existing Board of Directors, appoint a new 
Board, and thereafter elect new officers of AlA Insurance. 
As indicated in Mr. Moran's December 12, 2006, letter, See Plaintiffs Ex. F, Reed 
Taylor was providing notices of special meetings of shareholders in accordance with I.e. § 30-1-
702 (1)(b) which provides pertinent part: 
(1) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders: 
*** 
(b) If the holders of at least twenty percent (20%) of all the votes entitled to be 
cast on any issue proposed to be considered at the proposed special meeting sign, 
date and deliver to the corporation (1) or more written demands for the meeting 
describing the purpose or purposes for which it is to be held .... 
Despite the fact that Reed Taylor held 100% of the votes entitled to be cast, he was 
denied a meeting by Defendants purporting act on behalf of AlA Insurance. 
It is noteworthy that in addition to the very clear direction contained in section 6 of the 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, See Plaintiffs Ex. C, executed on behalf of 
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AlA Services by John Taylor, section 11.2(a) of the same Agreement provides: 
[AlA Services] will sign such additional documents relating to the Pledged 
Collateral [all shares of AlA Insurance] as [Reed Taylor] may reasonably request 
in order to provide [Reed Taylor] with the full benefit of this Agreement. [AIA 
Services] hereby grants to [Reed Taylor] a power of attorney to execute any such 
documents as [AlA Services'] attorney-in-fact. Such power of attorney is coupled 
with an interest and shall be irrevocable until the Secured Obligations have been 
fully and finally paid. 
In response to Reed Taylor's second Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders, 
scheduling a meeting at the corporation's offices for February 5, 2007, JoLee Duclos, purporting 
to act as Secretary for AlA Insurance, responded by letter of February 1,2007, Plaintiffs Ex. H, 
which letter was drafted by Chicago counsel for John Taylor, James Gatziolis, of the firm of 
Quarles & Brady LLP. Mr. Gatziolis' authorship of the letter is evidenced by the legend in the 
lower lefthand comer. By this letter, this Ms. Duclos advised Mr. Taylor that the sole 
stockholder of AlA Insurance was AlA Services, and that only the Board of Directors or 
shareholders holding at least 20% of the stock could call a special meeting of the shareholders. 
Ms. Duclos further requested that Reed Taylor provide evidence of his authority. In closing, Ms. 
Duclos stated: 
Please do not enter the Corporation's premises at the time above stated. You will 
not be granted access to the Corporation's offices nor will a meeting of the 
Stockholders occur at such time. 
Reed Taylor responded to Ms. Duclos' letter the same day by letter dated February 1, 
2007, hand delivered to her at AlA Insurance's office. See Plaintiffs Ex. 1. In his letter, Reed 
Taylor provided Ms. Duclos with the evidence of his authority she had requested in her letter. 
Reed Taylor next wrote to the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance on February 2,2007. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. 1. In his letter, Reed Taylor reiterated his demand for a special shareholder 
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meeting to be held February 5, 2007. He further advised in his letter of his intention to vote the 
shares pledged to him to appoint new directors and officers. 
After Defendants had repeatedly thwarted his efforts to schedule a special shareholder 
meeting, Reed Taylor elected, as the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, to execute a Consent In 
Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, by which he removed the existing 
Directors and elected himself as the sole Director. See Plaintiff sEx. K. Thereafter, Reed 
Taylor executed a Consent In Lieu of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, and 
removed the existing officers of the corporation, and appointed himself as the President, 
Secretary and Treasurer. See Plaintiffs Ex. L. Copies of both Consents were faxed to the 
offices of counsel for John Taylor on the morning of February 25,2007. See Plaintiffs Ex. A W. 
Reed Taylor'S actions in executing the two Consents were justified not only by the prior 
wrongful conduct of John Taylor, but by Reed Taylor'S rights as the sole shareholder of AlA 
Insurance, who, pursuant to LC. § 30-1-706 (1), had the right to waive any notice required by 
Idaho's Corporations Act. 
Although Reed Taylor had hoped that John Taylor would facilitate a peaceful transition 
of the management of AlA Insurance, such has not been the case, as John Taylor has continued 
to thwart his brother's rights and efforts at every instance. 
Reed Taylor's actions in executing the Consents were further authorized by the Articles 
of Incorporation of AlA Insurance, formally knows as A.LA., Inc. Article Ten of the 
corporation's Articles ofIncorporation, See Plaintiffs Ex. Y, provides in pertinent part: 
(3) Any and all of the Directors of the Corporation may be removed at any time, 
with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the issued and outstanding 
voting stock of the corporation. 
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(4) The Board of Directors is especially authorized to remove at any time, with or 
without cause, any officers of the corporation. 
John Taylor has previously argued in his Declaration In Support of Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order that Reed Taylor cannot vote AlA Insurance's shares because they 
have not been transferred into his name. The basis for this argument is Section 3.9 of the Bylaws 
of AlA Insurance, Plaintiffs Ex. M, which provides: 
A stockholder whose shares are pledged shall be entitled to vote such shares until 
the shares have been transferred into the name of the pledgee .... 
It is noteworthy that the statute reference stated in the Bylaws for the above noted provision has 
been repealed, and is no longer in existence. 
All of the shares of AlA Insurance were assigned and transferred into Reed Taylor's 
name on July 22, 1995. See Plaintiffs Exs. D and E (Assignments Separate from Certificates). 
By each Assignment, John Taylor, on behalf of AlA Services, stated that AlA Services "hereby 
assigns and transfers to REED J. TAYLOR 6,279 shares of the common stock standing in the 
name of the undersigned on the books of AlA Insurance, Inc and represented by Certificate(s) 
No. 10 and 11 herewith .... " The shares are all of the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance and 
such shares were assigned and transferred into the name of Reed Taylor on July 22, 1995. 
Defendants' argument cannot defeat Reed Taylor's contractually proved voting rights 
contained in Section 6 of the Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement, Plaintiff sEx. C, signed 
on behalf of AlA Services by John Taylor. Reed Taylor was provided by such section with "an 
irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged Collateral upon the occurrence 
and continuation of such a Default, and any officer of. .. [AlA Insurance] ... may rely on written 
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notice from [Reed Taylor] as to the existence of a Default and [Reed Taylor's] right to vote [the 
shares of AlA Insurance]." See Plaintiffs Ex. C., p. 7, § 6. 
Even if the Defendants contended that the shares had to be transferred on the books of 
AlA Insurance into the name of Reed Taylor, which contention they do not make, and which is 
not supportable, Defendants cannot thwart Reed Taylor'S entitlement to vote the shares pledged 
to him pursuant to section 6 of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement by their own 
actions in failing to transfer the stock on the books of the Corporation. 
Reed Taylor's position is further supported by case law dealing with similar situations. 
DeFelice v. Garon, 380 S.2d. 676 (La. App. 1980) involved a situation where pledgees were 
contractually granted the unqualified right to vote the shares of stock pledged to them. The 
Court distinguished other cases and stated: 
The present case, however, does not involve a mere pledgee, but rather a pledgee 
upon whom the owner of the stock has expressly conferred by contract the right to 
vote the shares. Since R.S. 12: 75D requires a transfer on the books of the 
Corporation to entitle the pledgee to vote the shares, the contract expressly 
granting the pledgee the right to vote the shares can only be interpreted 
reasonably as implicitly granting the pledgee the right to obtain a transfer of the 
shares upon the books of the Corporation. 
(Emphasis added.) DeFelice, 380 S.2d at 678. 
The Court continued and stated: 
The right to vote the shares (a right not necessarily accorded to a mere pledgee) 
could hardly have been more clearly conferred, and with this right the pledgee 
necessarily is given the right to take the formal steps necessary to accomplish 
utilization of that right. 
DeFelice, 380 S.2d at 678. 
III 
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Also on point is Valley International Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones, Inc., 568 SW.2d 
680 (Tex. App. 1978). In this case, the court held that a shareholder had a protectable property 
interest in the corporation even though its stock was not registered or transferred on the books of 
the corporation, and such shareholders should have been able to protect such interest by 
demanding shareholders' meetings. In rendering its decision, the court stated: 
The requirement that shares be registered is intended for the protection of the 
corporation so that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive dividends, and 
otherwise participate in other managerial functions. 
Valley International Properties, 568 S.W.2d at 687. 
No such difficulty is present here. There is no question that Reed Taylor is the only 
person entitled to vote the shares of AlA Insurance. This is made clear not only by section 6 of 
the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, but also by the Assignments Separate from 
Certificates. Similarly, there is absolutely no question that AlA Services' rights to vote the shares 
terminated long before Reed Taylor exercised his right to vote the shares. See Plaintiffs Ex. C., 
p. 7, § 6 ("Upon the occurrence and continuation of a Default, [AlA Services'] right to exercise 
voting rights shall immediately cease and terminate ... ). 
Finally, any contention that AlA Insurance's shares pledged to Reed Taylor must first be 
transferred on the books of the Corporation before Reed Taylor is entitled to vote them has been 
waived by both John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance by the documents executed at the 
time these shares were pledged to Reed Taylor, including the Amended and Restated Stock 
Pledge Agreement. In addition, Defendants are further estopped by their conduct to make such 
contention. John Taylor acknowledged in his letter of December 21, 2006, to Patrick Moran, 
Plaintiffs Ex. AE, that Reed Taylor had the right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance to oust the 
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Directors. John Taylor acknowledged the same when he stated in his letter of January 3, 2007, to 
Patrick Moran "I fully recognize that Mr. Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, 
including calling a special shareholders meeting." See Plaintiff's Ex. AF. 
A. AlA Services Has Waived and is Estopped from Contending Shares Must First 
be Transferred on the Books of Corporation and From Asserting Any Other 
Defense Under the Bylaws. 
AlA Insurance's Bylaws may be altered or amended. See Plaintiff's Ex. M, p. 22, § 13.1. 
AlA Insurance's Board of Directors consented to the rights granted to Reed Taylor in the 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. See Plaintiff's Ex. AC and Schedule III 
thereto. Moreover, a corporation's bylaws may be amended or waived by an informal action of 
the board of directors. Hernandez v. Banco De Leas Americas, 116 Ariz. 552, 555, 570 P.2d 494 
(1977)( approval of a contract by the directors constituted an informal waiver of the Bylaws). 
Because the directors approved the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, any 
inconsistencies between the rights granted to Reed Taylor and the Bylaws constitute a waiver of 
the Bylaws. 
IV. THE TERMS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 
WERE NOT ORALLY MODIFIED BY THE PARTIES 
A. Terms of Promissory Note 
1. Oral Modification of the Terms of a Promissory Note is Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-505(5) 
Each of the relevant Agreements, including the Promissory Note and the Stock Pledge 
Agreements, contain clauses which bar subsequent oral modifications of the Agreements. All 
modifications or amendments of the Agreements must be in writing to be enforceable. 
III 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 22 
Below are the relevant clauses which reqUIre that all future modifications to the 
Agreements be in writing: 
ORAL AGREEMENTS OR ORAL COMMITMENTS TO LOAN MONEY, 
EXTEND CREDIT, OR TO FORBEAR FROM ENFORCING 
REPAYMENT OF A DEBT ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER IDAHO 
LAW. 
See Plaintiff s Ex. A (promissory Note, dated August 1, 1995). 
The provisions of this Agreement may be amended only by the written agreement 
of Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder and Creditor. Except as otherwise 
provided herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character 
on the part of either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of any 
provision or condition of this Agreement must be made in writing and shall be 
effective only to the extent specifically set forth in such writing. ... The waiver 
by either Company, Series A Preferred Shareholder or Creditor of a breach of this 
provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any 
subsequent breach. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. B (Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, dated July 1, 1996). 
No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or 
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No 
waiver of Secured Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. C (Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, dated July 1, 
1996). 
No prOVISIOn of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or 
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the party sought to be charged with 
the amendment, modification, waiver or supplementation. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. E (Amended and Restated Security Agreement, dated July 1, 1996). 
Amendments and Waivers. The provisions of this agreement may be amended 
only by the written agreement of the parties hereto. Except as otherwise provided 
herein, any waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or character on the 
part of either party of any provision or condition of this Agreement must be made 
in writing and shall be effective only to the extent specifically set forth in such 
writing. No action take pursuant to this Agreement, including any investigation 
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by or on behalf either party, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by the party 
taking such action of compliance with any representation, warranty, covenant or 
agreement contained herein. The waiver by any party hereto of a breach of any 
provision of this Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any 
subsequent breach. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. Z (Stock Redemption Agreement, dated July 22, 1995). 
No provision of this Agreement may be amended, modified, waived, or 
supplemented, except by a writing signed by the parties to this Agreement. No 
waiver by Secured Party of any default shall be a waiver of any other default. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. AA (Stock Pledge Agreement, dated July 22,1995). 
This Agreement and the other written documents, instruments and agreements 
entered into in connection with the Secured Obligations contain the complete and 
final expression of the entire agreement of the parties. No provision of this 
Agreement may be amended, modified, waived or supplemented, except by a 
writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the amendment, 
modification, waiver or supplementation. No waiver by Secured Party of any 
Default shall be a waiver of any other Default. 
See Plaintiffs Ex. AB (Security Agreement, dated July 22, 1995). 
B. Oral Modification of the Terms of a Promissory Note is Barred by the 
Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-505(5). 
Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, agreements to lend money must be in writing to be 
enforceable. I.e. § 9-505(5) provides as follows in pertinent part: 
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the \vriting or 
secondary evidence of its contents: 
* * * 
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in an 
original principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a 
person or entity engaged in the business of lending money or extending credit. 
I.e. § 9-505(5). 
The subject Promissory Note falls within the statute of frauds as a commitment to lend 
money of $50,000 or more. Therefore, the terms of the $6 Million Promissory Note must be in 
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writing to be enforceable pursuant to I.C. § 9-505(5). 
The $6 Million Promissory Note (See Plaintiff's Ex. A) falls within the Statute of Frauds 
as a commitment to lend money of $50,000 or more. Therefore, any modifications to the terms 
of the $6 Million Promissory Note must be in writing to be enforceable pursuant to I.C. § 9-
505(5). 
Idaho Courts have recognized that any subsequent oral modifications of commitments to 
lend money are barred by the Statute of Frauds. In USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First National 
Bank, 120 Idaho 271, 815 P.2d 469 (1991), the plaintiff, USA Fertilizer, attempted to argue that 
the lender, Idaho First, had orally modified the length of the terms of a written commitment to 
lend money. The Idaho Court of Appeals summarily dismissed USA Fertilizer's argument of an 
oral modification of the written document. The Court held that "to the extent that USA Fertilizer 
seeks to argue the evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we hold that such an 
oral modification would be barred under the statute of frauds." USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho at 275. 
The holding of the Court in USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho 271 is directly analogous to the 
present case. It is anticipated that the Defendants will argue that the terms of the Promissory 
Note have been modified by subsequent oral agreements between the parties. To the extent that 
Defendants assert this argument, their argument fails under the Statute of Frauds and the holding 
in USA Fertilizer. 
C. Even if the Court finds the Statute of Frauds Inapplicable, Defendants 
Cannot Meet Their Burden of Proving Oral Modification by Clear and 
Convincing Evidence 
In the event Defendants argue that USA Fertilizer and the Statute of Frauds for 
Promissory Notes is inapplicable, they are nonetheless unable to prove an oral modification to 
the $6 Million Promissory Note or any other written documents entered into between the parties. 
III 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 25 
J9i H 
While it is true that some courts have recognized that a party may orally modify a written 
contract, in limited circumstances, the party asserting the oral modification has a difficult burden. 
See e.g., Scott v. Castle, 105 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163 (1983). "The party asserting an oral 
modification of a written contract has the burden of proving the modification by clear and 
convincing evidence." Scott, 105 Idaho at 724 (citing Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116,645 P.2d 
350 (1982). In Scott, the appellant, Scott, entered into a purchase and sale agreement and note 
with Castle to purchase real property. The purchase and sale agreement and note contained 
provisions requiring that Scott make five annual payments of equal amount. Scott attempted to 
argue that the parties had orally agreed to defer payments under the purchase and sale agreement 
and note by contending the parties had a separate oral agreement and that Castle had acquiesced 
in demanding payments. The court rejected Scott's argument holding that Castle had not met its 
difficult burden of proving an oral modification by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 724. 
In the present case, even if the Court finds that the Statute of Frauds does not preclude an 
oral modification to the Promissory Note or other documents between the parties, Defendants 
have not produced sufficient evidence of an oral modification. 
V. MICHAEL McNICHOLS AND HIS FIRM ARE BARRED BY RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FROM REPRESENTING AlA INSURANCE, 
AlA SERVICES, AND JOHN TAYLOR DUE TO THE CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST BETWEEN SUCH PERSONS AND ENTITIES13 
A. RPC 1.7 Requires Mr. McNichols and His Firm From Representing AlA 
Insurance, AlA Services and R. John Taylor. 
Michael McNichols and the firm of Clements Brown & McNichols have formally 
appeared as counsel of record in this matter for Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc. and John Taylor. John Taylor is an officer and director of AlA Services and AlA 
13 Mr. McNichols and his firm have also been terminated as counsel for AlA Insurance by Reed Taylor's 
letter dated February 25, 2007, Plaintiffs Ex. N, which letter followed Reed Taylor assuming control of AlA 
Insurance pursuant to the Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Plaintiffs Ex. K. 
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Insurance, and is also the majority shareholder of AlA Services. Mr. McNichols' triple 
representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and John Taylor in this lawsuit is conflict of 
interest and not permitted under RPC 1.7. 
Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct provide as follows, with respect to conflicts 
between current clients: 
RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of 
interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former 
client or a third person or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including 
family and domestic relationships. 
RPC 1.7. 
The conflict that exists in Mr. McNichols representation of AlA Insurance, AlA Services, 
and John Taylor arises from the complaint filed by Reed Taylor. The complaint filed by Reed 
Taylor alleges fraud and self-dealing committed by John Taylor against the corporations. See 
First Amended Complaint, p. 13. In addition, AlA Services has numerous shareholders who 
may have claims against John Taylor and/or AlA Services may have claims against John Taylor. 
See Plaintiff's Ex. AX (list of shareholders of AlA Services). Moreover, Reed Taylor is the 
single largest creditor of AlA Services. See Plaintiff's Exs. AJ, AL-A T. Because the interests of 
the corporations are in direct conflict with the interests each other and those of John Taylor, Mr. 
McNichol's representation of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor is a conflict of 
interest under RPC 1.7. 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT IDS MOTIONS AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION - 27 
39t S 
Courts and commentators have consistently stated that an attorney cannot represent an 
officer or director and the corporation when allegations of fraud are made against the officer or 
director. Law of Corp. Officers & Dir.: Indemn. & Ins. § 4:5 (2006) ("An attorney may not 
represent both the board of directors and the corporation where the directors are alleged to have 
committed fraud."); Forrest v. Baeza, 58 Cal. App. 4th 65, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 (1st Dist. 1997) 
(An attorney may not represent both corporation and directors in a shareholder suit where the 
directors are alleged to have committed fraud.); Musheno v. Gensemer, 897 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. 
Pa. 1995) (An attorney representing a corporation and its board of directors in a shareholder suit 
would be disqualified from representing a corporation, where the complaint alleged fraud and 
self-dealing by directors, revealing a clear divergence of interests between a corporation and its 
directors). Similarly, Reed Taylor has alleged fraud and self-dealing committed by John Taylor 
against the corporations and, thus, Mr. McNichols cannot represent the corporations and John 
Taylor due to their conflicting interests. 
Although Idaho courts have not addressed the issue of conflicts of interest during the dual 
representation of an officer or director and a corporation, Idaho courts have held that the a 
motion to disqualify is proper if there is a conflict of interest that bars representation. "The 
decision to grant or to deny a motion to disqualify counsel is within the discretion of the trial 
court." Crown v. Hawkins Co., 128 Idaho 114,910 P.2d 786 (1996) (citing Weaver v. Millard, 
120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1991)). In Crown, the court denied the party's 
motion to disqualify opposing counsel when it was made three weeks before the trial date. Id. at 
122, 910 P.2d at 794. The court in Crown held that "a motion to disqualify opposing counsel 
should be filed at the onset of the litigation, or 'with promptness and reasonable diligence' once 
the facts upon which the motion is based have become known." Id. at 123,910 at 795 (quoting 
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Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698,819 P.2d at 116). 
In contrast to Crown and Weaver, Reed Taylor has brought this motion to disqualify at 
the onset of litigation. The trial date has not been scheduled and all Defendants have not 
answered the First Amended Complaint. Given the lack of prejudice to Defendants John Taylor, 
AlA Insurance, and AlA Services and the conflict that exists between John Taylor and the 
corporations, the Court should disqualify Mr. McNichols from representing the conflicted 
parties.14 15 
VI. REED TAYLOR IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES DUE TO 
WRONGFUL ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
If a party is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained, the wrongfully 
restrained party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. I.R.C.P.65(c). 
Here, John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance have wrongfully restrained Reed 
Taylor from exercising his right to vote the shares in AlA Insurance to replace the Board of 
Directors, replace the officers and take such other actions he deems appropriate, as were the 
rights irrevocably provided to him under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement. 
Reed Taylor is entitled to an award of his attorneys' fees and costs to be paid in whole or in part 
from the $10,000 cash bond posted by John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance. 
II/ 
14 Jonathan Hally of the firm Clark and Feeney has appeared and filed an Answer on behalf of Connie 
Taylor in this action. Connie Taylor and Clark and Feeney are presently representing Reed Taylor in a pending 
action. Clark and Feeney and its lawyers are also precluded from representing Connie Taylor under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and time does not permit this issue to be briefed and heard at the scheduled hearing. Reed 
Taylor will move to disqualify Clark and Feeney and its attorneys as soon as practical. 
15 Reed Taylor recognizes that until he determines how he will proceed with his security interest in the 
pledged shares he will retain independent counsel for AIA Insurance. Obviously, this issue will be moot should 
Reed Taylor elected to sell the shares at a public or private sell or purchase the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance 
himself through a public or private sale by crediting his purchase price against the over $8 Million owed to him. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion, without bond or security, deny the 
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and award Reed Taylor attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED: This 28th day of February, 2007. 
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AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By: ----
Roderic 
Paul sman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of the Reed J. Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Support of Emergency Motion and 
Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants R. John Taylor, AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
AlA Services Corporation's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs Exhibits Volume I, 
and Plaintiffs Exhibits Volume II on the following person(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John 
Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 28th day of February, 2007, at Lewiston, Id,..,... __ ?--_ 
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COOPER v. MILAMTex.Civ.App. 1953 
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Waco. 
COOPER 
v. 
MILAM et al. 
No. 3080. 
March 5, 1953. 
Suit to enJoIn a bank, which held stock in a 
corporation as independent executor of estate of a 
deceased, from voting such shares in favor of a 
partial capital liquidating dividend, and for other 
relief. The District Court, McLennan County, D. Y. 
McDaniel, J., entered an interlocutory order 
refusing to grant temporary injunction and plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Hale, A. J., 
held that cause of action was moot. 
Order in accordance with opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Injunction 212 ~135 
212 Injunction 
212IV Preliminary and Interlocutory Injunctions 
212IV(A) Grounds and Proceedings to 
Procure 
212IV(A)1 In General 
212kI35 k. Discretion of Court. Most 
Cited Cases 
Generally trial judge, in exercise of his equitable 
powers to grant or refuse application for temporary 
injunction pendente lite, is vested with wide latitude 
of sound judicial discretion. 
[2] Appeal and Error 30 ~954(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k950 Provisional Remedies 
30k954 Injunction 
30k954(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 ~954(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 




30k954(2) k. Refusing Injunction. 
Most Cited Cases 
Generally on appeal from action of trial judge in 
exercising his equitable powers to grant or refuse 
application for temporary injunction pendente lite, 
reviewing court should not disturb action of trial 
court unless record on appeal shows that such 
action constituted an abuse of discretion. 
[3} Action 13 ~6 
13 Action 
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent 
13k6 k. Moot, Hypothetical or Abstract 
Questions. Most Cited Cases 
Where bank, which held stock in corporation as 
independent executor of estate of a decedent, had 
voted such stock in favor of a partial capital 
liquidating dividend, and corporation and its 
president had counted such vote, cause of action for 
temporary injunction to prohibit bank from voting 
the stock in favor of partial liquidating dividends 
and to prohibit corporation and its president from 
counting such vote or from paying dividends, was 
moot, even though trustee had not accepted 
liquidating dividends and vote was cast without 
representation that bank had right to cast vote. 
*197 Naman, Howell & Boswell, Waco, for 
appellant. 
Witt, Terrell, Jones & Riley, Waco, for appellees. 
HALE, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the 
trial court refusing to grant appellant a temporary 
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injunction. As plaintiff in the court below, 
appellant sought to enjoin the Citizens National 
Bank of Waco from voting 1,600 shares of stock in 
the Cooper Company in favor of a partial capital 
liquidating dividend in the amount of $366,000. 
The Bank held the stock as independent executor of 
the estate of E. C. Barrett, deceased. Appellant also 
sought to enjoin the Cooper Company and its 
president, J. R. Milam, Jr., from counting any vote 
cast by the Bank as executor of the estate of E. C. 
Barrett in favor of such liquidating dividend, and to 
enjoin the Cooper Company and its president from 
paying such dividend. In addition to his prayer for 
a temporary injunction, appellant also prayed that 
upon final hearing the temporary injunction sought 
by him be made permanent, that certain action 
theretofore taken by the board of directors of the 
Cooper Company in declaring a prior dividend be 
cancelled, set aside and held for naught and that 
judgment be rendered in favor of the corporation 
against the said J. R. Milam, Jr., in the sum of 
$338,832 and interest, and for damages and costs of 
court and for such other and further relief as he 
might show himself entitled to. 
Appellant's application for a temporary injunction 
came on for hearing in the court below on 
December 3, 1952 and after the evidence thereon 
had been adduced the court refused the same, 
appellant duly excepted, gave notice of appeal, filed 
appeal bond and caused a record of the proceedings 
to be filed in this Court on December 17, 1952. 
Appellant's brief was filed here on January 2, 1953, 
his appeal being predicated upon the following 
point of error: 
'The trial court erred ill refusing to grant the 
temporary injunction in this case because the 
Citizens National Bank of Waco has no right as 
independent pendent executor of the estate of E. C. 
Barrett, deceased, to vote the 1,600 shares of the 
Barrett stock in The Cooper Company in the 
proposed stockholders' meeting to vote on a partial 
capital liquidating dividend.' 
On January 6, 1953, J. R. Milam, Jr., and the 
Cooper Company filed their motion herein to 
dismiss the cases on appeal on the ground that the 
acts which appellant sought to enjoin had been 
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accomplished since the hearing in the court below 
and hence his application for injunctive relief had 
become moot. From the recitals in the verified 
motion of appellees to dismiss, it appears that on 
December 3, 1952, after the trial court had denied 
appellant's application for a temporary injunction, a 
meeting of the stockholders of the Cooper Company 
was had at which the Citizens National Bank of 
Waco, as executor of the estate of E. C. Barrett, 
voted the 1,600 shares of stock held by it in favor of 
the partial capital liquidating dividend in the 
amount of $366,000. It also appears that the 
Cooper Company and its president, J. R. Milam, Jr., 
counted the votes cast by the Bank at the meeting of 
the stockholders, the proper officers and directors 
of the corporation certified to the Secretary of State 
that the partial capital liquidating dividend had been 
passed by vote of more than two-thirds of the 
stockholders of the corporation and the proposed 
charter amendment reducing the corporation's 
capital stock in accordance with the action so taken 
by its stockholders, was approved by the Secretary 
of State. The motion to dismiss has been carried 
along with the appealed cause which is now under 
submission on written briefs and oral arguments of 
the parties. 
*198 Appellant filed his original verfied petition in 
the court below on December 1, 1952. He alleged 
therein, among other things, that he was the owner 
of 570 shares of stock in the Cooper Company; that 
E. C. Barrett was the owner of 1,600 shares of stock 
in the corporation at the time of his death on May 
30, 1952, and by the terms of his will the stock was 
bequeathed to appellant as trustee for the benefit of 
certain other persons as set forth in the will; that on 
July 19,1952, a judgment was rendered in the court 
below in favor of the Cooper Company against J. R. 
Milam, Jr., in the amount of $297,897.93 and in 
order to pay said judgment the said J. R. Milam, Jr., 
borrowed such sum from some third party and 
under the terms of his loan obligated himself to vote 
his stock in the Cooper Company and to obtain the 
votes of other directors in favor of an irrevocable 
dividend, either ordinary or by way of partial 
liquidation of the corporation, and to pledge such 
dividend to secure his personal loan; that the said J. 
R. Milam, Jr. in order the fulfill his agreement and 
contrary to the best interests of the Cooper 
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Company, had the directors of the corporation to 
adopt a resolution declaring a dividend in the 
amount of $338,832 and withdrew such amount 
from the corporation, such action constituting a 
misappropriation and a conversion of the assets of 
the corporation; that J. R. Milam, Jr., as president of 
the Cooper Company had called a meeting of the 
stockholders of the corporation which would be 
held on December 2, 1952, for the purpose of 
voting a partial capital liquidating dividend and that 
the Citizens National Bank of Waco, as executor of 
the extate of E. C. Barrett, was threatening to vote 
the 1,600 shares of stock which it held as executor 
in favor of such partial liquidation and that, unless 
restrained, it would do so, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Bank as executor had no right to vote the 
stock so held by it in favor of the proposed 
liquidating dividend. Upon presentation of 
appellant's application for a temporary injunction, 
the court ordered that appellees be cited to appear 
on December 2, 1952, at 9:00 o'clock a. m. and 
show cause, if any they had, why the injunction as 
prayed for should not be granted. 
Appellees filed an extensive answer to the 
application for injunctive relief in which they 
alleged, among other things, that the Bank, as 
executor of the will and estate of E. C. Barrett, was 
lawfully in possession of the 1,600 shares of stock 
which was of the reasonable value of $233,600 and 
as such executor it was charged with the duty of 
paying all the debts of the decedent, including State 
inheritance taxes and Federal estate taxes. 
Appellees further alleged in their verified answer as 
follows: 
'8. 
'Defendants allege that Madison A. Cooper, 
plaintiff herein, is acting unreasonable and 
arbitrary, and against the best interest of his cestui 
que trust, for the reason that the defendants have 
gone to considerable time and expense to obtain a 
ruling from the Internal Revenue Department of the 
U. S. Government to the effect that in view of the 
liquidation of the grocery department of said 
corporation, said corporation and stockholders 
thereof have a right to declare a partial capital 
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liquidation, provided that two-thirds of the 
stockholders of the said corporation vote in favor of 
said partial capital liquidating dividend, and to 
obtain said two-thirds majority for said liquidating 
dividend requires a vote therefor of all of the said 
1600 shares of stock now standing on the books of 
said corporation in the name of E. C. Barrett. That 
if said dividend is declared to be a partial capital 
liquidating dividend, the estate of E. C. Barrett and 
the owners of the stock in question will make a 
considerable saving in taxes. In fact, said estate and 
the beneficiaries ultimately receiving said stock will 
save approximately $40,000.00. That Pauline 
Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton, in person 
or through their duly authorized agents, have 
instructed Madison A. Cooper to vote said 1600 
shares of stock which they will receive as 
beneficiaries under the will of E. C. Barrett in favor 
of said partial capital liquidation, and has written 
him a letter to this effect, but he has declined *199 
and refused to do so, to their injury and detriment. 
They have also advised the Citizens National Bank, 
independent executor of the estate of E. C. Barrett, 
to vote in favor of said capital liquidation plan or 
paying a dividend which will receive the treatment 
of capital gain or loss tax benefits under the Federal 
Estate Tex. That if this procedure is not followed, 
an ordinary dividend will be paid, amounting to 
approximately $366,000.00, which will cost the 
Barrett estate and the said Pauline Barrett Brassell 
and Mary Barrett Denton approximately $40,000.00 
and the partial capital dividend will save said estate 
and the said beneficiaries said $40,000.00 in taxes. 
That the action of the said plaintiff, Madison A. 
Cooper, in refusing to vote in accordance with the 
wishes of the beneficiaries named in said will, as 
the ultimate owners of said stock, is arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable, and will result in 
serious financial injury to said beneficiaries, whose 
best interests he is supposed to represent, and in this 
connection, these defendants would show that the 
Bank, as the independent executor, stands ready to 
vote for said partial capital liquidation dividend in 
accordance with the instructions from the said 
Pauline Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton 
conveyed to said Bank through their duly 
authorized agents. 
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'That the Directors of said corporation have 
heretofore declared a dividend of $366,000.00 to be 
padi one-half thereof on the 27th day of December, 
1952, and the remaining one-hale on the 5th day of 
January, 1953, conditioned only upon the fact if 
they were able to obtain the consent of the Internal 
Revenue Department of the U. S. Government to 
pay a partial capital liquidation dividend; this form 
of dividend would be substituted for an ordinary 
dividend, and, as stated above, if an ordinary 
dividend is paid, the Barrett estate and the 
beneficiaries under his will receiving said stock of 
The Cooper Company, Inc., will save 
approximately $40,000.00 which they will 
otherwise have to pay in the form of taxes if an 
ordinary dividend is ultimately paid for said amount. 
'10. 
'Defendants would show that they now have 
secured from the Internal Revenue Department of 
the U. S. Government a ruling to the effect that if 
said partial capital liquidating dividend is paid, a 
tax thereon under the Capital Gain and Loss 
Provisions of said Federal Tax Law would be 
applied, which will result in the savings to said 
estate and beneficiaries as set out above. 
'11. 
'That the payment of said capital liquidating 
dividend of $366,000.00 will not result in any 
injury or damage to the plaintiff or to the defendants 
herein because after the payment thereof, said 
corporation will still have remaining approximately 
$650,000.00 net worth, which is more than ample to 
properly conduct the wholesale dry goods business, 
which is the only business that said corporation is 
now conducting, as said wholesale dry goods 
business does not amount, in volume, to more than 
one million dollars per annum.' 
The contention of appellant to the effect that the 
Citizens National Bank as executor of the estate of 
E. C. Barrett had no right to vote the Barrett stock is 
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based upon the following provision in the will of 
the testator: 
'I give and bequeath to Madison A. Cooper, Jr., in 
trust, all of my shares of stock in the Cooper Co., 
Inc., of Waco, Texas, and in Behrens Drug Co., of 
Waco, Texas, to be held by my said trustee during 
his lifetime for the benefit of my two nieces, Pauline 
Barrett Brassell and Mary Barrett Denton, share and 
share alike. Said stock shall be turned over to said 
trustee as promptly as practicable after my death 
and all income thereon shall be paid by said trustee 
annually or as dividends are paid on said stock to 
said beneficiaries, share and share alike. Said *200 
trustee . shall receive no compensation for his 
services as trustee of said stock and shall not be 
required to give bond as such trustee, and shall have 
full voting rights as the holder of the legal title to 
said stock during the life of said trustee, or so long 
as he may continue to serve as trustee under this 
provision of my will. It is my will that said trustee 
shall not be required to comply with the Texas Trust 
Act while acting as trustee herein, and that no 
beneficiary shall ever have any claim against said 
trustee for any act or omission on his part in the 
performance of said trust.' 
Appellant says the Bank had no right to vote the 
1,600 shares of stock in the Cooper Company for a 
partial capital liquidating dividend because, among 
other reasons, 'Under Texas law, upon the death of 
E. C. Barrett the legal title to the 1600 shares of 
Cooper Company stock vested in Madison A. 
Cooper, Jr., legatee in the Barrett will, and Mr. 
Cooper had the sole right to vote said stock as an 
incident to his legal title.' On the other hand, 
subject to their motion to dismiss the cause on 
appeal, appellees say the Bank, as executor of the 
will and estate of E. C. Barrett, had the legal right 
and duty, under the circumstances alleged in their 
verified answer to appellant's application for a 
temporary injunction, to vote the Barrett stock on 
December 3, 1952, for a partial capital liquidating 
dividend and that appellant, as trustee under the will 
of E. C. Barrett, had no legal or equitable right to 
vote the Barrett stock against such dividend to the 
injury and detriment of the cestui que trustent for 
whose benefit he was purporting to act. 
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{l )(2) As a general rule a trial judge, in the exercise 
of his equitable powers to grant or refuse an 
application for a temporary injunction pendente lite, 
is vested with a wide latitude of sound judicial 
discretion. Houston Electric Co. v. City of 
Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W. 198; Ward 
County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Ward 
County Irr. Dist. No.1, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W. 
490; Beirne v. North Texas Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 
221 S.W. 301; Sutherland v. City of Winnsboro, 
Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 63; Fort v. Moore, 
Tex.Civ.App., 33 S.W.2d 807 (er. Dis.); Wizig v. 
Jefferson, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W.2d 428; First Trust 
Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago v. Hayes, 
Tex.Civ.App., 90 S.W.2d 331; Pancake v. Kansas 
City Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 776. 
It is also generally held that upon appeal from an 
exercise of such power, a reviewing court should 
not disturb the action of the trial judge unless the 
record on appeal shows that such action constituted 
an abuse of discretion. Davidson v. Wells, 
Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 518; Pavey v. McFarland, 
Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W. 591; Basham v. Holcombe, 
Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W. 691; Gordon v. Hoencke, 
Tex.Civ.App., 253 S.W. 629; Massa v. Guardian 
Trust Co., Tex.Civ.App., 258 S.W. 598; Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. San Antonio Compress 
Co., Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 214; Southwestern 
Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Comm. of Tex., 128 
Tex. 560,99 S.W.2d 263,109 A.L.R. 1235. 
(3) Although we are inclined to the view that the 
record before us fails to disclose an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to 
grant appellant's application for a temporary 
injunction, we do not think it is necessary or proper 
for this court to pass upon that question or to 
determine at this time whether appellant or the Bank 
had the right or duty to vote the Barrett stock on 
December 3, 1952, or to decide whether the trial 
court did or did not err in refusing to grant the 
application because it now appears that the acts 
which appellant sought to enjoin have been 
performed and hence we have concluded that 
appellant's application for a temporary injunction 
has become moot. Brown v. Fleming, 
Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 483, pts. 1 and 2; 
Anderson v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Civ.App., 26 
S.W.2d 353; International Ass'n of Machinists 
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Union Local No. 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of 
Accessory Workers, 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282; 
Service Finance Corp. v. Grote, 133 Tex. 606, 131 
S.W.2d 93; Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Gandy, 
Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 631; Panos v. Foley 
Bros. Dry Goods Co., Tex.Civ.App., 198 S.W.2d 
494. 
In his verified answer to the motion of appellees to 
dismiss the cause, appellant says his asserted cause 
of action for a temporary *201 injunction has not 
become moot because (1) the Bank, in voting the 
Barrett stock for the proposed inquidating dividend 
on December 3, 1952, did not act unconditionally 
and (2) the Cooper Company and its president have 
not completed the payment of such liquidating 
dividend. Attached to such answer is a copy of a 
letter from the Bank's trust officer dated December 
3, 1952, addressed to Jesse Milam as president of 
the Cooper Company which reads in part as 
follows: 'In voting the stock this afternoon, 
(meaning the Barrett stock) we do so without 
asserting or representing to you that we have any 
right to do so. If we have the right to vote it, our 
vote is cast in favor of the liquidating dividend.' It 
also appears from such answer that appellant has 
not accepted the sum of $25,696 under the 
proposed liquidating dividend. However, we do not 
think these facts are material to a determination as 
to whether or not appellant's application for a 
temporary injunction is now moot. The material 
question now before us is not what the Bank or the 
Cooper Company or its officers should have done 
under the circumstances; in the light of what was 
actually been done, the vital question is whether any 
of the threatened acts which appellant sought to 
enJOIn can now be effectively prevented. 
Regardless of whether the Bank did or did not have 
the right to vote the Barrett stock, conditionally or 
unconditionally, it has done so and no preliminary 
injunction can now effectively that which has been 
done. Furthermore, the fact that appellant has not 
accepted the liquidating dividend which has been 
declared is a matter beyond the control of the Bank, 
the Cooper Company or its officers. 
It is quite clear to us that the subject matter of this 
suit, viz.: appellant's cause of action for a temporary 
injunction to prohibit the Citizens National Bank 
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from voting the Barrett stock in favor of a partial 
capital liquidating dividend and to prohibit the 
Cooper Company and its president, J. R. Milam, Jr., 
from counting such vote or from paying the 
dividend so voted, no longer exists as a live subject 
of controversy because such acts have been 
completely performed in so far as the Bank, the 
Cooper Company and its president are concemed. 
Preventive injunctions necessarily operate only 
upon unperformed and unexecuted acts. It is 
axiomatic that a prohibitory injunction against the 
performance of an act or a deed which has already 
been accomplished is futile and useless. 
In the case of Isbell v. Rednick, Tex.Civ.App., 193 
S.W.2d 736, 737, this court said: 'It is a 
fundamental principle that courts are created, not 
for the purpose of deciding abstract questions of 
law or rendering advisory opinions, but for the 
judicial determination of presently existing disputes 
between parties in relation to facts out of which 
controverted questions arise. Where a controversy 
becomes moot while a cause is pending in an 
appellate court, so that no effective relief can be 
given to either party to the appeal, it is the duty of 
the appellate court to vacate the proceedings out of 
which the controversy arose, reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and dismiss the asserted cause of 
action. State v. Society for Friendless Children, 
130 Tex. 533, III S.W.2d 1075; Benavides v. 
Atkins, 132 Tex. 1, 120 S.W.2d 415; City of West 
University Place v. Martin, 132 Tex. 354, 123 
S. W.2d 638; Ansley v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 175 
S.W. 470; Shinn v. Barrow, Tex.Civ.App., 121 
S.W.2d 450 (er. dis.); Changos v. Ford, 
Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 1025; Renfro v. Burrell, 
Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 1110; Callison v. Vance 
Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 152 
S.W.2d 395; Dowlen v. Amarillo Independent 
School District, Tex.Civ.App., 175 S. W.2d 288 (er. 
reO·' 
We do not wish to express any opinion whatsoever 
at this time on the issues as to whether the action of 
the Bank in voting the Barrett stock, or the action of 
the Cooper Company or of its president in counting 
such stock or in paying all or any part of the 
dividends so declared, was or was not wrongful. 
These issues have not been adjudicated and they 
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must be disposed of, if such an adjudication is 
desired, at a trial of the main case on its merits. 
Hence, our disposition of this appeal should be and 
is without prejudice to any right of any party *202 
to this proceeding in so far as such issues may be 
involved on a trial ofthe main case on its merits. 
Since we have concluded that appellant's asserted 
cause of action for a temporary injunction is now 
moot, appellees' motion to dismiss the cause will be 
granted, the order of the trial court refusing to grant 
appellant's application for a temporary injunction 
will be vacated, the case to the extent of such 
application will be dismissed, and all costs of court 
incident to such application will be assessed against 
appellant, and it is so ordered. 
Tex.Civ.App.1953 
Cooper v. Milam 
256 S.W.2d 196 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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DeFelice v. GaronLa.App., 1980. 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit. 
Frances Radosta, wife of and Stephen 1. DEFELICE 
v. 
Herbert J. GARON and Rufus M. Carimi. 
No. 10344. 
Feb. 4, 1980. 
Appeal was taken from a partial summary judgment 
entered in the Civil District Court, Parish of 
Orleans, S. Sanford Levy, J., invalidating a contract 
giving pledgees the unqualified right to vote shares 
of stock pledged to them. The Court of Appeal, 
Lemmon, J., held that: (1) contract giving pledgees 
unqualified right to vote shares of stock pledged to 
them was not invalid as a contract which separated 
voting rights from ownership interest and pledgees 
could enforce such contract by having the shares of 
stock transferred on the books of the corporation 
during the existence of the pledge, and (2) contract 
was not invalid as one containing a potestative 
condition, since pledgees under the contract were 
clearly obligees. 
Partial summary judgment set aside; case remanded. 
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Contract giving pledgee unqualified right to vote 
shares of stock pledged to them was not invalid as a 
contract which separated voting rights from 
ownership interest and pledgees could enforce the 
contract by having the shares of stock transferred on 
the books of the corporation during the existence of 
the pledge. LSA-R.S. 12:75, subd. D. 
[3J Corporations 101 €;:::;>197 
101 Corporations 
10 lIX Members and Stockholders 
10 IIX(B) Meetings 
10 1 k 197 k. Right to Vote In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Contract giving pledgees unqualified right to vote 
shares of stock pledged to them was not invalid as 
one containing a potestative condition, since 
pledgees under the contract were clearly obligees. 
LSA-C.C. arts. 2034-2036. 
*676 Victoria L. Bartels and William F. Wessel, 
New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellees. 
Garon, Brener & McNeely, Milton E. Brener, New 
Orleans, for defendants-appellants. 
Before SAMUEL, LEMMON and GARRISON, n. 
LEMMON, Judge. 
Defendants have appealed from a partial summary 
judgment which declared invalid a contract they had 
executed with plaintiff and prohibited them from 
acting as trustees under the contract.[FNIJ The 
issue on appeal is the validity of the contract. 
FNl. The judgment, couched in terms of a 
preliminary injunction, was not appealed 
within 15 days as required by C.c.P. art. 
3612 for judgments relating to preliminary 
injunctions. However, the only matter 
before the court at the time of the 
judgment was a motion for partial 
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summary judgment declaring the contract 
invalid, the rule for preliminary injunction 
having previously been denied, and the 
parties had stipulated that an injunction 
should issue if the contract was invalid. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court, on 
application for supervisory writs, ordered 
the granting of a suspensive appeal at a 
time more than 15 days after the judgment. 
We therefore treat this appeal as one from 
a partial summary judgment. 
Prior to the execution of the contract at issue, 
plaintiff was the owner of 50% of the shares of 
stock in Pascal-Manale, Inc., and defendants Garon 
and Carimi were the attorney and accountant 
respectively for the corporation. Plaintiff had 
contracted to purchase the other 50% of the stock 
from her sister for the price of $450,000.00, but had 
difficulty obtaining financing. *677 Through 
defendants' efforts a bank agreed to lend plaintiff 
$600,000.00 (which included the pay-out of an 
existing $150,000.00 loan), but required the pledge 
of the corporate stock and mortgages of other 
property owned by plaintiff, as well as personal 
guaranties by defendants and three other persons 
(intervenors in this suit) and additional security 
valued in excess of $200,000.00 to be furnished by 
defendants and intervenors. 
As part of the agreement to guarantee the loan and 
furnish the necessary security defendants and 
intervenors required plaintiff to execute two 
contracts. In the first contract, entitled Joint 
Venture Agreement, the parties stated that it was in 
their best interest for the corporation to be managed 
and directed under a definite and fixed policy in 
order to properly develop the corporation's business 
opportunities and to repay the loan, and they agreed 
that defendants and intervenors would guarantee the 
loan and provide the additional security and that 
plaintiff would pay them $2,000.00 per month 
during the term of the loan (or a minimum of 
$120,000.00). Plaintiff further agreed that, in the 
event of her default on the note, she would assign 
all of her interest in the corporation to defendants 
and intervenors upon their demand, subject to 
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plaintiffs right to reacquire the stock within 60 days 
by paying all sums expended to remedy the default. 
In the second contract, entitled Voting Trust 
Agreement, plaintiff, as sole shareholder, and 
defendants, as trustees, reasserted that it was in 
plaintiffs best interest for the corporation to be 
managed and directed during the next ten years 
under a definite and fixed policy, and for this 
purpose plaintiff "requested" defendants to hold 
legal title to the stock in trust for ten years under the 
contract terms. Defendants were further given the 
unqualified right to vote the stock as shareholders, 
free from any interference by plaintiff, but without 
liability as shareholders, and were also given the 
following powers: 
a) The right to vote for election of directors and in 
favor of or in opposition to any resolution or 
proposed action of any character whatsoever which 
may be presented in any meeting requiring the 
consent of shareholders of the corporation; 
b) The right to set salaries, bonuses, and other 
compensation for all employees, agents, officers, 
and directors of the corporation; 
c) The right to declare all dividends; 
d) The right to hire and fire all personnel employed 
by the corporation; 
e) The right to approve of any and all remodeling, 
alterations and repairs of any property owned or 
leased by the corporation; 
f) The right to authorize and approve all capital 
expenditures for any purpose whatsoever; and 
g) The right to dispose of the collateral securing the 
debt of shareholder in any manner deemed 
appropriate by the trustees and to pledge the stock 
to secure any corporate loan. 
The contract specified a term of ten years, but 
reserved to the trustees the right to terminate the 
agreement sooner by unanimous vote. 
II 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment 
attacked the second contract (Voting Trust 
Agreement) on two grounds: (1) the contract is 
invalid as a voting trust agreement, because R.S. 
12:78 only authorizes such an agreement when 
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contracted by two or more shareholders, and (2) the 
contract is invalid as an ordinary contract, because 
it contains a potestative condition in that the 
trustees are free to terminate at will. The trial court 
invalidated the contract on the second ground. 
Taken in the context of the overall circumstances, 
the contract at issue is not a voting trust 
contemplated by R.S. 12:78. Rather, the contract is 
a security device, designed to protect the guarantors 
of plaintiffs promissory note by giving them the 
right to control the management of the *678 
corporation during the term of the loan.[FN2} The 
intent of the contract therefore was to constitute 
defendants as pledgees, rather than trustees. 
FN2. The substance, not the title, 
determines the nature of the contract. 
Indeed, in their petition plaintiffs asserted 
that the contract was a "guise for a security 
device coupled with a managerial mandate" 
[1] Normally, only the registered owner of shares 
listed on the books of the corporation have the right 
to vote the stock. Chapp ius v. Spencer, 167 La. 
527, 119 So. 697 (La.1928); D'Amico v. Canizaro, 
256 La. 801, 239 So.2d 339 (La.l970). In Emile 
Babst Co. v. Commercial Enterprises, Inc., 274 
So.2d 742 (La.App. 4th Cif. 1973), cert. den. 277 
So.2d 673, noted 68 A.L.R.3d 674 (1976), this 
court held that, despite the revision and reenactment 
of the Business Corporation Law, a mere pledgee 
cannot vote the pledged stock unless the shares 
have been transferred on the books of the 
corporation to the pledgee.[FN3] 
FN3. The Babst case turned on an 
interpretation of R.S. 12:75 D, which 
provides: 
"A person whose shares are pledged shall 
be entitled to vote thereon unless and until 
such shares have been transferred on the 
books of the corporation to the pledgee; 
and thereafter the pledgee shall be entitled 
to vote thereon." 
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[2} In the Babst case the owner had not expressly 
authorized the pledgee to vote the shares, and the 
pledgee sought to do so simply on the basis of his 
status as pledgee. The present case, however, does 
not involve a mere pledgee, but rather a pledgee 
upon whom the owner of the stock has expressly 
conferred by contract the right to vote the shares. 
Since R.S. 12:75 D requires a transfer on the books 
of the corporation to entitle the pledgee to vote the 
shares, the contract expressly granting the pledgee 
the right to vote the share can only be interpreted 
reasonably as implicitly granting the pledgee the 
right to obtain a transfer of the shares upon the 
books of the corporation. 
Under our interpretation of R.S. 12:75 D the type of 
security device executed by the parties in the 
present case is statutorily authorized. Under the 
contract plaintiff turned over the shares of stock to 
defendants and granted them "the unqualified right, 
without any restrictions or limitations, to vote the 
stock deposited with them in accordance with their 
own best judgment and free from any interference 
or control" by plaintiff. The right to vote the shares 
(a right not necessarily accorded to a mere pledgee) 
could hardly have been more clearly conferred, and 
with this right the pledgee necessarily was given the 
right to take the formal steps necessary to 
accomplish utilization of that right. 
We therefore conclude that a contract gIvmg the 
pledgee the unqualified right to vote shares of stock 
pledged to him is not invalid as a contract which 
separates voting rights from ownership interest, but 
is valid as a contract authorized by R.S. 12:75 D, 
and that the pledgee may enforce the contract by 
having the shares of stock transferred on the books 
of the corporation during the existence of the pledge. 
III 
[3] Finally, the contract was not invalid as one 
containing a potestative condition. Nullity on 
account of a potestative condition is limited to those 
potestative conditions which make the obligation 
dependent solely on the exercise of the obligor's 
will. C.C. arts. 2034, 2035. Under the contract at 
issue defendants were clearly the obligees (the 
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parties in whose favor the obligation was 
contracted), since they had performed their 
obligation concurrently with the execution of the 
contract by guaranteeing the loan and furnishing the 
additional security. [FN4] c.c. art. 3556(20). An 
obligation may validly be made to depend on the 
will of the obligee for its duration. c.c. art. 2036. 
The contract was therefore not null on account of an 
invalidating potestative condition. 
FN4. Defendants and intervenors stated 
they would not have done so without the 
protection afforded by the two contracts. 
Accordingly, the partial summary judgment 
rendered by the trial court is set *679 aside, and the 
matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs 
are to be assessed upon final disposition. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SET ASIDE, 
CASE REMANDED. 
La.App., 1980. 
DeFelice v. Garon 
380 So.2d 676 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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H 
Valley Intern. Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones, 
Inc.Tex.Civ.App.,1978. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi. 
V ALLEY INTERNATIONAL PROPERTIES, 
INC., Appellant, 
v. 
LOS CAMPEONES, INC., Appellee. 
No.l300. 
June 15, 1978. 
Rehearing Denied June 26,1978. 
Shareholder of corporation petitioned for order to 
compel holding of annual shareholders meeting. 
The 197th District Court, Cameron County, 
Filemon B. Vela, J., ordered holding of meeting, 
and corporation appealed. The Court of Civil 
Appeals, Young, J., held that: (1) state court had 
jurisdiction of suit to compel shareholders' meeting, 
notwithstanding that corporation was subject of 
arrangement proceeding under Bankruptcy Act; (2) 
shareholder had protectible property interest in 
corporation even though shareholder's stock was not 
registered with corporation, and thus shareholder 
should have been able to protect such interest by 
demanding annual shareholders' meeting regardless 
of shareholder's ability or desire to vote; (3) claim 
that shareholder had defective title to shares was not 
considered where no pleadings were presented to 
trial court concerning such defense nor was matter 
brought to court's attention; (4) evidence was 
sufficient to support implied finding that there was 
no breach of contract by savings and loan 
association which sold stock to shareholder at 
foreclosure sale to release shares, in that president 
did not meet all conditions required for association 
to release shares, and (5) correspondence between 
savings and loan association and shareholder which 
was association member was privileged and 




[1] Appeal and Error 30 €;::::;>846(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
Page 1 of 11 
Page 1 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of 
Trial in Lower Court 
30k846 Trial by Court in General 
30k846(5) k. Necessity of Finding 
Facts. Most Cited Ca'!Ies 
Where no findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were filed by trial court in proceeding to compel 
annual shareholders' meeting of corporation nor 
were any requested by parties, and corporation 
brought forward statement of facts on appeal, the 
Court of Civil Appeals was required to presume that 
the trial judge found every fact necessary to sustain 
the judgment compelling the shareholders' meeting, 
provided such facts were raised by the pleadings 
and were supported by the evidence. 
[2] Bankruptcy 51 €;::::;>2060.1 
51 Bankruptcy 
51 I In General 
51I(C) Jurisdiction 
51k2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
51k2060.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 51k2060, 51k964) 
Generally, under Chapter XI governing corporate 
arrangements, the bankruptcy court has exclusive 
jurisdiction of a debtor and his property, wherever 
located; however, the bankruptcy court does not 
have jurisdiction over all suits brought against the 
Chapter XI debtor. Bankr.Act, § 301 et seq., 11 
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[3] Bankruptcy 51 €;::::;>3661.100 
51 Bankruptcy 
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SI XV Arrangements 
SIXV(A) In General 
Slk3661.100 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly Slk9S1) 
Under the Bankruptcy Act, a Chapter X 
reorganization provides for extensive jurisdictional 
and judicial control over the proceedings and 
administration of a corporation, while a Chapter XI 
arrangement is intended to provide a quick efficient 
method of implementing a composition among the 
debtor's general creditors with minimal court 
involvement. Bankr.Act, §§ 101 et seq., 301 et 
seq., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ SOl et seq., 701 et seq. 
[4] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2062 
SI Bankruptcy 
SI I In General 
SII(C) Jurisdiction 
Slk2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
SI k2062 k. Bankruptcy Courts and 
State Courts. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly Slk96S) 
The mere pendency of a Chapter XI arrangement 
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act does not 
divest a state court of jurisdiction. Bankr.Act, § 
301 et seq., 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[5] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2062 
SI Bankruptcy 
SI I In General 
SII(C) Jurisdiction 
S1k2060 Exclusive, Conflicting, or 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
SIk2062 k. Bankruptcy Courts and 
State Courts. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly SI k96S) 
A state claim must interfere with the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court in order to preclude a state 
court's jurisdiction. 
[6] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2361 
SI Bankruptcy 
SIIV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction 
and Stay 
Page 2 of 11 
Page 2 
SIIV(A) In General 
S1k2361 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly Slk9S4) 
Bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction over meetings 
of shareholders of corporate debtor; however, the 
court does have power to enjoin a shareholders' 
meeting which will interfere with the administration 
of the debtor'S estate. 
[7] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2361 
SI Bankruptcy 
SIIV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction 
and Stay 
SIIV(A) In General 
S1k2361 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly Slk9S4) 
Fact that an election and possible installation of 
new directors of corporation could ultimately have 
had some indirect effect on Chapter XI arrangement 
of corporation under Bankruptcy Act did not confer 
jurisdiction over shareholders meeting on the 
bankruptcy court. Bank.Act, § 30 I et seq., II 
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[8] Bankruptcy 51 <8:=2395 
SI Bankruptcy 
SI IV Effect of Bankruptcy Relief; Injunction 
and Stay 
SIIV(B) Automatic Stay 
S1k2394 Proceedings, Acts, or Persons 
Affected 
S1k239S k. Judicial Proceedings in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly Slk9S4) 
Where bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction 
over suit to compel shareholders' meeting of 
corporation which was subject of Chapter XI 
arrangement proceeding, the automatic stay of state 
court actions under the Bankruptcy Rules did not 
preclude trial court's order compelling holding of 
shareholders' meeting. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 
11-44, 11 U.S.c.A.; Bankr.Act, § 301 et seq., II 
U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.; V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, 
art. 2.24, subd. B. 
[9J Corporations 101 <8:=191 
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101 Corporations 
IOIIX Members and Stockholders 
101 IX(B) Meetings 
IOIkI9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases 
Statute governing rights of issuer of securities with 
respect to registered owners deals only with 
relationship between the issuer and the shareholder; 
such statute makes no provision for a court to treat 
the unregistered shareholder in the same manner 
that the issuer of the stock might treat him. 
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a). 
[10J Corporations 101 €;::;;>191 
101 Corporations 
1 OIIX Members and Stockholders 
10 I IX(B) Meetings 
IOIkl9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases 
Shareholder had a protectable property interest in 
corporation, even though its ownership of the shares 
was not registered with the corporation; thus, 
shareholder should have been able to protect that 
property interest by demanding an annual 
shareholders' meeting regardless of shareholder's 
ability or desire to vote. V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, 
art. 2.24, subd. B; V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a). 
[11] Corporations 101 €;::;;>170 
101 Corporations 
IOIIX Members and Stockholders 
10 IIX(A) Rights and Liabilities as to 
Corporation 
101 k 170 k. Who Are Members or 
Stockholders. Most Cited Cases 
The plain meaning of the term "shareholder" is one 
who owns a share of corporate stock. V.A.T.S. 
Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B. 
[12] Statutes 361 €;::;;>205 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36Ik204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
36Ik205 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
A statute should be construed as a whole, and all of 
Page 3 of 11 
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its parts be harmonized if possible. 
[13] Statutes 361 €;::;;>212.6 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36Ik2I2 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
36Ik2I2.6 k. Words Used. Most Cited 
Cases 
Every word or phrase in a statute is presumed to 
have been used intentionally, with a meaning and 
purpose. 
[14J Corporations 101 €;::;;>191 
101 Corporations 
10 IIX Members and Stockholders 
101 IX(B) Meetings 
IOIkI9I k. Necessity. Most Cited Cases 
Requirement that shares be registered with issuer is 
intended for the protection of the corporation so 
that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive 
dividends, and otherwise participate in other 
managerial functions; however, under statute 
governing court order for shareholders' meeting, the 
court intervenes to determine the status of a 
purported shareholder, and the protections provided 
by a registration requirement are not necessary. 
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B; 
V.T.C.A., Bus. & C. § 8.207(a). 
[15] Appeal and Error 30 €;::;;>173(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower 
Court of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30kI73 Grounds of Defense or Opposition 
30kI73(2) k. Nature or Subject-Matter 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Court of Civil Appeals was not required to consider 
corporation's defense that shareholder had defective 
title to shares in action brought by shareholder to 
compel shareholders' meeting where no pleading 
was presented to trial court concerning such defense 
and matter was not brought to court's attention when 
setting out issues before court for decision. 
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B. 
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[16] Corporations 101 <8=113 
101 Corporations 
101 VIII Capital and Stock 
101 VIII (D) Transfer of Shares 
101 k 113 k. Restriction of Right to 
Transfer. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence in action by shareholder, which purchased 
shares at foreclosure sale by savings and loan 
association, to compel annual shareholders' meeting 
of corporation was sufficient to support implied 
finding that there was no breach of contract by 
savings association to release shares in that 
president of corporation could not meet conditions 
required for savings association to release shares 
which had been pledged. 
[17] Pleading 302 <8=78 
302 Pleading 
302III Responses or Responsive Pleadings in 
General 
302III(A) Defenses in General 
302k78 k. Necessity for Defense. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where corporation asserted that shareholder which 
brought action to compel shareholders' meeting had 
obtained shares in fraudulent manner, defense of 
fraud was used as an affirmative defense, and thus 
defense was waived by failure of corporation to 
plead it or have it acted upon by the trial court. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 94; V.A.T.S. 
Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B. 




184k58 Weight and Sufficiency 
184k58(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Evidence in action by shareholder, which had 
purchased shares at foreclosure sale by savings and 
loan association, to compel shareholders' meeting of 
corporation was sufficient to support implied 
conclusion that corporation did not meet its burden 
of proving that savings association had defrauded 
corporation. 
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[19J Building and Loan Associations 66 <8=6(2) 
66 Building and Loan Associations 
66k6 Membership 
66k6(2) k. Members' Rights and Liabilities in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
Legislature did not intend to eliminate 
correspondence from phrase "books and records" in 
statute governing right of member of savings and 
loan association to inspect books and records of 
association, and thereby prevent members from 
inspecting their own correspondence. Vernon's 
Ann.Civ.St. art. 852a, § 3.07. 
[20] Witnesses 410 <8=196.3 
410 Witnesses 
41 orr Competency 
41 OIl(D) Confidential 
Privileged Communications 




410k196.3 k. Bank and Customer. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 41 Okl96) 
Correspondence between savings and loan 
association and shareholder which was member of 
association was privileged, and thus corporation did 
not have right to view such correspondence in 
action by shareholder to compel shareholders' 
meeting of corporation. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 
852a, § 3.07; V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, 
subd. B. 









410k196.3 k. Bank and Customer. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 410k196) 
Statute providing for confidentiality of books and 
records of savings and loan association confers 
privilege upon which trial court may exclude 
evidence. Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 852a, § 3.07. 
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[22] Appeal and Error 30 <8=846(5) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, In 
General 
30k844 Review Dependent on Mode of 
Trial in Lower Court 
30k846 Trial by Court in General 
30k846(5) k. Necessity of Finding 
Facts. Most Cited Cases 
Where no findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were filed in action by shareholder to compel 
shareholders' meeting of corporation, Court of Civil 
Appeals presumed that trial judge disregarded 
evidence which might have been improperly 
received. V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B. 
[23] Appeal and Error 30 <8=77(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30m Decisions Reviewable 
30III(D) Finality of Determination 
30k75 Final Judgments or Decrees 
30k77 Nature or Form of Action or 
Proceeding 
30k77(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Judgment rendered by trial court compelling 
holding of annual shareholders' meeting of 
corporation was a final judgment in that it disposed 
of all matters involved in suit and determined rights 
of all parties in suit, and thus Court of Civil Appeals 
had jurisdiction to hear appeal from such judgment. 
V.A.T.S. Bus.Corp.Act, art. 2.24, subd. B; 
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 1819. 
*683 Joel W. Ellis, Carter & Ellis, Harlingen, Rhett 
G. Campbell, Houston, for appellant. 
Joel W. Cook, Schlanger, Cook, Cohn & Mills, 
Richard L. Fuqua, Haines, Cowgill, Andell & 
Fuqua, Houston, for appellee. 
OPINION 
YOUNG, Justice. 
Los Campeones, Inc. filed a petition on July 25, 
1977, in the district court of Cameron County 
seeking relief under Tex.Bus.Corp.Act Ann. art. 
Page 5 of 11 
Page 5 
2.24 B (Supp.1978) which provides for a court of 
competent jurisdiction to summarily compel an 
annual shareholders' meeting upon application of 
any shareholder where no annual meeting has been 
held within the prior thirteen months. Valley 
International Properties, Inc., was named in the 
petition as defendant. Los Campeones is the 
majority shareholder ofV.I.P. 
On that same day (July 25) the trial court granted an 
ex parte order ordering, among other things, the 
requested shareholders' meeting to be held on 
September 2. Then, on August 11 V.I.P. filed its 
answer which sought a hearing to set aside the July 
25th order. The trial court set and conducted a 
hearing without a jury and thereafter, on September 
7, rendered judgment, among other things, 
upholding its prior order and resetting the 
shareholders' meeting for September 26. V.I.P. 
appeals from the September 26th order. 
Appellant brings forward four points of error. In 
those points appellant contends: 1) that the trial 
court was without jurisdiction of this matter because 
V.I.P. was engaged in a Chapter XI, 11 U.S.C.A. s 
701 et seq. (1970), Bankruptcy Proceeding at the 
time Los Campeones filed suit; 2) that Los 
Campeones could not compel a meeting because it 
was not a shareholder of record, because Los 
Campeones had a defective title to its V.I.P. shares 
in that it received its stock in a sale which violated 
the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.CA. ss 77a et seq. 
(197 I), because Brownsville Savings & Loan 
Association, the prior owner of the V.I.P. shares 
now held by Los Campeones, breached an 
agreement with V.I.P., and because Brownsville 
defrauded V.I.P. in certain loan agreements. V.I.P. 
also contends (3 and 4) that the trial court erred in 
excluding and admitting certain evidence. 
Los Campeones asserts by cross-point and by 
motions to dismiss the appeal that this court has no 
jurisdiction of an appeal from a Tex.Bus.Corp.Act 
Ann. art. 2.24 B (Supp.1978) proceeding. We 
overrule all of the contentions of the parties and 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
The background of this case involves an embittered 
struggle between the management and stockholders 
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of V.I.P. to gain managerial control. V.I.P. is a 
corporation owning various country club and golf 
course facilities in Cameron County, Texas. In 
order to finance the purchase and construction of its 
facilities and property, V.I.P. borrowed substantial 
amounts from Brownsville Savings at some time 
prior to *684 1973. Subsequently, on September 24, 
1973, Brownsville Savings in conjunction with 
Mutual Savings Association of Fort Worth and 
Abilene Savings Association issued a 3.9 million 
dollar permanent loan commitment to V.I.P. 
provided it performed certain conditions. The 
commitment was to be funded September 24, 1976. 
In December of 1974 V.I.P. shareholders pledged a 
majority of V.I.P.'s outstanding shares to 
Brownsville Savings in order to secure the 
previously mentioned loans. 
Sometime in early 1976, it became apparent to 
V.I.P. and Brownsville Savings that V.I.P. would be 
unable to payoff its debts as they became due. As a 
result, the loans were renegotiated and extended. As 
a further means of insuring the continuing viability 
of V.I.P., Bill Bass, president of V.I.P., began 
organIzmg a limited partnership, Los 
Conquistadores, which would be used to inject 1.6 
million dollars of additionally needed capital into 
the V.I.P. operations. By June of 1976, Los 
Conquistadores allegedly had raised $800,000 and 
still needed to raise an additional $800,000. Bass 
then purportedly presented the limited partnership 
idea to Brownsville Savings' president, Thomas 
Pope, and other officers at a meeting on June 25, 
1976. During this meeting, the Brownsville officers 
stated that they wanted no part of the limited 
partnership but that they would consider other 
alternatives for helping Bass inject additional 
capital into the V.I.P. operations. These alternatives 
were presented to Brownsville Savings in a written 
memorandum on June 28, 1976. On July 1, 1976, 
Pope, on behalf of Brownsville Savings, responded 
to the memo by agreeing to release the V.I.P. stock 
in its possession in return for Bass' agreeing to 
assign a $98,661.00 promissory note to Brownsville 
Savings. V.I.P. contends Brownsville Savings knew 
in July that without payment of the 3.9 million 
dollar commitment due on September 24, 1976, the 
limited partnership would be unable to secure the 
additional $800,000 required and thus would fail. 
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But Robert Knowles an officer of Brownsville 
Savings in 1976, and later president, denied these 
allegations. 
On September 24, 1976, Brownsville Savings 
refused to fund the 3.9 million dollar commitment 
because of the failure of V.I.P. to meet certain 
conditions in the loan commitment; i. e., failure to 
have the property free of liens and failure to issue a 
plat as required. The principals of Los 
Conquistadores then refused to further fund the 
$800,000, and Bass was unable to secure the 
$98,661.00 promissory note which he was going to 
assign to Brownsville Savings in order to secure a 
release of the pledged V.I.P. stock. 
In November of 1976, Bass informed Brownsville 
Savings that he could not make his payments on the 
prior debt, whereupon Brownsville Savings 
accelerated maturities of its outstanding loans to 
V.I.P. In addition, on November 9, 1976, 
Brownsville Savings formed Los Cam peones, Inc., 
appellee herein, for the purpose of taking over 
operations of V.I.P. Pat Stanford was hired as agent 
for Brownsville Savings to operate Los Cam peones 
and the V.I.P. operations it was assuming. Los 
Cam peones operated the golf course and country 
club facilities during parts of November and 
December of 1976. 
On December 7, 1976, V.I.P. filed for Chapter XI 
Bankruptcy. The Federal Bankruptcy Judge then 
appointed a receiver for V.I.P. In March of 1977, 
V .I.P.' s unsecured creditors voted on and approved 
the arrangement plan submitted by V.I.P., and on 
May 10, 1977, the Bankruptcy Judge entered an 
order confirming the plan. Subsequently, on May 
18, 1977, the Bankruptcy Judge entered an order 
allowing Brownsville Savings to foreclose on the 
V.I.P. 's shares in its possession. On June 6, 1977, 
Pat Stanford's employment with Brownsville 
Savings terminated. On June 7, 1977, Stanford, 
representing Los Cam peones, purchased all of the 
V.I.P. shares possessed by Brownsville Savings at a 
public foreclosure sale. 
[1] All of which brings us to a consideration of the 
merits of this appeal. No findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were filed nor were any 
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requested. Appellant *685 has brought forward a 
statement of facts and therefore we must presume 
that the trial judge found every fact necessary to 
sustain the judgment, provided such facts are raised 
by the pleadings and are supported by the evidence. 
Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Sup.l962); 
Texas Construction Associates, Inc. v. Balli, 558 
S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1977, no 
writ). 
Appellant's first point of error asserts that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
enter an order compelling an annual shareholders' 
meeting under Tex.Bus.Corp.Act Ann. art. 2.24 B 
(Supp.1978) in that the article is unconstitutional as 
applied to appellant because the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court had exclusive and paramount 
jurisdiction over the appellant's cooperative affairs 
and because Rule 11-44 (U.S.C.A. Bankruptcy 
Rules, 1975, pamphlet edition) stayed state court 
proceedings against appellant. 
[2] An overview of the jurisdictional provisions of 
Chapter XI is set forth in In re Breinig, 40 F.Supp. 
29 (E.D.Penn.194I). Generally speaking under 
Chapter XI, the Bankruptcy Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, wherever 
located. Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 
U.S.C.A. s 5 11 (1970) contains substantially the 
same provision. In re Bettinger Corporation, 197 
F.Supp. 273 (D.Mass.1961). The Bankruptcy Court 
does not have jurisdiction, though, over all suits 
brought against the Chapter XI debtor. 8 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 3.01(2) (14th ed. 1974), Evarts v. 
Eloy Gin Corp., 204 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1953), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876, 74 S.Ct. 129, 98 L.Ed. 
384 (1953), See In re Prudence Bonds Corporation, 
75 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1935). 
Much of the precedent which we find relevant to the 
scope of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over 
suits to compel shareholder meetings is found not 
only in cases dealing with the jurisdiction of 
Chapter XI proceedings but also in Chapter X, 11 
U.S.C.A. ss 501 et seq. (1970), reorganization 
cases. Chapter X and Chapter XI represent the two 
corporate rehabilitation provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act. Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 
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U.S. 594, 85 S.Ct. 513, 13 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); In 
re Texas Consumer Finance Corp., 480 F.2d 1261 
(5th Cir. 1973). A more detailed explanation of the 
background and interrelationship of Chapters X and 
XI can be found in American Trailer, supra, and 
Texas Consumer Finance, supra. 
[3] In that regard, a Chapter X reorganization 
provides for extensive jurisdictional and judicial 
control over the proceedings and administration of a 
corporation, while a Chapter XI arrangement is 
intended to provide a quick efficient method of 
implementing a composition among the debtor's 
general creditors with minimal court involvement. 
American Trailer, supra, T-Anchor Corp. v. 
Travarillo Associates, 529 S. W.2d 622 
(Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1975, no writ). Moreover, 
Breinieg, supra, points out that certain provisions of 
Chapters I-VII, 11 U.S.C.A. ss 1 et seq. (1966) are 
also applicable to the jurisdiction of a Chapter XI 
case. 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.10, 3.11 (14th ed. 
1974). The jurisdiction of a Chapter XI Bankruptcy 
Court is somewhat broader, however, than that 
under Chapters I-VII. Pocono Racing Management 
Association, Inc. v. Banks, 434 F.Supp. 507, 509 
(M.D.Pa.1977); 1 Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. 
Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400 F.Supp. 280 
(N.D.Ga.I975); 8 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.01 
(14th ed. 1974). 
Appellant contends in its brief that pendency of an 
arrangement proceeding precludes a state court 
from adjudicating any matter which might touch 
upon affairs of the corporate debtor without first 
obtaining the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. In 
sum, appellant argues that the instant suit to compel 
a shareholder's meeting is tantamount to a suit to 
oust current management, and that the potential 
result would indeed interfere with the arrangement 
debtors' affairs and the Bankruptcy Court's 
jurisdiction. We do not agree with this conclusion. 
*686 [4J[5] The mere pendency of a Chapter XI 
proceeding does not divest a state court of 
jurisdiction. Fitch v. Jones, 441 S.W.2d 187, 188 
(Tex.Sup.l969). A state claim must interfere with 
the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court in order to 
preclude a state court's jurisdiction. In re Wisconsin 
Cent. Ry. Co., 94 F.Supp. 165, 167 (D.Minn.l950) 
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. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 
261,49 S.Ct. 108,73 L.Ed. 318 (1929); In re Bush 
Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662, 665 (2nd Cir. 1935), 
Cert. denied 299 U.S. 596, 57 S.Ct. 189, 81 L.Ed. 
440 (1936); Northeastern Real Estate Securities 
Corporation v. Goldstein, 276 N.Y. 64, 11 N.E.2d 
354 (1937), (cited with approval in Fitch, supra); 8 
C.J.S. Bankruptcy s 143 (1962). Compare 6 Collier 
on Bankruptcy P 3.09 n. 18 (14th ed. 1977). 
[6][7] The Bankruptcy Court has no jurisdiction 
over the meetings of stockholders of the debtor. In 
re J. P. Linahan, Inc., III F.2d 590 (2nd Cir. 1940); 
In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., supra; see also 
Taylor v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 7 F. 381 
(C.C.E.D.Pa.1881). A Bankruptcy Court though, 
does have the power to enjoin a shareholders' 
meeting which will interfere with the administration 
of the debtors' estate. In re Public Service Holding 
Corp., 141 F.2d 425 (2nd Cir. 1944); Fitch, supra; 
6 Collier on Bankruptcy P 8.15 (14th ed. 1977). In 
the instant case, there is no evidence that the 
court-appointed receiver, or any other party, sought 
an injunction or order staying the holding of an 
annual shareholders' meeting. Indeed, the 
Bankruptcy Judge signed an order approving the 
holding of a shareholders' meeting. Furthermore, the 
mere fact that an election and possible installation 
of new directors might ultimately have had some 
indirect effect on the arrangement does not confer 
jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court. In re Bush 
Terminal Co., supra; In re New York and Worcester 
Express, Inc., 294 F.Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y.1968). 
Accordingly, we find the state court had jurisdiction 
of this matter. 
[8] Because we have concluded that the Bankruptcy 
Court did not have jurisdiction over this suit to 
compel a shareholders' meeting, and because we 
construe the scope of Rule 11-44 to be in accord 
with the substantive provisions of Chapter XI, we 
find that the automatic rule 11-44 stay of the 
Chapter XI proceeding did not preclude the district 
court's order. Mid-Jersey National Bank v. 
Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3rd Cir. 
1975). See also Matter of Cuba Electric and 
Furniture Corporation, 430 F.Supp. 689 (D.Puerto 
Rico 1977); Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett 
Bank & Trust Co., 400 F.Supp. 280, 284 
Page 8 of 11 
Page 8 
(N.D.Ga. 1 975). Appellant's first point is overruled . 
Appellant's second point first contends that the trial 
court erred in compelling an annual shareholder'S 
meeting under Article 2.24 B because Los 
Campeones failed to register its stock with V .J.P. in 
accordance with the requirements of Tex.Bus. & 
Comm.Code Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968) and in 
accordance with the corporate bylaws ofV.I.P. 
The current provisions of Article 2.24 B provide in 
pertinent part: 
" ... If the annual meeting is not held within any 
13-month period, any court of competent 
jurisdiction in the county in which the principal 
office of the corporation is located may, on the 
application of any shareholder, summarily order a 
meeting to be held .... " 
V.J.P. then directs us to Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code 
Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968), which provides in pertinent 
part: 
"Prior to due present for registration of transfer of a 
security in registered form the issuer ... may treat 
the registered owner as the person exclusively 
entitled to vote, to receive notifications and 
otherwise to exercise all the rights and powers of an 
owner." 
Article III Section 1 of the V.J.P. bylaws contains a 
similar provision. Appellant, further asserts that the 
evidence is undisputed that Los Cam peones failed 
to present its stock for registration to V.J.P. In 
effect, V.I.P. argues that if an issuer may treat an 
unregistered shareholder as having no power to 
exercise the rights and powers *687 of an owner, 
then the court under Article 2.24 B must treat an 
unregistered shareholder as having no rights to seek 
an annual shareholders' meeting. V.J.P. further 
argues that the accepted meaning of the term " 
shareholder" comports with Tex.Bus. & 
Comm.Code Ann. s 8.207(a) (1968) and actually 
means "shareholder of record," citing Mead 
Corporation v. Commissioner of International 
Revenue, 116 F.2d 187, 191 (3rd Cir. 1940). We do 
not agree with these assertions for several reasons. 
[9][I0J[IIJ[12][13J First, Section 8.207(a) deals 
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only with the relationship between the issuer and 
the shareholder. It makes no provision for a court's 
treating the unregistered shareholder in the same 
manner. Compare Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90, 
94 (3rd Cir. 1941). Second, in an analogous 
situation, unregistered shareholders are said to have 
a protectable property interest which entitles them 
to sue on behalf of the corporation regardless of 
their lack of record status. In re Pittsburg & L. E. R. 
Co., Etc., 543 F.2d 1058 (3rd Cir. 1976); 13 
Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Laws of Private 
Corporations ss 5976, 5979 (1970), 12 Id. s 5507 
(1971). Similarly, Los Campeones has a protectable 
property interest. Cooper v. Citizens Nat. Bank of 
Waco, 267 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1954, 
writ refd n. r. e.); Greenspun v. Greenspun, 194 
S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth), affd 145 
Tex. 374, 198 S.W.2d 82 (1946). And it should be 
able to protect that interest by demanding an annual 
shareholders' meeting regardless of its ability or 
desire to vote. Third, in Mead Corporation v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 116 F.2d 187 
(3rd Cir. 1940), cited by appellant for the 
proposition that "shareholder" means shareholder of 
record, the term " shareholder" there defined was 
derived from a specific tax law provision rather 
than from common usage. The plain meaning of the 
term "shareholder" is one who owns a share of 
corporate stock. Applications of Friedman, 184 
Misc. 639, 54 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1945). Fourth, it is 
fundamental that a statute should be construed as a 
whole, and that all of its parts be harmonized if 
possible. Trawalter v. Schaefer, 142 Tex. 521, 179 
S.W.2d 765 (1944); Turullols v. San Felipe Country 
Club, 458 S.W.2d 206 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 
1970, writ refd n. r. e.). Every word or phrase is 
presumed to have been used intentionally, with a 
meaning and purpose. Robertson v. State, 406 
S.W.2d 90 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1966, writ 
refd n. r. e.). 
[14J In looking at the entire Business Corporation 
Act we find that if the Legislature had intended the 
word "shareholder" in Article 2.24 B to mean " 
shareholder of record," it would have provided that 
the shareholder be one "of record" as it did in 
Article 2.25. 53 Tex.Jur.2d, Statutes ss 160, 181 
(1964). See HFG Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d 
536, 540 (7th Cir. 1947). Finally, this Court's 
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interpretation of the word "shareholder" comports 
with the purpose of the registration requirement. 
The requirement that shares be registered is 
intended for the protection of the corporation so 
that it may know who is entitled to vote, receive 
dividends, and otherwise participate in other 
managerial functions. 12 Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
Law of Private Corporations s 5489 (1971). See 
also Kerr v. Tyler Guaranty State Bank, 283 S.W. 
601 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1926, no writ). Under 
Article 2.24 B, however, the court intervenes to 
determine the status of a purported shareholder, and 
the protections provided by a registration 
requirement are not necessary. 
Further in its second point V.J.P. asserts that the 
trial court erred in ordering the meeting under 
Article 2.24 B because Los Campeones possessed a 
defective title to the shares; i. e., that it was not a 
legitimate shareholder because: 1) the foreclosure 
sale violated s 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C.A. s 77e (1971); 2) the evidence shows 
Brownsville Savings breached its agreement to 
release the pledged shares to their rightful owners; 
and 3) Brownsville Savings and Los Cam peones 
engaged in a scheme and artifice whereby they 
fraudulently obtained the V.J.P. shares. 
[15J About the general contention that Los 
Campeones possessed a defective title to its shares, 
we need not consider the merits*688 of this point 
of error because no pleadings were presented to the 
trial court concerning this defense nor was the 
matter brought to the court's attention when setting 
out the issues before the court for decision. See 
State of California Department of Mental Hygiene 
v. Bank of the Southwest National Association, 163 
Tex. 314, 354 S.W.2d 576 (1962); Smith v. Davis, 
453 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1970, 
writ refd n. r. e.); Blackmon v. Stanley, 265 S.W.2d 
695 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1954, no writ); 3 
Tex.Jur.2d Rev. Appeal & Error s 98 (1974). 
There are additional reasons why we must overrule 
this phase of the second point. V.J.P. 's contention 
that the foreclosure sale violated the 1933 Securities 
Act was never pled nor presented to the trial court; 
indeed, at trial defense counsel denied that the 
legality of the foreclosure was in issue. 
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[16][17][18] As to V.I.P.'s assertion that 
Brownsville Savings breached its agreement to 
release the V.I.P. shares, even considering this 
contention on its merits, we find there is sufficient 
evidence to support the trial judge's implied finding 
that there was no breach of contract in that Bass did 
not meet all the conditions required for Brownsville 
Savings to release the pledged shares. Relative to 
the assertion by V.J.P. of fraud, that defense as used 
in this case is an affirmative defense. Tex.R.Civ.P. 
94. Here the defense was waived by V.J.P. 's failure 
to plead it or have it acted on by the trial court. 
Petroleum Anchor Equipment, Inc. v. Tyra, 419 
S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Sup.l967); Parliament Insurance 
Company v. L.B. Foster Co., 533 S.W.2d 43, 50 
(Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n. r. 
e.). Furthermore, even if V.I.P. had properly plead 
and preserved this contention, we find there was 
sufficient evidence to support the court's implied 
conclusion that V.I.P. did not meet its burden in 
proving that Brownsville Savings defrauded V.I.P. 
Appellant's second point is overruled. 
[19J In V.I.P.'s third point it alleges that the trial 
court erred in refusing to permit V.J.P.'s counsel to 
review court exhibits 1 through 4, 6 and 7, and in 
refusing to admit exhibits 1 and 4 into evidence. 
Pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum Robert 
Knowles was ordered to deliver to the court 
Brownsville Savings' correspondence file relevant 
to Los Campeones. The Court reviewed seven 
documents and admitted court exhibit number 5 into 
evidence. The rest were considered privileged 
information and V.I.P. 's counsel was not permitted 
to review them. The privilege was claimed under 
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a s 3.07 (1964), 
which provides in pertinent part: 
"The books and records pertaining to the accounts 
and loans of members shall be kept confidential by 
the Commissioner, his examiners and 
representatives, except when disclosure thereof 
shall be compelled by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, and no member or other person shall 
have access to the books and records . . . except 
upon express action and authority of the board of 
directors." 
V.I.P. submits that the language of Section 3.07 
quoted above does not apply to correspondence, but 
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only to books and records of a more formal nature. 
We disagree. Sections 3.07 also provides:"Every 
member shall have the right to inspect such books 
and records of an association as pertain to his loan, 
Permanent Reserves Funds Stock or savings 
Account." 
In construing statutes every word or phrase is 
presumed to have been used intentionally, with a 
meaning and purpose. Robertson, supra. We do not 
think the Legislature intended to eliminate 
correspondence from the phrase "books and records 
", and thereby prevent members from inspecting 
their own correspondence. 
V.I.P. also asserts that Section 3.07 does not apply 
to litigants of a formal lawsuit but is meant to apply 
to the "Commissioner, his examiners and 
representatives". The clear language of the statute 
refutes this contention in stating "no member or 
other person shall have access to the books and 
records ... " 
*689 [20] V.I.P. further maintains that Section 3.07 
provides that a court of competent jurisdiction may 
order disclosure of the correspondence herein, and 
that the subpoena duces tecum was tantamount to 
such an order. Rule 167, T.R.C.P., pertaining to the 
production of documents, provides a party shall 
only produce such documents as are "not privileged" 
. We hold that these documents were privileged and 
V.I.P. 's counsel did not have a right to view them. 
[21 J V.I.P. also appears to complain that Section 
3.07 does not preclude the admission into evidence 
of such undisclosed communications where they are 
material to the suit. A provision similar to Article 
852a s 3.07; i. e., Article 1136a-9 (parts of which 
are now in Article 852a s 11.18), was interpreted to 
preclude the discoverability of certain reports in 
Falkner v. Gibraltar Savings Association, 348 
S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1961, writ refd 
n. r. e.). See also Benson v. San Antonio Savings 
Association, 374 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.Sup.l963). We 
agree with these decisions and find Section 3.07 
confers a privilege upon which a trial court may 
exclude certain evidence. V.I.P.'s third point is 
overruled. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND 3{)(fflff 
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 7 0 
http://web2.westlaw.com/printiprintstream . aspx?prft= HTMLE&destination=a tp&sv=S plit... 2/28/2007 
568 S.W.2d 680 
568 S.W.2d 680 
(Cite as: 568 S.W.2d 680) 
[22] V.J.P. complains in its fourth point that the trial 
court erred in permitting the witness Knowles to 
testify, over objection, concerning Bill Bass' 
statement about an audit report because such 
testimony was hearsay as to the report. We need not 
consider the merits of this contention in that without 
findings of fact and conclusions of law we presume 
the trial judge disregarded evidence which might 
have been improperly received. Gray v. Bird, 380 
S.W.2d 908 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1964, writ refd n. 
r. e.). See also Yzaguirre v. State, 427 S.W.2d 687 
(Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1968, no writ); 4 
Tex.Jur.2d Rev. Appeal & Error s 720 n. 17 (I 974). 
V.I.P.'s fourth point is overruled. 
[23] Los Cam peones by cross-point argues that the" 
summary" nature of an Article 2.24 B order makes 
it unappealable and final in the trial court and that 
consequently this Court is without jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal. We do not agree. The judgment 
rendered by the trial court on September 7, 1977, 
was a final judgment in that it disposed of all 
matters involved in the suit and determined the 
rights of all parties in the suit. North East 
Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 
S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Sup.1966); McHenry v. Shelton, 
456 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1970, 
no writ). Consequently, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 
1819 (I 964) confers jurisdiction on this Court for 
purposes of this appeal. The cross-point and 
motions to dismiss the appeal contentions of Los 
Campeones are overruled. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Tex.Civ.App., 1978. 
Valley Intern. Properties, Inc. v. Los Campeones, 
Inc. 
568 S.W.2d 680 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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An attorney was simultaneously representing two 
closely held family-run corporations and two of the 
three shareholders (and directors) of those 
corporations in a shareholder's derivative action. 
Those two shareholders were accused of 
embezzling from the corporations and subjecting 
them to penalties for tax fraud. The trial court 
granted the motion brought by the third shareholder 
to disqualifY the attorney from representing the 
corporations, but allowed the attorney to continue 
with representation of the other two shareholders in 
the litigation. (Superior Court of San Mateo County, 
Nos. 386666 and 390289, Harlan K. Veal, Judge.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting in 
part and denying in part the motion for 
disqualification. The court held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it disqualified the 
attorney from representing the corporations, since it 
was clear that the interests of the corporations and 
the shareholders were diverse. In addition, under 
Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-600, the two 
shareholders could not as directors consent to the 
dual representation. The court further held that the 
motion for disqualification was timely filed, since 
any delays were occasioned by settlement 
negotiations, and the two shareholders had notice of 
the third shareholder's wish to disqualifY their 
attorney from the outset of the third shareholder's 
representation by independent counsel. In addition, 
the court held that the attorney's continuing 
representation of his individual shareholder clients 
was permissible. Because the functioning of these 
closely held corporations had been so intertwined 
with the individual defendants that any distinction 
between them was entirely fictional, application of a 
strict rule of disqualification would be meaningless. 
(Opinion by Kline, P. J., with Haerle and Lambden, 
JJ., concurring.) 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports 
(1) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of 
Former Clients--Motion to DisqualifY--*66 
Appellate Review of Ruling. 
An order granting or denying a motion to disqualifY 
counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The 
trial court's exercise of discretion is limited by 
applicable legal principles and is subject to reversal 
when there is no reasonable basis for the action 
taken. 
[See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) 
Attorneys, § 134.] 
(2) Attorneys at Law § 10--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Motion to DisqualifY. 
The issue of disqualification of an attorney 
ultimately involves a conflict between the clients' 
right to counsel of their choice and the need to 
maintain ethical standards of professional 
responsibility. The paramount concern, though, 
must be the preservation of public trust in the 
scrupulous administration of justice and the 
integrity of the bar. The recognized and important 
right to counsel of one's choosing must yield to 
considerations of ethics that run to the very integrity 
ofthe judicial process. 
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(3) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of 
Former Clients--Successive Representation of 
Adverse Clients. 
When an attorney's conflict of interest arises from 
successive representation of clients with potentially 
adverse interests, the chief fiduciary value 
jeopardized is that of client confidentiality. The 
initial question in such cases is whether there is a 
substantial relationship between the subjects of the 
former and current representations. If a substantial 
relationship exists, the court will presume that 
confidences were disclosed during the former 
representation which may have value in the current 
relationship. 
(4) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of 
Former Clients--Simultaneous Representation of 
Adverse Clients. 
When an attorney's conflict of interest arises from 
simultaneous representations of clients with 
potentially adverse interests, the primary value is 
the attorney's duty-and the client's legitimate 
expectation-of loyalty, rather than confidentiality. 
Representation adverse to a present client must be 
measured not so much against the similarities in 
litigation as against the duty of undivided loyalty 
which an attorney owes to each of his or her clients. 
In all but a few instances, the rule of 
disqualification in simultaneous representation 
cases is an automatic one. The strict proscription 
against dual representation of clients with adverse 
interests derives from a concern with protecting the 
integrity of the attorney-client relationship rather 
than from concerns with the risk of specific acts of 
disloyalty or diminution of the quality of the 
attorney's representation. *67 
(5) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest--Simultaneous 
Representation of Corporation and Directors in 
Shareholders' Derivative Action. 
In a shareholder's derivative action in which the 
same attorney simultaneously represented two 
closely held family-run corporations and two of the 
three shareholders (and directors) of those 
corporations, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it disqualified the attorney from 
representing the corporations, since the 
shareholders were accused of embezzling from the 
corporations and subjecting them to penalties for 
tax fraud. It was clear that the interests of the 
corporations and the shareholders were diverse. In 
addition, under Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-600, the 
two shareholders could not as directors consent to 
the dual representation. 
[See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) 
Attorneys, § 139.J 
(6) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest and Remedies of 
Former Clients--Motion to Disqualify--Timeliness. 
In a shareholder's derivative action, a motion for 
disqualification of an attorney who simultaneously 
represented two closely held family-run 
corporations and two of the corporation's three 
shareholders (and directors) was timely filed. 
Although inexcusable delay may occasion denial of 
a motion to disqualify counsel, the delay must be 
extreme in terms of time and consequence. The two 
shareholders had notice of the third shareholder's 
wish to disqualify their attorney from the outset of 
the third shareholder's representation by 
independent counsel. Any delays in bringing the 
motion were occasioned by settlement negotiations. 
Once that settlement was repudiated, the third 
shareholder obtained the deposition transcript 
containing damning admissions of embezzlement 
and tax fraud against the corporation by one of the 
shareholders under representation, and filed the 
motion to disqualify. Given this history, the attorney 
and his individual clients could not have been 
misled into thinking that the third shareholder had 
consented to the adverse representation. 
(7) Attorneys at Law § 15--Attorney-client 
Relationship--Conflict of Interest--Shareholders' 
Derivative Action--Continuing Representation of 
Individual Directors. 
In a shareholder's derivative action in which the 
same attorney simultaneously represented two 
closely held family-run corporations and two of the 
three shareholders (and directors) of those 
corporations, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it disqualified the attorney from 
representing the corporations, yet allowed the 
attorney to continue with his individual 
representation of the shareholders. The shareholders 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND 39 F k.k 
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
http://web2.westlaw.com/printlprintstream .aspx?prft= HTMLE&destination=atp&sv=Split... 2/28/2007 
Page 3 ofl3 
58 CaI.App.4th 65 Page 3 
58 CaI.App.4th 65, 67 CaI.Rptr.2d 857, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7806, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,541 
(Cite as: 58 Cal.AppAth 65) 
were accused of embezzling from *68 the 
corporations and sUbjecting them to penalties for 
tax fraud. While dual representation of a 
corporation and its directors in shareholder 
derivative litigation is impermissible (at least if the 
directors are charged with fraud), the attorney who 
formerly represented both clients may continue to 
represent the individual ones. This rule recognizes 
that while the corporation's attorney is nominally 
the corporation's representative, his or her personal 
loyalties will inevitably be to the insider executives 
who hired him or her. Because the functioning of 
these closely held corporations had been so 
intertwined with the individual defendants that any 
distinction between them was entirely fictional, 
application of a strict rule of disqualification would 
have been meaningless. 
COUNSEL 
Corey, Luzaich, Gemello, Manos & Pliska and 
Dario de Ghetaldi for Defendants and Appellants. 
David M. McKim for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
KLINE, P. J. 
This case raises issues pertaining to a motion to 
disqualifY the attorney simultaneously representing 
two closely held, family-run corporations, and two 
of the corporations' three shareholders. The trial 
court granted the motion to disqualifY the attorney 
from representation of the corporate parties, but 
allowed him to continue his representation of the 
individuals. The minority director/shareholder 
appeals, contending the court erred in failing to 
grant the disqualification motion In full. The 
corporations, on cross-appeal, urge the trial court 
erred in granting the motion at all. 
Statement of the Case and Facts 
This case involves a dispute between the three 
shareholders of Ba-Cel, Inc. (a corporation 
primarily engaged in the business of automobile 
towing and now known as Michael W. Forrest, 
Inc.), and Elgin Auto Body, Inc. (a corporation 
primarily engaged in the business of automobile 
body repair and now known as Forrest Auto Body, 
Inc.). The corporations are each owned in equal 
measure by Michael W. Forrest, his wife, Sandra 
Forrest, and Sandra Forrest's brother, Ritch Ricetti. 
The three shareholders were each officers and 
directors of the corporations until September 22, 
1994, when the Forrests purportedly removed 
Ricetti from office. *69 
On January 26, 1994, Michael W. Forrest and 
Ba-Cel, Inc., filed a complaint (No. 386666) for 
damages and declaratory relief against John M. 
Baeza, a former officer and 50 percent shareholder 
of Ba-Cel, Inc., and various insurance companies 
and brokers. The complaint alleged Baeza had 
procured inadequate liability insurance for the 
corporation before selling his interest. The plaintiffs 
were represented by David M. McKim. 
On June 14, 1994, Baeza filed a cross-complaint for 
indemnity against Michael Forrest, Sandra Forrest, 
Ritch Ricetti and the insurance defendants. McKim 
filed an answer to the cross-complaint on behalf of 
Michael and Sandra Forrest (the Forrests) and 
Ricetti. 
On November 23, 1994, a new attorney was 
substituted as counsel for Ricetti. 
On November 28, 1994, McKim filed on behalf of 
the Forrests and Elgin Auto Body, Inc., a complaint 
(No. 390289) for damages, contribution and 
equitable subrogation against Ricetti and Baeza. FNI 
The complaint alleged malfeasance against 
Elgin by Ricetti, and a conspiracy between Ricetti 
and Baeza to drive the Forrests out of the business 
and enable Baeza to repurchase stock at a 
discounted price. The plaintiffs sought contribution 
for amounts owed by Ricetti on the promissory 
notes by which the corporation's stock had been 
purchased, alleging Ricetti had failed to pay these 
amounts and the Forrests had done so in order to 
avoid foreclosure upon their home, which secured 
the notes. They further sought equitable subrogation 
to the secured obligations held by Baeza and 
Celestre. 
FNI The complaint also named as a 
defendant Julio Ricetti, father of Ritch 
Ricetti and Sandra Forrest. According to 
the allegations of subsequent pleadings, 
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Baeza and Carmelo Celestre had sold their 
Elgin and Ba-Cel stock to the Forrests and 
Julio Ricetti; the latter then transferred his 
shares to Ritch Ricetti. 
On December 9, 1994, Ricetti filed notice of a 
motion for appointment of a receiver to manage the 
affairs of Elgin and Ba-Cel. He also filed the first of 
his motions to disqualifY McKim as counsel for the 
Forrests and the corporations in the two pending 
cases, alleging a conflict of interest due to McKim's 
prior representation of the Forrests, the corporations 
and Ricetti in the litigation. 
On January 23, 1995, the trial court denied Ricetti's 
motions to disqualifY McKim and to appoint a 
receiver, and granted his motions for leave to file a 
cross-complaint and to consolidate the two cases. 
Ricetti filed a crosscomplaint against the Forrests, 
the corporations, and the insurance parties. Ricetti 
alleged the corporations were alter egos of the 
Forrests; the Forrests *70 made personal use of 
assets and funds of the corporations, transferred 
assets and funds of the corporations to themselves 
without adequate consideration, and operated the 
corporations to Ricetti's detriment. He further 
alleged that the Forrests improperly removed Ricetti 
as a director and officer of the corporations at a 
meeting on September 22, 1994. Among other 
things, Ricetti sought damages, removal of the 
Forrests as directors, and winding up and 
dissolution of the corporations (for the protection of 
Ricetti as the minority shareholder). 
In April 1995, Sandra Forrest's deposition was 
taken. As evidenced by the excerpts included in the 
record, she testified that cash brought into Ba-Cel 
was recorded on deposit slips, except that before 
Ricetti left, the Forrests and Ricetti each received 
$500 a week that was not recorded. After Ricetti's 
departure, everything was recorded except cash 
overtime payments to four employees. Forrest also 
stated that prior to Ricetti's departure she would " 
skim" from lien sales, with Ricetti receiving 
one-third of the money. Forrest kept a record of the 
income not recorded on the deposit slips, so that the 
corporation's total income could be ascertained by 
consulting this record plus the deposit slips. The 
income reflected in this separate record, however, 
was not reported on the corporation's income tax 
returns or on the Forrests' or Ricetti's returns. The 
cash payments Forrest made to employees were not 
reported to federal or state authorities or to the 
corporation's accountant. Forrest denied using 
undeposited cash for personal purposes. Forrest 
testified that a check from Julio Ricetti, for the 
purchase of an engine through Elgin, was at Ritch 
Ricetti's direction cashed and split three ways 
between Ricetti and the Forrests. 
On January 19, 1996, Ricetti filed a second motion 
to disqualifY McKim. In his accompanying 
declaration, Ricetti alleged that his inspection of the 
corporate records revealed embezzlement by the 
Forrests from the corporations. Ricetti· submitted 
excerpts from Sandra Forrest's deposition and took 
the position that Sandra Forrest had admitted 
embezzlement, tax fraud and other crimes, creating 
an actual conflict of interest between the Forrests 
and the corporations that could not be waived. 
On February 22, 1996, the parties stipulated to have 
the disqualification motion determined by retired 
Justice Robert Kane, a referee. 
In opposition to the motion to disqualifY, the 
Forrests submitted a joint declaration affirming 
their wish, as individuals and as shareholders of the 
corporations, to have McKim continue his 
representation. The Forrests stated they had taken 
no cash distribution from either corporation for 
which Ricetti did not get a corresponding 
proportionate share; no creditor of either *71 
corporation ever went unpaid because of cash 
distributions to the shareholders; and two 
accountants had been retained and had begun to 
redo the corporate tax returns to account for the 
cash withdrawals. They further stated that 
throughout McKim's representation, the 
corporations had had separate general counsel. The 
Forrests felt Ricetti's disqualification motion had 
been brought, on the eve of trial, for purposes of 
harassment. In their brief opposing the 
disqualification motion, the Forrests noted that if 
Ricetti was permitted to amend his cross-complaint 
to allege a derivative action against the Forrests and 
the corporations regarding the purported 
embezzlement and tax related liabilities, McKim " 
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arguably" would be prohibited from joint 
representation as to those issues. 
The Forrests also submitted the declaration of Ron 
Ferretti, a retired San Mateo County Sheriff, who 
stated that he had on several occasions observed 
Sandra Forrest hand Ricetti "a thick wad of currency 
" saying "here's your money" or "here's your share," 
creating the impression Forrest was giving Ricetti 
his share of the businesses' profits. Ferretti also 
declared he had been present at the Forrests' home 
when Ricetti asked Sandra Forrest to keep his 
$6,000 share of cash in the wall safe until he could 
obtain his own safe. The declaration of Hattie 
Ferretti related the same incident. 
McKim's declaration in opposition to the motion to 
disqualify stated that a subpoena of Ricetti's bank 
records showed his use of his checking account 
dropped dramatically after he became a shareholder 
and rose again after the Forrests stopped making 
cash distributions in the summer of 1994, and that 
Ricetti wrote checks to "cash" before becoming a 
shareholder and after being terminated as an officer, 
but not in between. 
Ricetti in turn, submitted deposition testimony, in 
which he denied ever receiving cash distributions 
from the corporations or the Forrests, or knowing 
the Forrests or corporation employees were 
receiving cash distributions or payments. With 
respect to his bank records, Ricetti did not 
remember why the number of checks written 
dropped, but explained it rose again after he was 
terminated from the corporations because he was at 
home all the time and took responsibility for paying 
more bills. Ricetti denied ever asking Sandra 
Forrest to keep cash for him in her safe. Ricetti also 
submitted the declaration of his father stating he had 
overheard Michael Forrest and Ron Ferretti 
agreeing to falsely represent that Ferretti was an 
employee of Ba-Cel on Ferretti's application for a 
mortgage. Ricetti's own declaration made further 
accusations against the Forrests, the Ferrettis and 
McKim. FN2 
FN2 Ricetti accused the Forrests, the 
Ferrettis and McKim of making false 
statements in their declarations regarding 
Ricetti's conduct and intentions and 
accused Ron Ferretti and the Forrests of 
improper conduct. Ricetti additionally 
charged that the Forrests had succeeded in 
defeating the first motion to disqualify 
McKim in part by submitting perjurous 
declarations from themselves, McKim and 
Frank Blum (former corporate counsel) 
stating that at the time of the Forrests' and 
Ricetti's initial meeting with McKim about 
filing the original lawsuit, Ricetti was 
neither an officer nor a director of either of 
the corporations. Ricetti also stated his 
belief that the Forrests were continuing to 
steal money from the corporations. 
At the hearing before Justice Kane on March 11, 
1996, McKim argued there was no actual conflict 
between the Forrests and the corporations due to *72 
the cash distributions and improper tax reporting 
because the Forrests had hired two accountants who 
were straightening out the situation. McKim urged 
that Ricetti's claims that the Forrests took money for 
their own use were personal, not derivative claims 
of the corporations, because if as the Forrests 
maintained Ricetti participated equally in the 
distributions, they were lawful distributions agreed 
to by the only three shareholders of the 
corporations. McKim also claimed any conflict was 
waived by the Forrests as shareholders of the 
corporations. 
On March 15, 1996, Ricetti filed his first amended 
cross-complaint adding derivative causes of action 
for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting, and 
deleting the cause of action for involuntary 
dissolution of the corporations. 
On April 1, 1996, the referee signed an order 
denying the motion to disqualify McKim. The 
referee found no actual conflict, based on the record 
existing at the time of the motion, and held damage 
to the corporations would have to be alleged by 
means of a derivative action. The referee further 
found any conflict had been effectively waived by a 
majority of the corporations' shareholders. 
Ricetti filed objections to the referee's decision and 
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a new motion for disqualification based on his 
derivative action against the Forrests. On June 3, 
1996, the court found no abuse of discretion in the 
referee's decision and appointed Justice Kane to 
hear the new motion for disqualification. The 
parties agreed to argue the matter without further 
briefing. 
On June 20, 1996, after a hearing which was not 
reported, the referee granted the motion to 
disqualifY as to McKim's representation of the 
corporations but denied it as to his representation of 
the Forrests. The superior court's order adopting the 
referee's decision was filed on June 27, 1996. 
On July 10, 1996, Ricetti filed a petition for writ of 
mandate (Ricetti v. Superior Court, No. A074866). 
The petition was denied on July 25, 1996, on the 
ground that an order denying a motion to disqualifY 
counsel is appealable. 
Ricetti filed a timely notice of appeal on July 29, 
1996, appealing the decision to allow McKim to 
continue to represent the Forrests. The corporations 
filed a notice of cross-appeal seeking review of the 
decision to disqualifY McKim from representation 
of the corporations. *73 
Discussion 
(1) An order granting or denying a motion to 
disqualifY counsel is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. (Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055 [8 
Cal.Rptr.2d 228]; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. 
Tracinda Corp. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 [ 
43 Cal.Rptr.2d 327].) "The trial court's exercise of 
discretion is limited by applicable legal principles 
and is subject to reversal when there is no 
reasonable basis for the action taken." ( 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 
atp.1838.) 
(2) "The issue of disqualification 'ultimately 
involves a conflict between the clients' right to 
counsel of their choice and the need to maintain 
ethical standards of professional responsibility. The 
paramount concern, though, must be the 
preservation of public trust in the scrupulous 
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. 
The recognized and important right to counsel of 
one's choosing must yield to considerations of 
ethics that run to the very integrity of our judicial 
process.' (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. 
Tracinda Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1838, 
quoting In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 
232 Cal.App.3d 572, 585 [283 Cal.Rptr. 732].) 
(3) Rule 3-310 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
of the State Bar of California FN3 provides in 
pertinent part: "(C) A member shall not, without the 
informed written consent of each client: [1] (2) 
Accept or continue representation of more than one 
client in a matter in which the interests of the clients 
actually conflict ... [~] (E) A member shall not, 
without the informed written consent of the client or 
former client, accept employment adverse to the 
client or former client where, by reason of the 
representation of the client or former client, the 
member has obtained confidential information 
material to the employment." 
FN3 All further references to rules will be 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
State Bar of California unless otherwise 
specified. 
Where an attorney's conflict arises from successive 
representation of clients with potentially adverse 
interests, "the chief fiduciary value jeopardized is 
that of client confidentiality." (Flatt v. Superior 
Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 283 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 
537, 885 P.2d 950], italics in original.) The initial 
question in such cases is whether there is a " 
substantial relationship" between the subjects of the 
former and current representations. (Ibid.; 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1839; Truck Ins. 
Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.) "If a substantial 
relationship exists, courts will presume that 
confidences were disclosed during the former 
representation which may have *74 value in the 
current relationship." (Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056; Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p.283.) 
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(4) A different test is utilized where the attorney's 
conflict arises from simultaneous representations. " 
The primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous 
or dual representation is the attorney's duty-and the 
client's legitimate expectation-of loyalty, rather than 
confidentiality." (Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 
Cal. 4th at p. 284, italics in original; 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. V. Tracinda Corp., 
supra, 36 Cal.AppAth at p. 1839.) " 
'[R]epresentation adverse to a present client must be 
measured not so much against the similarities in 
litigation, as against the duty of undivided loyalty 
which an attorney owes to each of his clients.' " ( 
Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 
supra, 6 Cal.AppAth at p. 1056, italics in original.) 
"[I]n all but a few instances, the rule of 
disqualification in simultaneous representation 
cases is a per se or 'automatic' one. [Citations.] [~] 
The reason for such a rule is evident, even (or 
perhaps especially) to the nonattorney. A client who 
learns that his or her lawyer is also representing a 
litigation adversary, even with respect to a matter 
wholly unrelated to the one for which counsel was 
retained, cannot long be expected to sustain the 
level of confidence and trust in counsel that is one 
of the foundations of the professional relationship." 
(Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 285.) 
The strict proscription against dual representation 
of clients with adverse interests thus derives from a 
concern with protecting the integrity of the 
attorney-client relationship rather than from 
concerns with the risk of specific acts of disloyalty 
or diminution of the quality of the attorney's 
representation. (Developments in the Law-Coriflicts 
of Interest in the Legal Profession (1981) 94 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1244, 1295-1302.) 
(5) In the present case, McKim is in the position of 
simultaneously representing the Forrests and the 
corporations they are accused of embezzling from 
and subjecting to penalties for tax fraud. In the 
context of the third disqualification motion-the only 
one before us for review-the corporations are 
nominal defendants in a shareholder's derivative 
suit. In such a suit, the corporation, while nominally 
a defendant, is actually a plaintiff; if the allegations 
of Ricetti's cross-complaint are proved, the 
corporations stand to benefit from recovery for the 
Forrests' wrongful actions. (Cannon V. u.s. 
Acoustics Corporation (N.D.Ill. 1975) 398 F.Supp. 
209,213-214.) Current case law clearly forbids dual 
representation of a corporation and directors in a 
shareholder derivative suit, at least w.here, as here, 
the directors are alleged to have committed fraud. ( 
Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Bolger (3d Cir. 1993) 2 FJd 
1304, 1317; Musheno V. Gensemer (M.D.Pa. 1995) 
897 F.Supp. 833, 838; In re Orade Securities 
Litigation (N.D.Cal. 1993) *75829 F.Supp. 1176, 
1188; Messing V. FDI, Inc. (D.N.J. 1977) 439 
F.Supp. 776; Lewis V. Shaffer Stores Company 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) 218 F.Supp. 238, 239.) 
We are aware of one California case holding that, 
prior to an adjudication that the corporation is 
entitled to relief against its officers or directors, the 
same attorney may represent both. (Jacuzzi V. 
Jacuzzi Brothers, Inc. (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 1, 
35-36 [52 Cal.Rptr. 147].) Jacuzzi has been 
criticized as illogical and against the weight of 
authority. (In re Oracle Securities Litigation, supra, 
829 F.Supp. at p. 1188, fn. 8; Patton, 
Disqualification of Corporate Counsel in 
Derivative Actions: Jacuzzi and the Inadequacy oj 
Dual Representation (1979) 31 Hastings L.J. 347.) 
As stated in Lewis V. Shaffer Stores Company, supra 
, 218 F.Supp. at page 239, the merits of the action 
(which will determine whether there is in fact 
adversity between the corporation and directors in a 
derivative suit) should not be determined in the 
context of a motion to disqualify counsel. Here, 
under the allegations of the cross-complaint, it is 
clear that the interests of the corporations and the 
Forrests are adverse. 
Respondents/cross-appellants (the Forrests and 
corporations) FN4 urge there is no conflict between 
the Forrests' interests and the corporations' with 
respect to either the embezzlement claims or the tax 
fraud issues. On the first point, they take the 
position all the distributions they received from the 
corporations were shared in equal measure by 
Ricetti, having been agreed to by the three 
directors/shareholders of the corporations. While 
this is the picture painted by Sandra Forrest's 
deposition testimony and the Forrests' declaration, 
inferentially supported by their other evidence of 
Ricetti being seen in possession of significant sums 
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of cash, Ricetti denied ever receIving cash 
distributions from the corporations or knowing the 
Forrests were receiving cash distributions. Which 
side of this story is to be believed has yet to be 
determined in this action. As for the tax fraud 
issues, the Forrests concede the corporations could 
be liable for taxes, interest and penalties, yet argue 
there is no conflict because the officers would be 
personally liable to the same extent as the 
corporation, and the Forrests hired accountants to 
correct the payroll reporting. The latter point does 
not resolve the question whether the corporation 
will be liable for penalties, nor whether accountants 
hired by the Forrests will be sufficiently 
independent to properly resolve the financial issues. 
The former point assumes Ricetti's knowledge of 
the Forrests' conduct, a matter as yet undetermined. 
The court did not abuse its *76 discretion in finding 
an actual conflict between the interests of the 
Forrests and the corporations. 
FN4 The "Respondents' and 
Cross-Appellants' Brief' was filed by 
McKim on behalf of the Forrests, who did 
not file a notice of appeal from the trial 
court's order. Some of the arguments made 
are clearly on behalf of the corporations, 
which did file a notice of appeal, and the 
brief makes no attempt to distinguish 
which arguments are made on behalf of 
which party. The "Cross-Appellants' Reply 
Brief' was filed by McKim on behalf of 
the corporations. 
Respondents urge any conflict was legally waived 
by the Forrests' consent, as shareholders of the 
corporations, to the dual representation. Rule 
3-600(E), provides: "A member representing an 
organization may also represent any of its directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or 
other constituents, subject to the provisions of rule 
3-310. If the organization's consent to the dual 
representation is required by rule 3-310, the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate constituent of the 
organization other than the individual or constituent 
who is to be represented, or by the shareholder(s) or 
organization members." According to respondents, 
the Forrests, as holders of two-thirds of the 
corporations' stock, could and did validly consent to 
McKim's representation on behalf of the 
corporations. 
The referee'S view on this issue was succinctly 
stated in its order: "[IJn the face of a derivative 
cause of action, to permit the Forrests to waive the 
conflict on behalf of the corporations would be the 
equivalent of denying Mr. Ricetti's derivative claim 
out of hand-a legally impermissible action." 
Clearly, under rule 3-600, the Forrests could not 
consent to the representation on behalf of the 
corporations in their capacity as directors of the 
corporations. In the circumstances here, where the 
only shareholders of the corporations are also the 
directors involved in the controversy, to allow the 
shareholders to consent on behalf of the corporation 
would render rule 3-600 meaningless. 
Indeed, commentators and case law alike have 
concluded that reliance on consent is ill founded in 
the context of derivative litigation. Thus, in Cannon 
V. u.s. Acoustics Corporation, supra, 398 F.Supp. 
at page 216, footnote 10, the court stated: "[Ethical 
Consideration] 5-16 [of the American Bar 
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility] 
provides that in some circumstances multiple 
representation may be permissible if both clients are 
fully informed of potential conflict and the parties 
consent to the representation. This consent rationale 
seems peculiarly inapplicable to a derivative suit, 
because the corporation must consent through the 
directors, who, as in the present case, are the 
individual defendants. See Opinion 842, 
Association of the City of New York Committee on 
Professional Ethics (Jan. 4, 1960), 15 Record 
N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960)." Messing v. FDI, Inc., supra 
, 439 F.Supp. at page 784, in discussing an alleged 
conflict between representation of corporate 
directors charged with fraud and directors charged 
with negligence, noted: "However, in contrast to the 
question of the joint representation of the directors 
and the corporation, here there are individuals who 
are capable of informed consent and who can act 
independently of each other." In *77 In re Oracle 
Securities Litigation, supra, 829 F.Supp. at page 
1189, the court stated: "It is also clear that an 
inanimate corporate entity, which is run by directors 
who are themselves defendants in the derivative 
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litigation, cannot effectively waive a conflict of 
interest as might. an individual under applicable 
professional rules such as [rules] 3-600(E) and 
3-310." One commentator noted: "But it would be 
meaningless in derivative litigation to allow the 
consent of the parties defendant to exculpate the 
practice of dual representation, for most often it 
would be the defendant directors and officers who 
would force the corporation's consent." (Comment, 
Independent Representation for Corporate 
Defendants in Derivative Suits (1965) 74 Yale L.J. 
524,528.) 
(6) Respondents also assert the disqualification 
motion should have been denied because it was not 
timely filed. They base this contention on the 
assertion that Ricetti "was aware of the cash 
withdrawals nearly a year before making the motion. 
" No citation to the record is provided to clarifY this 
assertion. We presume it is based on the fact that 
Sandra Forrest discussed the cash distributions and 
payments upon which Ricetti's allegations of 
embezzlement and tax fraud are based in her 
deposition in April 1995, but the motion to 
disqualifY McKim based on Forrests' admissions 
was not filed until January 1996. 
The record reflects that Ricetti filed his first motion 
to disqualifY McKim in December 1994, within 
weeks of substituting in his new attorney. This 
motion, based on different grounds from the one 
before us for review, was denied. In April 1995, 
Sandra Forrest's deposition was taken. At this time, 
the parties entered into a settlement agreement, 
which was subsequently repudiated in July 1995. 
According to Ricetti's attorney, preparation of the 
deposition transcript was delayed as part of the 
settlement agreement. Ricetti then attempted 
unsuccessfully to have the court enter judgment on 
the settlement agreement. In November 1995, the 
court denied the motion for judgment on the 
settlement agreement and Ricetti made a written 
demand for McKim's withdrawal from 
representation. McKim refused, Ricetti's attorney 
ordered transcription of Sandra Forrest's deposition, 
and the transcript was finalized on December 15, 
1995. Ricetti's motion to disqualifY based on the 
conflict between the Forrests and corporations due 
to the alleged embezzlement and tax fraud was filed 
on January 19, 1996. The motion was denied on 
April 1, 1996; Ricetti filed the third motion for 
disqualification along with his objections to the 
referee's decision later that month. 
Although inexcusable delay may occasion denial of 
a motion to disqualifY counsel, the "delay must be 
extreme in terms of time and consequence." (River 
West, Inc. V. Nickel (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1297, 
1311 [*78234 Cal.Rptr. 33].) In River West, a 
defendant moved to disqualifY plaintiffs' attorney 
because the attorney had represented the defendant 
in a "substantially related" matter some 27 to 30 
years before. The motion was filed more than three 
years after the defendant had knowledge of the 
conflict, after the attorney had worked more than 
3,000 hours on the case, at a cost of some $387,000. 
The defendant attempted to excuse the delay by 
claiming there had been no court available to hear 
the motion due to pending motions for change of 
venue and judicial disqualification. The reviewing 
court found the excuse insufficient, as there had 
been times within the period when a judge would 
have been available and, in any case, the inability of 
a court to determine the motion did not excuse the 
defendant from filing the motion to give notice to 
the plaintiffs and their attorney of the claimed 
conflict. (188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1314.) 
In Trust Corp. of Montana V. Piper Aircraft Corp. 
(9th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 85, 87-88, upon which 
respondents rely, an objection to adverse 
representation was deemed waived where the 
objecting party had known of the conflict for two 
and a half years before seeking disqualification. 
Health Maintenance Network V. Blue Cross of So. 
California (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1064 [249 
Cal.Rptr. 220], the other case relied upon by 
respondents, is inapposite as it found a former client 
had waived objection by impliedly consenting to the 
adverse representation. The only discussion of the 
issue of delay as a waiver of a disqualification 
motion was the following statement: "Although a 
waiver of an objection to an opposing attorney by 
reason of a disqualifYing conflict of interest will 
normally not be presumed merely because of delay 
in raising such objection, a client or former client 
may consent to an attorney's acceptance of adverse 
employment and such consent may be implied by 
© 2007 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
MEMORANDUM OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT HIS MOTIONS AND 3 fj f I( kJ 
IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION "'-
http://web2.westlaw.com/printiprintstream.aspx?prfi= HTMLE&destinati on=atp&sv=S p Ii 1... 2/28/2007 
Page 10 of 13 
58 Cal.App.4th 65 Page 10 
58 Cal.App.4th 65, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 857,97 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 7806,97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,541 
(Cite as: 58 Cal.AppAth 65) 
conduct." (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1064, italics 
added.) 
In the present case, the evidence supports the trial 
court's implied finding that any delay was 
insufficiently extreme to warrant denial of the 
disqualification motion. Respondents had notice 
from the outset of Ricetti's representation by 
independent counsel that Ricetti wished to 
disqualifY McKim. Ricetti's second motion to 
disqualifY was based upon Sandra Forrest's 
statements in her April 1995 deposition, after which 
the parties entered into a settlement agreement. As 
explained in Ricetti's attorney's November 1995 
letter to McKim, Ricetti was willing to accept 
McKim's representation of the Forrests and 
corporations during the time the parties tried to 
effectuate a settlement. Once the settlement was 
repudiated, Ricetti's attempt to have the court 
enforce it failed, and McKim rejected Ricetti's 
demand that he withdraw as counsel for the Forrests 
and corporations. Ricetti then obtained the 
deposition transcript and filed the motion to 
disqualifY. The third motion to disqualifY was filed 
within weeks of the denial of the second one. Given 
the history of this case, respondents and their 
attorney could not have been *79 misled into 
thinking Ricetti consented to the adverse 
representation. Respondents have suggested no 
extreme time delay or extreme prejudice such as 
motivated the courts in River West and Health 
Maintenance Network. 
(7) Finally, Ricetti argues the trial court erred in 
failing to disqualifY McKim from representing the 
Forrests as well as the corporations. Relying 
primarily on Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 
Cal.4th 275 and Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, Ricetti 
claims the actual conflict between the interests of 
the Forrests and the corporations required that 
McKim take no further part in the litigation. 
In Truck Ins. Exchange, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & 
May (Crosby), the law firm contacted to represent 
Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) in litigation 
against Fireman's Fund Insurance Company 
(Fireman's Fund) and others discovered it had been 
defending an entity related to Fireman's Fund in two 
wrongful termination suits. Crosby asked Fireman's 
Fund if it objected to the law firm representing 
Truck in the insurance coverage case and, in the 
alternative, offered to withdraw from the wrongful 
termination cases. Fireman's Fund objected to the 
concurrent representation and stated it wished to 
have the law firm continue its role in the wrongful 
termination cases. Crosby, however, accepted 
representation of Truck and moved to withdraw 
from the wrongful termination cases. Fireman's 
Fund filed a motion to disqualifY Crosby from 
representing Truck in the insurance case, viewing 
the issue as a breach of the duty of loyalty in 
concurrent representation that required automatic 
disqualification. Truck maintained that because 
Crosby had withdrawn from the wrongful 
termination cases, Fireman's Fund was only the law 
firm's former client and disqualification was not 
required because Crosby possessed no confidential 
information that could be misused to Fireman's 
prejudice. Truck Ins. Exchange rejected Truck's 
analysis, concluding that "a law firm that knowingly 
undertakes adverse concurrent representation may 
not avoid disqualification by withdrawing from the 
representation of the less favored client before 
hearing." (6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.) 
In Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.4th page 
275, the court held that an attorney's duty of loyalty 
to an existing client negated any duty to give advice 
to a new or prospective client, representation of 
whom would irreconcilably conflict with the duty of 
loyalty to the existing client. Discussing the duty of 
loyalty, the court stated: "So inviolate is the duty of 
loyalty to an existing client that not even by 
withdrawing from the relationship can an attorney 
evade it. Thus, in Truck Ins. Exchange V. Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, the 
Court of Appeal discussed the aptly named 'hot 
potato rule,' that is, the bar on curing dual 
representation conflicts by *80 the expedient of 
severing the relationship with the preexisting 
client.... ' "[T]he principle precluding representing 
an interest adverse to those of a current client is 
based not on any concern with the confidential 
relations between attorney and client but rather on 
the need to assure the attorney's undivided loyalty 
and commitment to the client. [Citations]." , (Id at 
p. 1056.) The court went on to hold that the 
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'automatic disqualification rule applicable to 
concurrent representation [cannot] be avoided by 
unilaterally converting a present client into a former 
client prior to hearing on the motion for 
disqualification[.]' (Id. at p. 1057 .... )" (Id. at p. 
288.) 
Neither Flatt nor Truck Jns. Exchange considered 
the issue of dual representation in the context of a 
shareholder's derivative action. These cases clearly 
stand for the proposition that dual representation of 
clients with adverse interests is impermissible (in 
the absence of informed consent) and requires 
automatic disqualification. They hold that an 
attorney may not violate his or her duty of loyalty to 
an existing client by undertaking representation 
adverse to that client's interests; they do not, 
however, hold that the attorney is required to cease 
representation of either client. While that may have 
been the practical effect of Truck Ins. Exchange, as 
Crosby had withdrawn from representation of the 
first client before being disqualified from 
representing the second, this effect is a function of 
the particular facts of the case. The opinion does 
not suggest that if Crosby had not so withdrawn it 
would have been precluded from continuing to 
represent Fireman's Fund in the wrongful 
termination cases. 
In the present case, McKim did not unilaterally (or 
otherwise) decide to drop one client in preference 
for a more favored one. Rather, the court 
determined McKim could not represent both the 
Forrests and the corporations-a correct 
determination as discussed above-and required the 
corporations to secure independent counsel. This 
order is consistent with federal authority in the 
precise circumstance of attorney disqualification in 
shareholder derivative litigation, which holds that 
while dual representation of a corporation and its 
directors is impermissible (at least if the directors 
are charged with fraud), the attorney who formerly 
represented both clients may continue to represent 
the individual ones. (Musheno v. Gensemer, supra, 
897 F.Supp. at p. 838; Lewis v. Shaffer Stores 
Company, supra, 218 F.Supp. at p. 239.) These 
cases are short on reasoning, perhaps because the 
parties were not contending complete 
disqualification was required. In Lewis, the court 
stated: "The affidavit submitted by [the law firm 
representing corporation and directors] states in 
substance that the firm feels an obligation to defend 
the officers and directors whom it has advised. This 
is understandable, and I see no impropriety in their 
doing so under the circumstances of this case. 
[Citation.] [,J Plaintiff indeed does not contend 
otherwise." (*81218 F.Supp. at p. 239.) In Musheno 
, the court stated: "It is unclear whether Plaintiffs 
seek to disqualify [the attorney) from representing 
any Defendant in this litigation, or whether they 
merely seek to prevent the firm from representing 
[the corporation). In any event, there is nothing to 
prevent [the attorney) from continuing to represent 
the Directors." (897 F.Supp. at p. 838, fn. 5.) In 
Messing v. FDJ, Inc., supra, 439 F.Supp. at pages 
781-783, although the issue was not explicitly 
addressed, the court held the corporation would be 
required to obtain independent counsel without 
suggesting new counsel would also be necessary for 
the directors. 
The reasoning reflected in these decisions is 
somewhat more extensively addressed in 
commentary discussing whether the problem of dual 
representation in the shareholder derivative suit 
context is better solved by requiring independent 
counsel for the corporation or for the individual 
defendants. One author stated: "An alternative 
solution [to requiring independent counsel for the 
corporation) might be to require the insiders to 
secure new counsel, thus permitting the corporation 
to retain its original counsel. But while this 
procedure removes the outward appearances of dual 
representation, the substance of the wrong remains. 
A residual bias in favor of the individual defendants 
might continue to undermine counsel's judgment. 
This potential bias would stem from the fact that 
counsel's first loyalty might remain with the 
directors and officers of the corporation, who have 
been his principal contact with the inanimate 
corporate client in the past. In addition, counsel 
might fear that rendering advice antagonistic to the 
insiders' interests would impair future relations with 
his corporate client. For these reasons, the Lewis 
decision to have the corporation secure new counsel 
seems the sounder alternative." (Comment, 
Independent Representation for Corporate 
Defendants in Derivative Suits, supra, 74 Yale LJ. 
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at pp. 533-534, fn. omitted.) To similar effect: "It 
has been suggested that the outside lawyer ... 
represent the individual defendants, perhaps as 
[another] means of ensuring that their legal fees are 
not borne by the corporation. The better rule is to 
require that outside counsel represent the 
corporation, while the corporate attorney represents 
the insider defendant; the question of expenses 
would be decided separately. This rule recognizes 
that while the in house attorney is nominally the 
representative of the corporation, his personal 
loyalties will inevitably be to the [insider] 
executives who hired him." (Developments in the 
Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 
supra, 94 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 1341, fns. omitted.) 
Interestingly, neither of these authors so much as 
entertains the possibility of requiring complete 
disqualification of the attorney who initially 
represented both the corporation and its directors. 
Ricetti argues that the court's order allowing 
McKim to continue to represent the Forrests while 
converting the corporations to former clients, *82 
requires violation of rule 3-310(E): "A member 
shall not, without the informed written consent of 
the client or former client, accept employment 
adverse to the client or former client where, by 
reason of the representation of the client or former 
client, the member has obtained confidential 
information material to the employment." 
Technically, this rule may not even apply as McKim 
is not accepting employment but continuing his 
preexisting representation of the Forrests. 
Moreover, in the factual circumstances of this case, 
where McKim has been representing a corporation 
comprised of three shareholders solely by virtue of 
his relationship with the Forrests, acting as the 
majority directors/shareholders, it is impossible to 
conceive of confidential information McKim could 
have received from the "corporation" that is 
different from information he received from the 
Forrests. We recognize the rule that "[w]here the 
requisite substantial relationship between the 
subjects of the prior and the current representations 
can be demonstrated, access to confidential 
information by the attorney in the course of the first 
representation (relevant, by definition, to the second 
representation) is presumed and disqualification of 
the attorney's representation of the second client is 
mandatory." (Flatt V. Superior Court, supra, 9 
Cal.4th at p. 283.) The rule, however, is based on 
the need to protect scrupulously against the 
improper use of confidential information " 'This is 
the rule by necessity, for it is not within the power 
of the former client to prove what is in the mind of 
the attorney. Nor should the attorney have to " 
engage in a subtle evaluation of the extent to which 
he acquired relevant information in the first 
representation and of the actual use of that 
knowledge and information in the subsequent 
representation." .. .' " (River West, Inc. V. Nickel, 
supra, 188 Cal.AppJd at p. 1304, quoting Global 
Van Lines, Inc. V. Superior Court (1983) 144 
Cal.AppJd 483, 489 [192 Cal.Rptr. 609].) Where, 
as here, the functioning of the corporation has been 
so intertwined with the individual defendants that 
any distinction between them is entirely fictional, 
and the sole repositories of corporate information to 
which the attorney has had access are the individual 
clients, application of the "former clienf' rule 
would be meaningless. 
The order granting in part and denying in part the 
motion for disqualification is affirmed. 
Haerle, J., and Lambden, J., concurred. *83 
CaI.App.l.Dist. 
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United States District Court,M.D. Pennsylvania. 
J. Randolph MUSHENO, John R. Musheno, 
individually and on behalf of all shareholders of 
Keystone Heritage Group, Inc., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Harry Z. GENSEMER, Albert B. Murry, Ernest D. 
Williams, Jr., Raymond M. Dorsch, Jr., Donald W. 
Lesher, Jr., Mark Randolph Tice, Lance M. 
Frehafer, Charles V. Henry, III, Harlan R. Wengert, 
The Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin H. Spitler, 
Norman J. Rothermel, Kurt A. Phillips, The Estate 
of Harry T. Richwine, Bruce A. Johnson, Lebanon 
Valley "National Bank, Keystone Heritage Group, 
Inc., Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. I:CV-95-570. 
July 10,1995. 
Derivative action initiated in state court was 
removed to federal district court where plaintiff 
shareholders moved to disqualifY law firm from 
continuing its dual representation of corporation 
and its board of directors. The District Court, 
Caldwell, J., held that: (1) disqualification was 
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*834 Richard E. Freeburn, Wilt, Magdule, Freeburn, 
Harrisburg, P A, for J. Randolph Musheno, John R. 
Musheno. 
Mark M. Wilcox, Michael F. Brown, Drinker, 
Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, PA, for Harry Z. 
Gensemer, Albert B. Murry, Ernest D. Williams, 
Jr., Raymond M. Dorsch, Jr., Donald W. Lesher, 
Jr., Mark Randolph Tice, Lance M. Frehafer, 
Harlan R. Wengert, Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin 
H. Spitler, Norman 1. Rothermal, Kurt A. Phillips, 
Estate of Harry T. Richwine, Bruce A. Johnson. 
Jeffrey B. Rettig, Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, 
Harrisburg, PA, Mark M. Wilcox, Michael F. Brown 
, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, P A, for 
Charles V. Henry, III. 
Wilbur L. Kipnes, Philadelphia, P A, Mark M. 
Wilcox, Michael F. Brown, Drinker, Biddle & 
Reath, Philadelphia, P A, for Lebanon Valley 
National Bank, Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. 
MEMORANDUM 
CALDWELL, District Judge. 
We are considering the Plaintiffs' motion to 
disqualifY Defendants' counsel. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs are shareholders of Keystone 
Heritage Group, Inc. ("Keystone"). They instituted 
this action by filing a writ of summons on January 
6, 1994, in the Dauphin County Court of Common 
Pleas, against Keystone, Lebanon Valley National 
Bank ("L VNB"), and the board of directors of 
Keystone and L VNB ("Directors") FNI. The 
claims arise from two loans made by L VNB to 
Gelder, Luttrell & Associates ("GLA"). Plaintiffs 
contend that the loans were made in violation of the 
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.c. § 21 et seq., which 
limits the amount of money a bank can lend to a 
Page 2 of7 
Page 2 
single customer. 
FNI. Keystone, a bank holding company, 
engages in banking through L VNB, its 
wholly owned subsidiary. Thus, we will 
refer to Keystone and L VNB collectively 
as "Keystone". The board of directors of 
the two corporations are nearly identical. 
The Directors named as Defendants here 
are: Harry Z. Gensemer, Albert B. Murry, 
Ernest D. Williams, Jr., Raymond M. 
Dorsch, Jr., Donald W. Lesher, Jr., Mark 
Randolph Tice, Lance M. Frehafer, 
Charles V. Henry, III, Harlan R. Wengert, 
the Estate of John H. Gerdes, Elvin H. 
Spitler, Norman 1. Rothermel, Kurt A. 
Phillips, the Estate of Harry T. Richwine, 
and Bruce A. Johnson. Defendant Henry 
also served as legal counsel to Keystone. 
On January 21, 1994, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter 
of demand to Defendant Lesher requesting that 
Keystone take action against the individuals 
responsible for losses sustained as a result of illegal 
loans to GLA. On February 22, 1994, the 
Directors appointed *835 an independent 
committee to investigate Plaintiffs' demands. This 
group was composed of two non-defendant 
Directors, Thomas 1. Siegal and Brett H. Tennis, 
and independent counsel, John P. Lampi. The 
committee conducted an investigation and 
concluded that it would not be in Keystone's best 
interest to pursue legal action against the Directors 
named in Plaintiffs' writ of summons. 
After the committee's recommendation was 
accepted by Keystone, the parties moved forward in 
the state court action, engaging in pre-complaint 
discovery. On April 12, 1995, before a complaint 
was filed, the Directors removed the case to this 
court, and on May 5, 1995, Plaintiffs filed their 
complaint against Keystone, LVNB, and the 
Directors. The complaint contains seven claims, 
all arising from losses sustained in connection with 
the allegedly improper loans to GLA. 
In Count I, Plaintiffs maintain that the Directors 
violated 12 U.S.C. § 84, which limits the amount a 
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bank is permitted to lend to one customer. A 
negligence claim is made in Count II and Count III 
is a claim for self-dealing, willful misconduct, 
and/or recklessness. In Count IV, Plaintiffs 
contend that the Directors breached their fiduciary 
duty and in Count V assert that they engaged in 
fraud. Count VI alleges a conspiracy and Count 
VII is a claim for negligence against Defendant 
Charles V. Henry, as counsel for Keystone. 
The law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath ("Drinker" 
) entered an appearance in state court on behalf of 
Keystone and the Directors. Plaintiffs seek to 
disqualify Drinker from continuing its dual 
representation. They claim there is a conflict of 
interest in the representation of both Keystone and 
its Directors, and that such representation violates 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The 
Directors contend that, at this stage of the litigation, 
there is no conflict of interest, and that it is 
premature to disqualify counsel from representing 
Keystone because Keystone's interests are aligned 
with those of its Directors, i.e., to have this action 
dismissed. 
II. LAW AND DISCUSSION 
A. Disqualification 
The Plaintiffs' suit appears to be a shareholder 
derivative action. In a derivative action, suit is 
brought on behalf of a corporation, by its 
shareholders. The defendants are generally 
corporate officers and directors, as well as the 
corporation itself. However, the corporation is 
merely a "nominal" defendant, and in fact stands to 
receive a substantial benefit if the 
plaintiffs/shareholders are successful. See, e.g., 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1315 
(3d Cir.1993). Thus, the corporation is in the 
anomalous position of being both a plaintiff and a 
defendant. 
We are faced with the question of whether, within 
the confines of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, an attorney or law firm can engage in the 
joint representation of both a corporation and its 
Page 3 of7 
Page 3 
officers/directors in a derivative action. This issue 
has, to some extent, produced a split in authority. 
Early decisions adopted the position that, at least in 
the absence of a breach of trust, joint representation 
was permissible. See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 57 F.Supp. 680, 684 
(E.D.Pa.1944), affd per curiam, 155 F.2d 522 (3d 
Cir.1946); Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 279, 
72 A.2d 294, 299 (1950). 
However, more recent decisions, beginning with 
Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F.Supp. 238 
(S.D.N.Y.1963), have identified numerous 
problems with dual representation. In Lewis, the 
shareholders of a corporation brought a derivative 
action against the corporation and its board of 
directors. After counsel entered an appearance on 
behalf of the corporation and its Directors, the 
shareholders sought to disqualify the law firm from 
representing the corporation. The court stated that 
[t]he interests of the officer, director and majority 
stockholder defendants in this action are clearly 
adverse, on the face of the complaint, to the 
interests of the stockholders of [the corporation] 
other than defendants. I have no doubt that [the 
attorneys] believe in good faith that there is no 
merit to this action. Plaintiff, of course, *836 
vigorously contends to the contrary. The court 
cannot and should not attempt to pass upon the 
merits at this stage. Under all the circumstances, 
including the nature of the charges, and the vigor 
with which they are apparently being pressed and 
defended, I believe that it would be wise for the 
corporation to retain independent counsel, who 
have had no previous connection with the 
corporation, to advise it as to the position it should 
take in this controversy. 
ld. at 239-40 (citations omitted). 
In Cannon v. u.s. Acoustics Corp., 398 F.Supp. 
209 (N.D.IlU975), affd in relevant part per 
curiam, 532 F .2d 1118, 1119 (7th Cir.1976), the 
court disqualified a law firm from representing a 
corporation and its board of directors in a derivative 
action, where the complaint alleged a 
misappropriation of corporate funds by the 
Directors. Id. at 218-19. The court reached its 
decision based upon both the conflict of interest 
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between the corporation and its directors, and the 
possibility that confidences obtained from one 
client during the course of representation might be 
used to the detriment of the other. Id. The court in 
Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F.Supp. 776 (D.NJ.1977) 
, faced with a similar situation, held that the 
corporation was required to obtain independent 
counsel, "unshackled by any ties to the directors", 
to advise it of its most favorable course of action. 
[d. at 782; see also In re Oracle Securities 
Litigation, 829 F.Supp. 1176, 1188-89 
(N.D.CaU993). 
Finally, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 
1304 (3d Cir.1993), the Third Circuit was faced 
with a factual scenario similar to the present action. 
After the settlement of consumer fraud claims 
brought by the Pennsylvania Attorney General 
against Bell Atlantic, a group of shareholders made 
a demand on Bell Atlantic's board to seek recovery 
from those responsible for causing the losses. The 
board formed a special committee, which included 
independent counsel, to investigate the allegations. 
The committee recommended that the board reject 
the demand as not in the corporation's best interest. 
The committee's recommendation was adopted, and 
the shareholders instituted a derivative action 
against Bell Atlantic and its directors. After the 
shareholders and the directors reached a proposed 
settlement, a second group of shareholders filed suit 
and objected to the settlement terms. The district 
court denied their objections and approved the 
settlement. 
[1] On appeal the court addressed the issue of 
whether the settlement was invalid based on the fact 
that counsel represented both the corporation and its 
directors in the derivative action. The court first 
conducted an historical overview of the law in this 
area, citing what it identified as a "representative 
observation" of one commentator: 
There is some conflict as to the propriety of an 
attorney or law firm simultaneously representing a 
corporation and its officers and directors in a 
stockholders' derivative action. But the modern 
view is that it is generally improper due to conflict 
of interests for counsel to attempt to represent the 
corporation, on whose behalf the action has been 
instituted, while also representing the individuals 
Page 40f7 
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charged with harming the corporation for their 
wrongful conduct. 
[d. at 1316 (citing 13 William M. Fletcher, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 
6025 at 442 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991)}. However, 
the court noted that" 'independent counsel may not 
be required if the derivative claim is obviously or 
patently frivolous.' " Id. (citing Fletcher, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia § 6025, at 443). The court then turned 
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to 
determine whether dual representation was 
appropriate.FN2 
FN2. "The ethical standards imposed upon 
attorneys in federal court are a matter of 
federal law", and therefore, "[w]e look to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
to furnish the appropriate ethical standard." 
Id. (citing County of Suffolk v. Long 
Island Lighting Co., 710 F.Supp. 1407, 
1413 (E.D.N.Y.l989), afj'd, 907 F.2d 
1295 (2d Cir.1990)}. 
[2] Pursuant to MRPC 1.13, "[a] lawyer employed 
or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized 
constituents", and when "representing an 
organization may also represent any of its directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, *837 subject to the provisions of Rule 
1.7." American Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct 1.13(a), (e).FN3 In Bell 
Atlantic, the court relied upon the commentary to 
Rule 1.13, which provides, in relevant part, that: 
FN3. Rule 1.7 provides that 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if 
the representation of that client will be 
directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a cI ient if 
the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's 
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responsibilities to another client or to a 
third . person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless: 
(l) the lawyer reasonably believes the 
representation will not be adversely 
affected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. 
American Bar Ass'n, Annotated Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a). 
The question can arise whether counsel for the 
organization may defend [a derivative] action. The 
proposition that the organization is the lawyer's 
client does not alone resolve the issue. Most 
derivative actions are a normal incident of an 
organization's affairs, to be defended by the 
organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, 
if the claim involved serious charges of wrongdoing 
by those in control of the organization, a conflict 
may arise between the lawyer's duty to the 
organization and the lawyer's relationship with the 
board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs 
who should represent the directors and the 
organization. 
Id. at 1316 (citing American Bar Ass'n, Annotated 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ) (emphasis 
added). Applying this standard to the facts before 
it, the court determined that "serious charges of 
wrongdoing have not been levelled against the 
individual defendants", and that Plaintiffs alleged 
only a breach of the fiduciary duty of care, not a 
breach of the directors' duty of loyalty. ld. Thus, 
the court held that independent counsel was not 
required, and affirmed the district court's approval 
of the settlement. The underlying rationale for the 
court's decision in Bell Atlantic conclusively 
establishes that Keystone must retain independent 
counsel in the present case. 
Like the shareholders in Bell Atlantic, the Plaintiffs' 
demand to the bank, to pursue an action against the 
Directors, was investigated by an independent 
committee and determined not to be in the best 
interest of the corporation. In Bell Atlantic, the 
court relied on this fact in reaching its decision, 
stating that 
[t]his suggests a relative (though not complete) 
convergence of the individual and corporate 
interests in defending and settling the litigation. 
Page 50f7 
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Although not dispositive, it is important that early 
in the litigation, independent counsel, after 
undertaking an exhaustive investigation, determined 
the corporation's interests were more in line with 
those of the defendants than plaintiffs. 
ld. In the present case, the Directors focus on this 
language in arguing that the interests of Keystone 
and its directors are not in conflict at this point in 
the litigation because the independent committee 
determined that Keystone should not pursue legal 
action. However, the Directors ignore the 
remainder of the quote from Bell Atlantic, which 
provides that[ o]f greater significance, however, is 
the absence of allegations of fraud, intentional 
misconduct, or self-dealing. We have no hesitation 
in holding that-except in patently frivolous 
cases-allegations of directors' fraud, intentional 
misconduct, or self-dealing require separate 
counsel. 
ld. (emphasis added). In this case, unlike Bell 
Atlantic, the Plaintiffs claim that the Directors 
committed fraud (Count V) by concealing the fact 
that they exceeded the legal lending limit, and 
self-dealing (Count III) by engaging in willful 
misconduct that was contrary to Keystone's interests 
and favorable to their own. Additionally, there is 
no evidence that the Plaintiffs' claims are "patently 
frivolous". Thus, under the standard set forth in 
Bell Atlantic, Keystone must retain independent 
counsel. 
[3] The Directors' sole argument in opposition to 
Plaintiffs' motion is that disqualification is 
premature because the business judgment*838 rule 
will likely result in dismissal of Plaintiffs' action. 
They contend that the disqualification issue should 
be postponed until a motion to dismiss, based on the 
business judgment rule, is decided.FN4 Although 
the Directors did not cite authority to support this 
contention, our research has uncovered a case that 
supports their argument. In Clark v. Lomas & 
Nettleton Fin. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 658 (N.D.Tex.1978) 
, the court held that 
FN4. We do agree that the business 
judgment rule presents an enormous hurdle 
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for the Plaintiffs, particularly in light of the 
fact that a special committee and 
independent counsel were retained after 
Plaintiffs' demand was made. However, 
as set forth below, we do not find that 
Plaintiffs' motion for disqualification is 
premature. Additionally, the Directors 
have not yet filed a motion to dismiss. 
there is no conflict of interest requiring 
disqualification in the narrow instance when one 
law firm represents a derivatively sued corporation 
and its individually sued directors and the law firm 
initially files a motion to dismiss on behalf of its 
clients, does not otherwise participate in the lawsuit, 
and withdraws from representation of either the 
corporation or the individual directors when either 
the motions are overruled or when it becomes 
necessary to participate in the defense of the 
corporation and the individual directors. At this 
stage of the proceedings, when the court must make 
a determination on whether as a matter of law the 
defendants should be in the lawsuit, unless it can be 
shown that an actual conflict exists or that certain 
confidences are being jeopardized, I think the 
client's right to select the counsel of his choice 
outweighs any potential conflict of interest. 
Id. at 661. 
The decision in Clark is not without merit. 
Keystone will be forced to incur additional cost to 
retain independent counsel and disqualifying 
Drinker impinges upon Keystone's right to select its 
own counsel. Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance 
Co., 230 N.W.2d 905, 915 (Iowa 1975). However, 
we believe the factual situation in the case at bar 
dictates that independent counsel be retained by the 
bank. See id. There is a clear divergence of 
interests between Keystone and its directors on the 
face of Plaintiffs' complaint, which weighs against 
joint representation. Lewis, 218 F.Supp. at 239-40. 
Additionally, permitting Drinker to represent two 
clients with conflicting interests, even if only until a 
motion to dismiss is decided, could result in 
substantial difficulty for all parties and the court. 
See, e.g., Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F.Supp. 87, 89 
(E.D.Tex.l981) ("While an actual conflict may not 
transpire at trial, there would be tremendous 
hardship imposed on the court and all parties alike 
Page 60f7 
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should separate counsel have to be retained in the 
middle of litigation"). Finally, there exists a 
chance that confidences obtained from one client 
could be used to the detriment of the other, 
particularly if the motion to dismiss is denied. See 
Cannon, 398 F.Supp. at 218. In our view the 
potential for harm requires that Keystone retain 
independent counsel. 
Our decision to grant Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify 
Drinker, Biddle & Reath from representing 
Keystone does not, in any way, call into question 
the good faith of the firm. Rather, in cases such as 
this, where the potential for conflict is great, the 
better approach is to require the corporation to 
obtain independent counsel. See Bell Atlantic, 2 
F.3d at 1317.FN5 
FN5. It is unclear whether Plaintiffs seek 
to disqualify Drinker from representing any 
Defendant in this litigation, or whether 
they merely seek to prevent the firm from 
representing Keystone. In any event, 
there is nothing to prevent Drinker from 
continuing to represent the Directors. See 
Lewis, 218 F.Supp. at 239. Our decision 
requires only that Drinker withdraw its 
representation of Keystone and LVNB. 
B. Retention of Independent Counsel 
[4] Although not expressly raised by the parties, we 
will briefly address the manner in which Keystone 
is to select independent counsel. This issue has 
produced varying results. At least one court 
appointed counsel for the corporation itself. See 
Rowen, 230 N.W.2d at 916. Other courts have 
declined to appoint counsel, or direct the 
corporation how to do so, irrespective of the fact 
that the directors who were defendants were 
involved in the decision-making process. See, e.g., 
*839 Cannon, 398 F.Supp. at 220; Lewis, 218 
F.Supp. at 240. However, we believe the most 
suitable procedure was adopted by the court in 
MeSSing. 
In that case, the corporation appointed an ad hoc 
committee of two non-defendant directors, and 
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indicated that, upon court order, it would have the 
ad hoc committee select independent counsel. The 
court, without approving or disapproving of the 
corporation's proposal, determined that the 
corporation should 
resolve this problem as it would any other issue as 
to which the existence of interested directors 
renders the usual corporate decision-making process 
unavailable .... It is the duty of the directors, in this 
as in other matters, to act in the corporation's best 
interest. If they are disqualified from acting on this 
or on any other matter, then it is for them, in the 
first instance, to devise a method to accommodate 
the need to continue the corporate enterprise while 
refraining from participating in any corporate 
decision in which they might have a personal 
interest. They act, or fail to act, at their peril. 
Messing, 439 F.Supp. at 783-84. We also will not 
appoint counsel FN6, nor will we dictate how 
Keystone chooses its new attorneys. Rather, 
Keystone should select independent counsel in the 
manner it would act in any other circumstance 
where a conflict of interest exists. 
FN6. "Of course, the directors may request 
this or any other court with jurisdiction 
over the matter to relieve them of this duty. 
" Messing, 439 F.Supp. at 783. 
We will issue an appropriate Order. 
ORDER 
AND NOW, this 10th day of July, 1995, upon 
consideration of the Plaintiffs motion for 
disqualification, filed May 19, 1995, it is Ordered 
that: 
1. The motion is granted insofar as it seeks 
disqualification of Drinker, Biddle & Reath from 
representing Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. or 
Lebanon Valley National Bank. 
2. Keystone Heritage Group, Inc. and Lebanon 
Valley National Bank shall retain independent 
counsel in accordance with the analysis set forth in 
the accompanying memorandum. New counsel 
should be retained within fifteen (15) days hereof. 
M.D.Pa.,1995. 
Musheno v. Gensemer 
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H 
Hernandez v. Banco De Las Americas,Ariz. 1977. 
Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. 
Paul R. HERNANDEZ, Appellant, 
v. 
BANCO DE LAS AMERICAS, a corporation, 
Appellee. 
No. 12946-PR. 
Oct. 5, 1977. 
Suit was instituted for alleged breach of 
employment contract. The Superior Court, Pima 
County, Cause No. 145860, J. Richard Hannah, J., 
directed a verdict for defendant on all issues raised 
in complaint except for granting plaintiff five days' 
contract damages and assessing jury costs against 
him, and plaintiff appealed from portion of 
judgment denying him damages for breach of 
contract. The Court of Appeals 117 Ariz. 237, 571 
P.2d 1033, reversed the judgment of the trial court 
and, thereafter, application for review was granted. 
The Supreme Court, Holohan, J., held that 
employment contract which board of directors of 
defendant bank entered into with plaintiff was valid 
even though it extended beyond term of board and, 
hence, was binding on successor board where 
contract was for a reasonable period of time, 
particularly when viewed against length of time for 
which prior contract with plaintiffs predecessor was 
made, and board not only had authority to make and 
enter into contracts on behalf of bank, but also had 
authority to alter or amend bylaw providing that 
officers were to serve for one year during term and 
at pleasure of board. 
Opinion of the Court of Appeals vacated, judgment 
of the trial court reversed, and case remanded for 
new trial. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Corporations 101 €::=>56 
101 Corporations 
101 VI Constitution and By-Laws 
Page 1 of 6 
Page 1 
101k53 Constitution and By-Laws 
101 k56 k. Adoption and Amendment. 
Most Cited Cases 
Bylaws may be amended informally as well as 
formally, orally or in writing, by acts as well as by 
words, and may be evidenced by a course of 
proceeding or conduct on part of corporation 
inconsistent with bylaws claimed to have been 
amended or repealed. 
[2] Corporations 101 (;=>57 
101 Corporations 
10 I VI Constitution and By-Laws 
101 k53 Constitution and By-Laws 
101 k57 k. Operation and Effect. Most 
Cited Cases 
When a board of directors has power to adopt 
bylaws, it also has power to waive bylaws which it 
adopts. 
[3] Banks and Banking 52 (;=>51 
52 Banks and Banking 
52II Banking Corporations and Associations 
52II(D) Officers and Agents 
52k51 k. Election or Appointment, 
Qualification, and Tenure. Most Cited Cases 
Act of board of directors of defendant bank in 
entering into a one-year contract with plaintiffs 
predecessor that extended beyond term of board 
operated as an informal modification or waiver of 
bylaw providing that officers would serve for one 
year during term and at pleasure of board of 
directors. 
[4] Banks and Banking 52 (;=>54(7) 
52 Banks and Banking 
52II Banking Corporations and Associations 
52II(D) Officers and Agents 
52k53 Rights and Liabilities as to Bank 
and Stockholders 
52k54 Nature and Extent 
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52k54(7) k. Compensation. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 52kl05(l)) 
When board of directors of defendant bank agreed 
to pay balance of salary and benefits of plaintiffs 
predecessor in order to cancel his contract before it 
expired, board recognized that there was a valid 
employment contract and that predecessor was 
entitled to be compensated. 
[5] Banks and Banking 52 <8=51 
52 Banks and Banking 
52II Banking Corporations and Associations 
52II(D) Officers and Agents 
52k51 k. Election or Appointment, 
Qualification, and Tenure. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 52k105(!)) 
Power which board of directors of defendant bank 
had under bylaws to remove an officer at its 
discretion was subject to rights of an officer under 
an employment contract such as plaintiff and did 
not carry with it power to terminate that contract 
without liability. 
[6] Corporations 101 <8=308(3) 
101 Corporations 
101 X Officers and Agents 
101 X(C) Rights, Duties, and Liabilities as to 
Corporation and Its Members 
101k308 Compensation 
1OIk308(3) k. Contracts or Resolutions 
Providing Therefor. Most Cited Cases 
Employment contracts are designed to be a benefit 
to both an officer and a corporation, and since 
corporation wishes to secure special services of 
officer, and officer wishes to have some financial 
security, corporation may not ignore contract at will 
and officer may not leave corporation at any time 
without liability no matter how essential or valuable 
his services. 
[7] Contracts 95 <8=1 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
95I(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
95kl k. Nature and Grounds of 
Page 2 of 6 
Page 2 
Contractual Obligation. Most Cited Cases 
Modern business practice mandates that parties 
must be bound by contracts they enter into absent 
fraud or duress. 
[8] Banks and Banking 52 <8=105(1) 
52 Banks and Banking 
52III Functions and Dealings 
52III(B) Representation of Bank by Officers 
and Agents 
52k105 Contracts 
52kl05(!) k. Directors. Most Cited 
Cases 
Employment contract which board of directors of 
defendant bank entered into with plaintiff was valid 
even though it extended beyond term of board and, 
hence, was binding on successor board where 
contract was for a reasonable period of time, 
particularly when viewed against length of time for 
which prior contract with plaintiffs predecessor was 
made, and board not only had authority to make and 
enter into contracts on behalf of bank, but also had 
authority to alter or amend bylaw providing that 
officers were to serve for one year during term and 
at pleasure of board. 
*553 **495 Stompoly & Even by John S. Stompoly 
and James L. Stroud, Tucson, for appellant. 
Russo, Cox, Dickerson & Cartin by Jerold A. 
Cartin, Tucson, for appellee. 
HOLOHAN, Justice. 
This case involves a suit by appellant (Paul 
Hernandez) against appellee, Banco De Las 
Americas (Banco), for damages arising out of an 
alleged illegal breach of contract for Hernandez' 
employment by Banco in 1973. After four days of 
trial, the trial court directed a verdict for Banco on 
all issues raised in the complaint except for granting 
plaintiff five days' contract damages and assessed 
jury costs against him. Plaintiff appealed only that 
portion of the judgment denying him damages for 
breach of contract. Banco attempted to appeal the 
trial court's finding of a valid contract by a cross 
assignment of error. [FNI] The Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgment below. 
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FNI. Because the bank in essence sought 
to enlarge the trial court's judgment on this 
issue, the proper procedure would have 
been to file a cross appeal, which the bank 
did not do. Therefore, under 16 A.R.S. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(b), 
Banco is precluded from raising this issue. 
Maricopa County v. Corporation 
Commission of Arizona, 79 Ariz. 307, 289 
P.2d 183 (1955). 
We granted review because this case involves the 
need for clarification of certain *554 **496 
statements made in Tucson Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Aetna Investment Corp., 74 Ariz. 163, 245 
P.2d 423 (1952) regarding corporate employment 
contracts. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated. 
Appellee Banco is a banking corporation which has 
been licensed in Arizona since 1971. Pursuant to 
Article I, Section 1 of Banco's By-Laws, the bank's 
annual meeting of stockholders was held in early 
June of 1972, and a Board of Directors was elected 
to serve for a term of one year. On July 19, 1972 the 
Board of Directors entered into a written contract 
with Morris Herring (one of the original 
incorporators) calling for the employment of 
Herring as Bank President for a period of one year 
at a salary of$25,000. 
Dissention apparently developed between Herring 
and a majority of the Board during the year, and on 
April 5, 1973, Herring wrote the Chairman of the 
Board setting forth the terms of an agreement 
reached between him and the Board regarding his 
resignation. The agreement, as approved by the 
Board, included inter alia a provision that Herring 
was to be paid a lump sum at the time of his 
resignation representing "the unpaid balance of my 
annual salary due under the terms of my contract 
dated July 19, 1972." Eleven of the fifteen Board 
members approved and accepted Herring's 
resignation on the stated terms at a special meeting 
of the Board of Directors of Banco held on April 8, 
1973. 
The Chairman of the Board thereupon appointed a 
committee comprised of several members of the 
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Board to search for a permanent president for the 
bank. The record reflects that during the time that 
the committee was searching for a new bank 
president, Morris Herring launched a proxy fight in 
an attempt to elect a new board. 
Meanwhile, the committee's search for a president 
had come to fruition in the selection of the 
appellant, Paul Hernandez, as President of the bank 
on June I, 1973. The corporate minutes reflect that 
a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
bank, attended by nine members, was held on June 
1, 1973. At that meeting the Chairman of the Board 
recommended that a one-year contract be entered 
into between Banco and Hernandez. All nine 
members of the Board of Directors in attendance at 
the special meeting on June 1, 1973 voted to offer 
Hernandez a contract.[FN2] 
FN2. The vote of the nine directors in 
attendance was unanimous. Since nine of 
the fifteen Board members were present at 
the meeting, the bank's quorum 
requirements were met. 
Banco by and through its Chairman, George 
Sandoval, then entered into a written contract of 
employment wherein Hernandez was to serve as 
President of the bank for one year commencing 
June 1, 1973 and terminating May 31, 1974. In 
addition to the one-year term of employment the 
contract provided inter alia that Hernandez accepted 
and agreed to his hiring, engagement and 
employment in accordance with the customary 
requirements of the position, including the Articles 
of Incorporation, the By-Laws and appropriate 
regulatory agency directives. The contract also 
provided that its interpretation would be according 
to the laws of the State of Arizona. 
Hernandez began his duties as President of the bank 
on June 1, 1973. On June 4, 1973, however, the 
Herring faction was successful in its proxy fight and 
a Board favorable to it was elected. On June 8, 
1973 the newly elected Board of Directors met, 
discharged appellant Hernandez, and reappointed 
Morris Herring President of the bank. 
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This case presents essentially one issue, namely, 
whether the Board of Directors had authority to 
enter into a valid and binding employment contract 
with appellant which would be binding beyond its 
term of office. 
There is no doubt that the Board of Directors of 
Banco had the express authority to make and enter 
into valid and binding contracts. The main 
contention of Banco is that the Board as constituted 
prior to June 4, 1973 did not have the authority to 
enter into a valid employment contract binding the 
subsequent Board. Banco has relied heavily on the 
statement in Tucson Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n 
v. Aetna Investment Corp., supra: 
*555 **497 "The directors of the Tucson Federal 
are elected for a three-year term, while this contract 
was to remain in force and effect for ten years from 
the date of its execution. It is contended by Tucson 
Federal that the contract is void for the reason that it 
extends and binds the corporation beyond the terms 
of the then acting officers and directors. To support 
this proposition we are referred to Edwards v. 
Keller, Tex.Civ.App., 133 S.W.2d 823; Clifford v. 
Firemen's Mut. Benev. Ass'n, 232 A.D. 260, 249 
N.Y.S. 713; Massman v. Louisiana Mfg. Cooperage 
Co., 177 La. 999, 149 So. 886; Kline v. Thompson, 
206 Wis. 464, 240 N.W. 128. We have examined 
these cases and find they all involve employment 
contracts whereby the corporate officers have 
attempted to employ a person for a period extending 
beyond their terms. The courts held that the 
contracts were void because one board of directors 
cannot bind subsequent boards as to future 
personnel to carry out administrative details of the 
corporation. These cases limit the application of the 
rule to employment contracts, which we believe is 
sound." 74 Ariz. at 170, 245 P.2d at 427. 
Tucson Federal concerned the effect to be given a 
contract to buy and sell insurance which was of 10 
years' duration, where the board which negotiated 
the contract served for a three-year term. Our 
comments on corporate employment contracts must 
be considered dicta. This is the first instance in 
which we have been faced with the issue of an 
employment contract extending beyond the term of 
the Board of Directors. Under the circumstances we 
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find no obstacle to considering the matter as one of 
first impression in this jurisdiction. 
It is asserted by Banco that the contract made 
between the Board of Directors and Hernandez was 
void because it was in contravention of the 
By-Laws which provide that officers are to serve for 
one year during the term and at the pleasure of the 
Board of Directors.[FN3] We note that the identical 
By-Law was in effect at the time of Herring's 
contract. [FN4] 
FN3. Article IV s 1 of the By-Laws 
provides as follows: "TERM OF OFFICE. 
The President, Vice-President, Cashier or 
Assistant Cashiers shall hold office during 
the term of the board by whom they are 
elected, subject to the power of the board 
to remove them at its discretion. Any 
vacancies occurring in any of the said 
offices shall be filled by the Board of 
Directors." 
FN4. Herring's contract ran from July 19, 
1972 to July 19, 1973. The Board's term 
under the Articles of Incorporation (Article 
VII) ran from the first Monday of June 
1972 to the first Monday of June 1973. 
There are two theories which support the conclusion 
that the Hernandez contract was valid although it 
extended beyond the Board's term. One theory 
centers on the conclusion that the Board by its prior 
acts with regard to Herring informally altered or 
modified the By-Laws. The other theory concludes 
that because the Board had the authority under the 
By-Laws to alter the By-Laws at any time, the 
Hernandez contract was pro tanto a modification 
which prevailed over the By-Laws. 
The Articles of Incorporation gave the Banco Board 
of Directors the power to amend by-laws; [FN5] 
further, Article X of the By-Laws provides: 
FN5. Article VII of the Articles of 
Incorporation provides: "In furtherance, 
and not in limitation of the powers 
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conferred by law, the board of directors is 
expressly authorized to adopt, amend and 
rescind by-laws for the corporation by a 
vote of a majority of the board of directors, 
until and unless otherwise provided by 
resolution of the shareholders, and such 
by-laws be binding on the directors, 
officers, shareholders and all parties 
contracting or in any way dealing with the 
corporation. The board of directors is 
further expressly authorized to fill 
vacancies in any office or in the board of 
directors resulting from any cause." 
"The Directors may, at any regular meeting, alter or 
amend these By-Laws, in a way not inconsistent 
with the law, provided that the number of those 
voting in favor of such amendment is equal to or 
greater than a majority of the whole Board of 
Directors; ... " 
[1][2][3] It is accepted law that by-laws may be 
amended informally as well as formally, *556 **498 
orally or in writing ... by acts as well as by words, 
and may be evidenced by a course of proceeding or 
conduct on the part of the corporation inconsistent 
with the by-laws claimed to have been amended or 
repealed. See Bay City Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 8 
Wash.2d 191, III P.2d 771 (1941). Moreover, 
when a Board of Directors has the power to adopt 
by-laws, it has power to waive those adopted,[FN6] 
and we therefore hold that when the Board entered 
into a one-year contract with Herring which 
extended beyond the then-Board's term, the By-Law 
at issue was informally modified, or waived. See 
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 
636, 639 (3rd Cir. 1930); United Producers and 
Consumers Co-op v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 
1955). 
FN6. Hill v. American Co-operative Ass'n, 
195 La. 590, 197 So. 241 (1940). 
[4] When the Board agreed to pay the balance of 
Herring's salary and benefits in order to cancel his 
contract before it expired, we conclude that the 
Board recognized that there was a valid 
employment contract and Herring was entitled to be 
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compensated. 
[5][6] Banco argues that the Board of Directors has 
the power under the By-Laws to remove an officer 
at its discretion.[FN7] This power of removal, 
however, is subject to rights of the officer under the 
employment contract. The power to remove an 
officer of the corporation does not carry with it the 
power to terminate a valid employment contract 
without liability. See Cuppy v. Stollwerck, 216 
N.Y. 591, III N.E. 249; 158 A.D. 628, 143 N.Y.S. 
967 (1916); In re Paramount Publix Corporation, 90 
F.2d 441 (2nd Cir., 1937). It must be remembered 
that employment contracts are designed to be a 
benefit to both an officer and a corporation. The 
corporation wishes to secure the special services of 
the officer; on the other hand the officer wishes to 
have some financial security. If the corporation may 
ignore the contract at will, so also could the officer 
leave the corporation at any time without liability 
no matter how essential or valuable his services. 
Such a result would be disruptive of modern 
business practice. See In re Paramount Publix 
Corporation, 90 F.2d 441, 443 (2nd Cir., 1937). 
FN7. See footnote 3, supra. 
[7] Most commentators now are in agreement that 
modern business practice mandates that parties must 
be bound by the contracts they enter into absent 
fraud or duress. The Arizona legislature has 
recently adopted this view. [FN8] 
FN8. See Title 10, Corporations and 
Associations, A.R.S. s 10-051 which 
provides: "Any officer or agent may be 
removed by the board of directors 
whenever in its judgment the best interests 
of the corporation shall be served thereby, 
but such removal shall be without 
prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of 
the person so removed. Election or 
appointment of an officer or agent shall not 
of itself create contract rights." 
[8] We believe that the contract here was for a 
reasonable period of time particularly when viewed 
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against the length of time for which the prior 
contract with Herring was made. The Board had the 
authority to make and enter into contracts on behalf 
of the corporation, and it had the authority to alter 
or amend the corporation By-Laws. There were no 
statutes in effect at the time the contract was entered 
into to bar its legality.[FN9] 
FN9. Although no statutes regarding this 
matter were in effect at the time this action 
arose, future banking corporation boards 
will have to consider the ramifications of 
A.R.S. s 6-417(7) (1974) which we note, 
but do not comment on. That section 
provides: "The board of directors may 
adopt or amend by-laws, but no by-law 
shall be effective until it has been 
submitted to and approved by the 
superintendent as being in conformity with 
this chapter. Each adopted amendment 
shall be subject to the same inquiry by the 
superintendent as the corresponding 
provision in the original by-laws of the 
association. The superintendent may 
require approval by a majority vote of the 
members for an amendment changing the 
location of the business office of the 
association." 
Judgment of the Superior Court is reversed and this 
case is remanded for a new trial on the issue of 
damages. 
CAMERON, C. J., STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J., and 
HAYS and GORDON, JJ., concur. 
Ariz. 1977. 
Hernandez v. Banco De Las Americas 
116 Ariz. 552, 570 P.2d 494 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR.~ ISB No. 7563 
NED A. CANNON~ ISB No. 2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-:IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plain.tiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., ao. 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thcrcof~ 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) 53: 
COUNTY OF KING ) 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTINI 
I, Ernie Dantini, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
--J 1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
~ run Reed Taylor's Accountant. I make this Affida.vit on my personal knowledge. 
-{!J 
~ 
~FFIDA VIT OF ERNIE DANTINI - 1 
MAR - .L - 2007 00: 54 FROM: E. J. INI & CO. C 4258222327 : 12087468421 
2. Attached. as EXhibit AI i~ a gel'l.ulne and authentic copy of the email that I 
received from John Taylor on October 7? 2005, the subject line of which read ~'Rceds 
note." 
DATED: This 1st day of March, 2007. 
~~ MI\rc.h 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '1:fft day ofFe'bttm~. 2007. 
Not 
Residi,at; ..,........~~:t"". "--'-:---=--=:---:1' __ 
My commission expire!.;: _~""'::"'-L---"""'---J'----
AFFIDAVIT OF ERNIE DANTINI - 2 
"1AR-: -2007 00: 55 FROM: E. J. INI & CO. C 4258222327 :12087468421 
Pa.ge lof2 
Print - Close Window 
Frorm "John Tt1Y1or" <JTayfOr@AIAlnsurnnca.com:> 
"J'o~ "Ernla D;mUnl (E"mllll)- <Mantlnl@yahoO.r;Om> 
It· .. .----·· 
SubjBd:: Reeds note ._----,-----_ .. , ... _-" ... ., .... 
I>t1tet FrI, 7 Oct: 2005 l5!:;JS!25 -0700 -_._ ....... -------_._---
I will send you by separate e mails expected cash flow reports for AlA andCrop as It now stands. 
We need 10 mUllon new crop priemium to get by this period and to be able to do a bond offertng, I will 
have dotalled cash flows later this month but these 9re my bftst guess. 
I hope that YOll And he can com& up wHh some speclDr: proposels to mOdIfY the debt tlnd move us 
tawerd putting the twa companies back together. Jt would be better for aH of us to be on the same 
side of the table. We both have mounds of personal debt ( and I'm about to get a shrt load more) 
because we have not taken as muoh out of tho Compeny oV8r the leet three years. 
I am wntlng to axplore all options, bu1 wnl need a wr1tten proposal. 
, propose that we enter Info a joint cross agreement like the one we almost did three years ago. 
Alternately: I would like to reVl'!f5e the transactIon of 10 yeam ego. AlA would /SSIJO 71,000 prefarrcd B shares 
to Rood. They WOuld be law par value booQUSEI we can't book any goodwRl. In lieu of If: of shares 
then W9 COUld exchang9 for Crop Interest. 
We would \han enter Into a redemption 8chadulo In traunchet over over the next throe years. 
Those are tho relaled Issues: 
,. Manedatory rodamptjon will not work, have to book the liability. no holp to fls 
2. Set;;urlty for the rademptJonm 
3. Who redeems? Crop USA may ba better one 
4. Cropusa exchange right 
5. How to payoff the GGMIT debt by yoor end 
6. Rodeem Donne first? 
7 If Reed wanl$ all the accrued intorest, I need back salary adjustment 
to my orglnal contract amount 
a Plan to gat the remaInIng C sheres out of 401 k, whIch Reed and' aro blggost owners. 
9. Suggest e rodempUon schedule basad on Gross Crop sales, It II; ~ common belief that 
Road, through Jay, ill competing wIth crop and dlsrup11ng sales efforts. 
You need t~ be awarn:; 
1. chang£t In control gives the assocIations Eln out of GGMIT and ASAMIT 
2. Any default will fresze up all money to Reed, Donna (and likely me) until all tl\e 
GGMIT debt is paid. Alot of this $ dates back to Universe bankruptcy. but 
also r&latee to advanOO$ from 1he !rust for faes and oommlssrons 11119 year .. 
3. AlA cannot tun without Bryan Dnd Ken. nl'luse they keep the old Trustmerk 
rating and billing systam going on tha old AS 400. Its e dInosaur, but neoded yet. 
4. AlA could sldnny down BxpenSGS more, but alot of thf!l expanses am beIng assumed 
by crop, 90 thoro:! not a lot of room to reduce costs faster !han the revenues wUl 
declirlo. . 
5. The net valuo of AlA In lfquldatlDn or runDff will not be mUCh more than payoff Donna, and sDltle 
the leese 01'1 buildIng with the state. Reed should be EIItIIato that there Is II reB/ pDBslbllly 
that the net prasent value could be minimal. 
6. Three of tho four investors 01 Crop l<now Reed pemona/ly. The fourth Is Jim Becks buddy lltld tho 
major owner of the brokerage hOUse that does tha bond deals. If full nOlo Is put in default, I will 
not bOBbie to keep any them On board to do any type buyout, mergQf or dosl WIth Reed. 
7. I do not want to live In Kansas CIty, 
http://uR.f:3:12.:m..Ri1:yabno.~mn/ym:lSMwr...etteflMx!:!'<I:ttboX&Msglti~8632 j168158.1_1StJ05... ],0/81l00.5 
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RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE T AYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO JOHN TAYLOR, AIA 
INSURANCE, AND AlA SERVICES' 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION RE: PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT AI 
Contrary to John Taylor's testimony, there were never any modifications to Reed 
Taylor's Promissory Note and Agreements as evidenced by his own email dated October 7, 
2005. John Taylor testified at the hearing that there was an oral modification of the agreements 
that took place in March 2003, with only himself and Reed Taylor present. When questioned at 
PLAINTlFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUMRE: PLAINTlFF'S EXHlBIT AI-1 
yesterday's hearing, John Taylor testified that he had no recollection of the October 7, 2005, 
email he sent to ErnieDantini,thesubjectlineofwhichwas"Reedsnote." Plaintiffs Ex. AI 
(emphasis added). Consequently, Reed Taylor submitted the Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, with the 
email attached as Exhibit AI. 
John Taylor admits significant facts in his email which undisputedly demonstrate that no 
oral agreement ever was reached: 
I hope that you and [Reed Taylor] can come up with some specific proposals to modify 
the debt and move us toward putting the two companies back together. .. r am willing to 
explore all options, but will need a written proposal. . .I propose that we enter into a joint 
cross agreement like the one we almost did three years ago ... Altematively; I would like to 
reverse the transaction of 10 years ago ... Suggest a redemption schedule based on Gross 
Crop sales ... 
Dantini Aff., Ex: AI (emphasis added). 
John Taylor's email provides clear and convincing evidence that the no alleged oral 
modification ever occurred. John Taylor's email was sent to Reed Taylor's accountant more 
than two years after the alleged March 2003, "oral agreement." 
John Taylor's email supports Reed Taylor's testimony that no modification occurred and 
that AIA Services was and is in Default when Reed Taylor exercised his right to vote the shares. 
The Court should deny John Taylor, AIA Insurance, and AlA Services' Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and award Reed Taylor attorneys' fees and costs, as authorized by I.R.C.P. 65(c), for 
overturning the Temporary Restraining Order. 
PLAINTIFF' S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT AI - 2 
DATED: This 2nd day of March, 2007. 
PLAINTIFF' S SUPPLEMENTAL 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By: ___ ---: 
Roderic 
Paul R. sman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed Taylor 
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT AI - 3 
L/oL/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of the Reed J. Taylor's Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition to John Taylor, AlA 
Insurance, and AIA Services' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Re: Plaintiffs Exhibit AI on the 
following person(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John 
Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
eX) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Signed this 2nd day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 




Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon, ISBA #2331 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr., ISBA #7563 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287 -9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ALA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; ALA INSURANCE, INC., 
an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR 
and CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and 
the community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, moves the Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 65 and all other applicable 
authority, for entry of a Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendants from interfering in any way 
with: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 




1. Reed Taylor's right to vote the shares of ALA Insurance, Inc.; and 
2. The corporate actions taken by the February 22,2007, Consent in Lieu of Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc., Plaintiffs Exhibit K to the February 26, 2007 
Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion, and also Plaintiff's Exhibit K, at 
the March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing; and with the February 22, 2007 Consent in 
Lieu of Meeting of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc., Exhibit L to the February 26, 
2007, Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion, and also Plaintiffs' Exhibit L 
at the March 1, 2007, Preliminary Injunction Hearing. I 
In light of the fact that Defendant, AIA Services Corporation, owes Plaintiff in excess of 
$8,189,614, and in the unlikely event that Plaintiff is found not to be entitled to the Preliminary 
Injunction sought by this Motion, because any resulting damages will not exceed the sums owing 
to Plaintiff, Plaintiff requests that he not be required to post security in accordance with 
LR.C.P. 65( c), and that the Court enter a finding to that effect, and that no such damages will 
exceed the sums owing to Plaintiff, as required by Hutchins v. Trombley, 95 Idaho 360,509 P.2d 
579 (1973). 
This Motion is based upon Plaintiff's Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder 
Vote and Board of Directors' Resolutions, and (2) to Confirm Termination of Counsel for ALA 
Insurance, Inc.; Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Emergency Motion; Affidavit of 
Roderick C. Bond in Support of Emergency Motion; Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of 
Law in Support of His Emergency Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and in 
Opposition to Motion of John Taylor, ALA Insurance, and AIA Services for Preliminary 
Injunction; Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5 of the. Affidavit of Aimee Gordon; Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, 
the statements and arguments of counsel at both the February 26, 2007 hearing on Plaintiffs 
I Contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion, out of an abundance of caution, Plaintiff is filing a Motion to 
Amend Complaint to make it clear that he seeks the relief sought by this Motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
68350.1 (#100021.1) 
Emergency Motion and Motion of AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and R. John 
Taylor for Temporary Restraining Order, and the March 1,2007 hearing on Defendants' Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction; and the testimony and evidence taken at the March 1, 2007 hearing 
on Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
DATED: This 6th day of March, 2007. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3 
68350.1 (#100021.1) 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
BY:_=--:-...-:--;::;---=iF 
Roderick C. ' 
Paul R. C an, Jr., ISBA #7563 
Ned A. on, ISBA #2331 
508 hth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax: (208) 743-9428 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of the Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and [Proposed] Preliminary Injunction 
on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321- 13 th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants, AIA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Halley 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
C~) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
C ) Hand Delivered 
C ) Overnight Mail 
C~) Facsimile 
Via: 
C.) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
C ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
C.) Facsimile 
Via: 
C.) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
C ) Hand Delivered 
C ) Overnight Mail 
C.) Facsimile 
Signed this 6th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 4 
68350.1 (#100021.J) 
CONSENT IN LIEU OF 
SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF 
AlA INSURANCE, INC. 
The undersigned, being the exclusive person entitled to vote all of the outstanding shares 
pledged to him of AlA Insurance, Inc. (the "Corporation") pursuant to the right vested in the 
undersigned because of the various defaults under the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement 
dated July 1, 1996, the $6 Million Promissory Note dated August 1, 1995, the Amended and Restated 
Security Agreement dated July 1, 1996, and Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement dated July 1, 
1996, hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Special Shareholder 
Meeting of the Corporation. 
Removal of Directors 
Effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed from the Board of 
Directors of the Corporation: 
Election of Director 
R. John Taylor 
JoLee Duclos 
Bryan Freeman 
Effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the Board of 
Directors, to serve in that capacity until the next annual meeting of the Corporation or until removed or 
replaced pursuant to the provisions contained in the Bylaws of the Corporation: 
Reed J. Taylor 
DATED: February 22,2007. 
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CONSENT IN LIEU OF 
MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
AIA INSURANCE, INC. 
The undersigned, being the sole member of the Board of Directors of AIA Insurance, Inc. (the 
"Corporation"), hereby consents to the following corporate actions without holding a formal Board 
Meeting of the Corporation. 
Removal of Officers 
It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individuals are unanimously removed 





.dlection of Officers 




It is resolved that, effective immediately, the following individual is unanimously elected to the 
corporate offices set forth below to serve as such until the first annual meeting or the election and 
qualification of their successors: 




Reed J. Taylor 
Reed J. Taylor 
Reed J. Taylor 
It is resolved that, effective immediately and in addition to being removed as an officer of the 
Corporation, R. John Taylor is terminated as an employee of the Corporation and allpayments to him 
shall cease, including, without limitation, all payments to R. John Taylor for alleged lease payments on 
L"'l.e parking lot. R. John Taylor shall not be permitted in the Corporation's offices at 111 Main Street, 




Lewiston, Idaho for any reason. All ofR. John Taylor's personal property located at the Corporation's 
Jffices at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho shall be locked up in stored there until delivery can be 
arranged to R. John Taylor. No papers, files, documents, draft documents, electronic files, email or 
any other information shall be released to R. John Taylor until it is ascertained that it owned by him 
and not the property of the Corporation. 
Change of Locks 
It is resolved that a locksmith shall be hired to replace and/or change the locks on all doors at 
the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. The locksmith shall also 
attempt if possible to change/replace/install a separate lock on the door to R. John Taylor's personal 
office to secure his personal property until delivery of his personal property can be arranged. The 
locksmith may rely on these Resolutions as full and complete authority to enter the premises and 
change/replace/install the locks described above as the Corporation's offices located at 111 Main 
treet, Lewiston, Idaho. Keys shall only be issued to personnel authorized in writing by the 
undersigned. 
Security Guard 
It is resolved that a security guard shall be posted outside the offices of the Corporation at times 
deemed appropriate by the undersigned. The security guard shall ensure that no unauthorized 
personnel enter the Corporation's offices, including, without limitation, R. John Taylor or any person 
acting on his behalf All security guards may rely in this Consent as full authorization by the 
undersigned to comply with and/or enforce all of the Resolutions. 
Security System 
It is resolved that the code for the security system shall be changed to a code only known to the 
undersigned. The undersigned may provide the security code to other officer(s) or employee(s), but 
\ly upon written consent from the undersigned. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
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Authority to Bind Corporation 
It is resolved that the undersigned shall be the only authorized signatory authorized to act on 
behalf of the Corporation to transfer funds, sign checks and/or execute contracts. Effective 
iIllmediately, R. John Taylor is removed as an authorized signatory to transact any business on behalf 
of the Corporation. R. John Taylor is removed and not authorized to act as an authorized signatory on 
any and all of the Corporation's bank accounts, credit card accounts, open accounts, and is stripped of 
all authority to act in any way on behalf of the Corporation. All banks and financial institutions may 
rely on these Resolutions to remove R. John Taylor from all accounts and add the undersigned as an 
authorized signatory. 
DATED: February 22, 2007. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof, ) 
BRIAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV07-00208 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John Taylor. Hearing on the motion was 
held March 1,2007. Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John 
Taylor were represented by attorney Michael E. McNichols. Plaintiff Reed Taylor was 
represented by attorneys Paul R. Cressman, Jr. and Roderick C. Bond. The Court, having read 
Taylor v. Taylor 
Opinion on Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
the motion, briefs, and affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard the testimony of 
witnesses and the oral argument of counsel, having considered only that evidence the Court 
found admissible, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
AlA Insurance Inc. is a business under the umbrella of AIA Services Corporation. The 
founder of the business was Plaintiff Reed Taylor. Eventually the Plaintiffs brother, Defendant 
R. John Taylor, joined the business and together, the brothers developed the parent company into 
a holding for numerous diversified insurance businesses. In 1995, Plaintiff Reed Taylor decided 
to retire. In order to effectuate his retirement, Reed Taylor and AlA Services, along with counsel 
for the respective parties, entered into a stock redemption agreement. The agreement included a 
promissory note payable to Reed Taylor in the amount of $6,000,000.00 plus interest, which was 
executed on August 1,1995. 1 In 1996, the agreement was amended and the parties executed an 
Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement and an Amended and Restated Security 
Agreement. 2 
Some ten years later, in a letter dated December 12, 2006, Plaintiff Reed Taylor's 
attorney notified Defendant John Taylor and AlA Services Corporation that AlA Services was in 
default under several sections of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, including but not 
limited to failure to pay the $6 million promissory note.3 The letter further notified the 
Defendants that Plaintiff intended to exercise his right to vote the redeemed shares pursuant to a 
reversion of voting rights upon default as provided for in the Pledge Agreement. Included in the 
letter was Plaintiff's demand for a special meeting of the shareholders for the purpose of electing 
1 Plaintiffs Exhibit "A". 
2 Plaintiffs Exhibit "e" and Exhibit "E". 
3 Plaintiffs Exhibit "F". 
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a new board of directors, with the special meeting to occur on December 26,2006. Plaintiffs 
demand for a December 26,2006 special shareholder's meeting was rejected. 
On January 29,2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor filed the above-entitled action seeking 
recovery of amounts owed under the Promissory Note, but making no claim seeking enforcement 
of other terms of the parties' written agreements. On an unknown date, Plaintiff made a second 
demand for a special shareholder's meeting to occur on February 5, 2007. Plaintiffs second 
demand for a special shareholder's meeting was denied by the Board's secretary, JoLee Duclos, 
in a letter dated February 1,2007.4 
On February 22, 2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor executed a Consent in Lieu of Special 
Meeting of Shareholders of ALA Insurance, Inc., in which Plaintiff removed the current ALA 
board members and elected himself, Reed Taylor, the sole board member.5 At 3:00 a.m. on 
Sunday, February 25,2007, Plaintiff Reed Taylor went to the business offices of ALA Services 
Corporation along with a locksmith and security personnel hired by the Plaintiff, and changed 
the locks on certain doors within the building housing ALA Insurance. 6 However, the activity 
caused an alarm system to go off and police arrived on scene. The police determined the matter 
was civil in nature, the old locks were put back in place and both parties had representative 
remain at the premises. 
On Monday morning, February 26, 2007, Defendants John Taylor and ALA Services 
Corporation filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Later the same day, Plaintiff filed 
an Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and Board of Directors Resolution, (2) to 
Confirm Termination of Counsel for ALA Insurance Inc. along with affidavits and a Motion for 
Order to Shorten Time. The Court took up the motions of the parties on the afternoon of 
4 Plaintiffs Exhibit "H". 
5 Plaintiffs Exhibit "K". 
6 The building houses other business as well that lease space from AlA Services Corporation. 
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February 26, 2007 and entered a Temporary Restraining Order against the Plaintiff and granted 
Plaintiff's Motion to Shorten Time. The Court then set a hearing on March 1, 2007 for 
Defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the Plaintiff's pending motion. 
At the March 1, 2007 hearing, the Court informed the parties that, after reviewing the 
flurry of pleadings and other documents filed over the three days, including several binders 
worth of exhibits, the Court had determined it would not hear the Plaintiff's lengthy and complex 
motion upon the grounds stated in open Court. The Court then proceeded on the preliminary 
injunction hearing only. 
STANDARD 
Idaho Civil Rule of Procedure 65(e) provides that a defendant may be granted a 
preliminary injunction (1) when it appears the defendant is "entitled to the relief demanded and 
such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of acts 
complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually" or (2) when it appears "that the 
commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or 
irreparable injury" to the defendant. LR.C.P.65(e). In addition to showing irreparable injury, a 
party seeking only an injunction must show a likelihood of prevailing at trial. Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984); Farm Service, Inc. v. Us. Steel Corp, 90 Idaho 
570, 414 P.2d 898 (1966). The necessary standard oflikelihood of prevailing cannot be met, 
however, where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt. Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho at 518. The decision to enter a preliminary injunction is within the 
discretionary powers of the trial court. Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69 (2004). 
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ANALYSIS 
In the instant case, the determination of whether the Defendants have met the burden 
necessary to obtain a grant of the requested preliminary injunction is not an easy task. At risk is 
a lucrative business that, while founded and made successful because of the efforts of Plaintiff 
Reed Taylor, has been under the supervision and management of Defendant John Taylor for the 
last ten years. If the business management is turned upside down, as Plaintiff seeks to have 
done, both parties appear to be at substantial risk of losing millions of dollars. The key question 
on which all other issues hinge is whether the Defendants are in default of the redemption 
agreement made with Plaintiff Reed Taylor. If a default has occurred, Plaintiff may have the 
right to vote his redeemed shares under the agreement and may have the right to demand a 
special shareholder's meeting. On the other hand, if the agreement has been orally amended, as 
asserted by Defendant John Taylor, then no reversion of voting rights occurred and the actions of 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor were taken without a lawful right to do so. However, despite the efforts of 
both parties to confuse and convolute the issues, the Court finds it must step back, remain 
focused, and look at the bigger picture. 
If Plaintiff Reed Taylor believed the redemption agreement was in default and that he 
was being denied 'a special shareholder's meeting in violation of his rights, Plaintiff had the 
ability to seek a court ordered special shareholder's meeting pursuant to I.C. § 31-1-703. 
Instead, Plaintiff attempted to (a) obtain relief through self-help in the middle ofthe night; (b) by 
means certain to be hotly contested and with a desired result of placing the Plaintiff in exclusive 
control of two Defendants; (c) based on a disputed theory. The Plaintiffs efforts to effectuate a 
hostile take-over of the business after being in retirement for ten years is reasonably likely to 
Taylor v. Taylor 5 
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cause irreparable harm to the parent company, its subsidiaries and to all persons holding an 
interest in the companies, including the Plaintiff. Given the substantial risk of financial loss that 
all of the parties will suffer if this matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure and 
temperance, the Court fmds irreparable harm is likely if Plaintiffs conduct is not kept in check 
while the critical issues are researched and resolved. Which party is likely to prevail on the 
question of default and voting rights has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the Court finds the 
risk of irreparable harm of sufficient significance to merit granting a preliminary injunction that 
will provide a degree of protection for all the parties until the complex legal issues can be 
determined. 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 65(d), the Court finds a preliminary injunction shall be entered 
restraining the Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, from harassing and/or interfering with the management of 
the businesses known as AlA Insurance, Inc. and AlA Services Corporation. Plaintiff Reed 
Taylor shall not enter upon the premises of AlA Insurance and AlA Services Corporation 
without the express permission of Defendant John Taylor, nor act or attempt to act as a director 
or officer of AlA Insurance Inc. Reed Taylor is also not to harass or annoy, directly or 
indirectly, any employee of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance Inc, in person, by 
telephone, or by written communications. 
By entering a preliminary injunction, the Court does not intend to discourage Reed 
Taylor and John Taylor from working together to reach resolution in this matter, rather, the 
Court encourages such conduct by the parties. However, in order to protect the parties from the 
potential irreparable harm that would likely occur if the matter is again allowed to become 
hostile, the Court finds it necessary to restrict the conduct of the parties by this preliminary 
Taylor v. Taylor 6 
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injunction until such time that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to complete discovery 
and the issues can be decided on the merits. 
It is the further finding of the Court that the issues raised in this matter are conducive to 
mediation. In an effort to encourage the parties to resolve these issues in a manner consistent 
with appropriate corporate management, the Court is ordering the parties into mediation. The 
parties are to commit their best efforts to reaching agreement on a mediator and then submit the 
name of the selected mediator to the Court no later than March 23,2007. If, however, the parties 
are unable to reach agreement on a mediator, the parties are to notify the Court of the impasse by 
March 23,2007, and submit nominations for mediator, after which the Court will designate one. 
ORDER 
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED consistent with the 
terms as articulated above. 
Further, the Court Orders the parties into mediation in the matter and to notify the Court 
regarding mediation consistent with the terms as articulated above. 
Dated this ---
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AIA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
T AYLOR and CONNIE T AYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST 
REED J. TAYLOR-l 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
AGAINST REED J. TAYLOR 
WITH ORAL ARGUMENT 
L(z,z-
nRIGINAL 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court to reconsider its 
findings and decision to enter a Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor: 
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
"A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of the final judgment. .. " LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B). 
A. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and John Taylor Have 
No Standing to Obtain a Preliminary Injunction 
The circumstances under which a preliminary injunction may be granted to a 
defendant are governed by LR.C.P. 65(e)(5), which states in pertinent part: 
A preliminary injunction may also be granted on the motion of the 
defendant upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon 
any of the grounds mentioned above in this section, subject to the same 
rules and provisions provided for the issuance of injunctions on behalf of 
the plaintiff. 
LR.C.P.65(e)(5). 
Here, the Defendants have no standing to seek a Preliminary Injunction because 
they failed to file the required counter-claim before the hearing praying for the 
affirmative relief necessary to support a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under 
LR.C.P.65(e)(1)-(4).1 See LR.C.P. 65(e)(5). 
B. Even if the Defendants Had Standing, They Failed to Demonstrate 
That They Are Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction 
"One who seeks an injunction has the burden of proving a right thereto." Harris 
v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988 (1984) citing Lawrence Warehouse 
Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965). 
I The Defendants failed to cite applicable authority for a preliminary injunction under LR.C.P. 65(e). The 
Court addressed I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1)-(2) in its Opinion, which appears to be the only applicable subsections 
based upon the Defendants' arguments and evidence (assuming the Defendants had filed a counter-claim 
before hearing their motion). 
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Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(1), a party must demonstrate that based upon the complaint 
or counter-claim, he or she is entitled to the relief demanded and that he or she is likely to 
prevail at trial. Id. 
Under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2), a preliminary mandatory injunction may only be granted 
in "extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will 
flow from its refusal." Id. Because Reed Taylor is owed over $8,000,000, there can be 
no irreparable injury as any alleged and proven damages would be an offset to amounts 
owed to Reed Taylor. 
The Court did not make critical findings that: (1) the Promissory Note had been 
orally modified; (2) a Default does not exist; (3) Reed Taylor did not have a right, as the 
sole shareholder, to vote the shares of ALA Insurance. Instead the Court merely stated: 
"[ w ]hich party is likely to prevail on the question of default and voting rights has yet to 
be determined." Opinion and Order, p. 6. Such a fmding is insufficient to support 
granting a Preliminary Injunction to Defendants. 
The evidence clearly supported a finding that ALA Services is in Default for 
(1) the failure to pay interest or principal; and (2) being insolvent. The Court failed to 
address ALA Services' undisputed insolvency, or that Reed Taylor's collateral (including 
the pledged shares) was impaired ALA Insurance's guaranty of the $15,000,000 revolving 
loan for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (of which ALA Insurance owns no interest). 
Instead, the Defendants alleged as their sole defense that they are not in Default 
because of an alleged and unproven "oral modification" to the Promissory Note. 
However, as set forth in Reed Taylor'S Memorandum of Law, an oral modification must 
be proven by clear and convincing testimony. Quite to the contrary, John Taylor's e-mail 
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to Ernie Dantini constitutes clear and convincing evidence that there was no oral 
modification.2 
There is no credible evidence to suggest that the Defendants will prevail at trial or 
that they have not committed numerous Defaults. The Defendants have failed to present 
any credible evidence to show that Reed Taylor was not entitled to vote the shares and is 
not entitled to take control of AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor has the right to vote the shares 
to protect his interest as any financial institution has for protecting an interest in 
collateral. 
The Defendants have failed to meet the burden of proving that they have a right to 
enjoin Reed Taylor from voting the pledged shares. 
C. Even if the Defendants Had Standing, the Court 
Failed to Set Security for the Preliminary Injunction 
A Court may not issue a preliminary injunction: 
except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such a sum as the 
court deems proper, as for the payment of such costs and damages 
including attorney's fees to be fixed by the court, as may be incurred or 
suffered by any party who is found to be wrongfully enjoined ... 
I.R.C.P. 65(c) (emphasis added). 
Here, the Court failed to provide for a bond or other security to offer protection to 
Reed Taylor for the damages which will be incurred by him. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Reed Taylor will not prevail and that security is not warranted. In fact, every 
2 John Taylor testified that the last date of oral modification occurred in March 2003, and his e-mail to 
Ernie Dantini sent some three years later directly contradicts his testimony that any modification occurred. 
See Affidavit of Ernie Dantini, Ex. AI. Significantly, John Taylor testified that he "did not recall the 
email." Assuming an oral modification occurred, John Taylor testified that the interest payments had been 
allegedly lowered to $15,000 per month, plus payroll services provided to Reed Taylor. Even if the 
Defendants were able to demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that such a modification 
occurred, John Taylor admitted in his testimony that several payments had been skipped and were owed. 
Thus, AlA Services would even be in Default of the alleged orally modified agreement. Under either 
theory, AlA Services is in Default of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement and has failed to cure the 
Defaults. 
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day that the Defendants retain control of AIA Insurance results in funds being improperly 
used for other unrelated entities thereby depriving Reed Taylor of such funds. 
Even if the Defendants had standing and the Preliminary Injunction was 
supported by the law and the evidence, the Court should have set at least a $2,000,000 
bond, the amount John Taylor testified ALA Insurance was worth, to protect Reed 
Taylor's interests. 
D. The Status Quo Is Abnormal and Should NOT Be Maintained 
Although Reed Taylor is mindful of the Court's position, the evidence and oral 
testimony demonstrates that ALA Insurance is being operated for the benefit of John 
Taylor, the other Defendants, and unrelated entities such as Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc. The evidence demonstrates that John Taylor has been utilizing ALA Insurance as his 
own bank to operate other businesses not owned by AlA Insurance, all under the 
watchful eyes of the present management of AlA Insurance. Through the Court's 
Preliminary Injunction, the Court is encouraging such activities to continue and 
suggesting that such behavior is proper corporate governance. 
In addition, the Court's concern for the other shareholders of AIA Services is 
misplaced because of the significant funds owed to Reed Taylor. All shareholder equity 
in ALA Services will be decimated at such time as Reed Taylor obtains a judgment for 
amounts owed under the Promissory Note. Even now, there is no shareholder equity in 
ALA Services. 
Reed Taylor is being prejudiced and irreparably harmed by the Court's decision to 
uphold the status quo by enjoining him from operating or monitoring AlA Insurance. 3 
3 Although mindful of the voluminous infonnation submitted to the Court, the Court also erred in finding 
that AlA Insurance is a lucrative business. In fact, AlA Insurance's business has been steadily 
deteriorating, while being subject to a guarantee of a $15,000,000 revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc., a company in which it holds no ownership interest. Not surprisingly, John Taylor 
is the holder of approximately 40% of the outstanding shares oferop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. 
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E. The Evidence Shows that the Defendants Were in Default and Remain 
in Default of Numerous Provisions of the Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, which Entitles Reed Taylor to Vote the Pledged Shares 
Reed Taylor demonstrated through briefing, exhibits, and testimony that AIA 
Services was in Default and remains in Default for the failure to pay interest, failure to 
pay principal, impairing Reed Taylor's collateral, and insolvency.4 
The only credible evidence before the Court demonstrates that AIA Services is in 
Default under numerous provisions of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
F. Reed Taylor was NOT Required to Request 
a Shareholder Meeting Under I.e. § 30-1-703 
The intent of I. e. § 30-1-703 is to provide a mechanism for a shareholder to be 
heard by the court ordering a meeting. See I.C. § 30-1-703(2). Reed Taylor is the holder 
of the right to vote all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance. No purpose would be 
served by requesting that the Court order a shareholder meeting because the results would 
be the same, Reed Taylor would remove the board and take all actions he deems 
appropriate. 5 
It should be noted that I.C. § 30-1-704 specifically provides that a shareholder 
meeting may be taken without a meeting "if the action is taken by all the shareholders 
entitled to vote on the action." I.e. § 30-1-704(1). As the holder entitled to vote all of 
4 AlA Services is Default if, among other things, it: (1) fails to pay interest due on the Promissory Note; 
(2) fails to pay principal due on the Promissory Note; (3) becomes insolvent; or (4) the value of Reed 
Taylor's collateral (the pledged shares) is impaired. John Taylor testified that he believed AlA Services' 
value was approximately $2,000,000 when NOT using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It is 
undisputed that Reed Taylor is owed over $8,000,000, which leaves AlA Services' assets far less than its 
debts. AlA Insurance guaranteed a $15,000,000 for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., in which it holds 
no ownership interest. This has significantly impaired the collateral provided to Reed Taylor. AIA Services 
is in Default under all of the above events of Default as set forth in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
5 The Court places emphasis on the fact that Reed Taylor elected to change the locks on the building at 
3:00 a.m. Reed Taylor's actions in this regard are analogous to a bank repossessing a car. Like a bank, 
Reed Taylor had the right to take all actions he deemed appropriate. He took the action at a time that he 
believed would not breach the peace. 
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the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor took appropriate action when he 
executed the Consents as pennitted under I.e. § 30-1-704. 
As discussed in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law, no Preliminary Injunction 
may be granted for an action that has already been done. Cooper v Milam, 256 S.W.2d 
196,201 (1953) (the Bank's vote of shares cannot be enjoined because the vote already 
took place). The Defendants had over 70 days to seek a TRO or Preliminary Injunction 
enjoining Reed Taylor from voting the shares, but they failed to do so, and Reed Taylor 
voted the shares. Reed Taylor voted the shares, and no Preliminary Injunction may be 
granted to undo such vote. 
G. The Court Should Have Considered 
John Taylor's Lack of Credibility 
The credibility of witnesses who testify in open court is for the trier of fact to 
determine. DeBaca v. McAffee, 109 Idaho 800, 711 P.2d l320 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The Defendants' sole defense rests exclusively with John Taylor's testimony 
regarding an alleged "oral modification" of the Promissory Note. Significantly, John 
Taylor testified that: (1) he could not recall the email he wrote to Ernie Dantini; (2) that 
AIA Insurance had received complaints from a person regarding its use of funds 
belonging to a Growers Trust; (3) his over $200,000 in compensation was actually 
benefits such as a vehicle when he wrote a letter to Donna Taylor stating he had taken no 
salary in 2001; (4) that AIA Insurance's balance sheet should be viewed without using 
GAAP; and (5) AIA Insurance resources were being used by other entities, and that all 
such use was properly allocated and paid by the correct entity, but then later testified that 
he spent approximately one-half of his time working for Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc., yet none of his salary was paid by Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and all of his 
salary was paid by AIA Insurance. 
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As described above and as seen by the numerous examples of improper corporate 
actions in the record, the Court should be very cautious of John Taylor's testimony. 
H. Reed Taylor Should Be Awarded His Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs Incurred for Being Wrongfully Enjoined 
A party wrongfully enjoined is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred as a result of being wrongfully enjoined. LR.C.P.65(C). 
Reed Taylor has been wrongfully enjoined from voting the shares pledged to him 
and should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Court should set aside the Preliminary Injunction and award Reed Taylor his 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred for being wrongfully enjoined. 
Reed Taylor requests oral argument. 
DATED: This 12th day of March, 2007. 
SMITH CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN P 
By: _____ -#_...."",.=-=-___ _ 
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Pau R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction on the 
following parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
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Via: 
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287 -9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT 
OF RECONSIDERATION OF 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST 
REED J. TAYLOR 
WITH ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") submits the following Supplemental 
Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for Reconsideration of Preliminary 
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Injunction against Reed Taylor: 
I. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Failed to Make Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Necessary to Support an Injunction against Reed Taylor. 
LR.C.P. 52(a) sets forth the required findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which pertain to a preliminary injunction: 
and in granting or refusing to interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action .... In the application of this principle regard shall be given to the special 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who 
appear personally before it. 
LR.C.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). 
The Court failed to make findings of fact or conclusions of law necessary to 
support granting a preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor as required by LR.C.P. 
52(a). 
The Court should enter findings to indicate whether the Defendants were in 
Default, whether Reed Taylor had a right to vote the shares, whether John Taylor was 
credible, whether clear and convincing evidence was submitted to support an oral 
modification, and such other warranted and required findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Court erred by not making specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 
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The Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor should be set aside and the Court 
should enter findings of fact and conclusions of law which conform to the evidence and 
law. 
DATED this l3th day of March, 2007. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
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SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
By:------If-~7'------­
Roderick C. 
NedA. C on 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction against Reed Taylor on the following parties 
via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, AIA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Via: 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
Signed this 13th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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I 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
ISB No. 993 
Attorneys for Defendants 
AlA Services Corporation, 
AlA Insurance, Inc. and 
R. John Taylor 
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No: CV 07-00208 
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, AIA 
INSURANCE, INC., AND 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., andR. John Taylor 
("these defendants"), answer plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as follows: 
I. 
Defendants admit paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 2.1. 
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES 
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II. 
Defendants deny paragraphs 2.2, 2.3, 2.12, 2.15,2.16,2.24,3.2,3.3,4.2,4.3, 
5.2,5.3, 6.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.2, 8.3, 9.3, 9.4, 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 and 12.2. Defendants 
deny paragraph 2.23 for lack of information and belief. 
III. 
Defendants reallege their admissions in paragraphs 3.l, 4.1,5.1,6.1, 7.l, 8.1, 
9.1, 10.1, 11.1 and 12.1. 
IV. 
Answering paragraph 2.4, these defendants admit the first sentence and the 
third sentence and allege that in 1995 Reed desired to retire and have AlA Services 
Corporation redeem his stock, and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.4. 
V. 
Answering paragraph 2.5, these defendants admit that AlA Insurance, Inc., is 
a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations. 
VI. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.6 but allege that the agreements were 
amended at a later time. 
VII. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.7 but allege that the Promissory Note 
provided that it was subordinate to the payment of redemption obligations owed by AlA 
Services Corporation to Donna Taylor and that the agreements were amended at a later time. 
VIII. 
Answering paragraph 2.8, these defendants admit that AlA Services 
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Corporation agreed to execute a Security Agreement and Stock Pledge Agreement and deny 
all the other allegations. 
IX. 
Answering paragraph 2.9, these defendants admit the first two sentences, but 
allege that the agreements were amended at a later time. These defendants deny the third 
sentence of paragraph 2.9 and deny all the other allegations. 
X. 
These defendants admit paragraph 2.10 but allege that the agreements were 
later amended. 
XI. 
Answering paragraph 2.11, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself, and deny all of the other allegations in paragraph 
2.11. 
XII. 
Answering paragraph 2.13, these defendants allege that the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement speaks for itself and deny all ofthe other allegations of paragraph 2.13. 
XIII. 
Answering paragraph 2.14, these defendants admit that plaintiff was the largest 
creditor of AlA Services Corporation and deny all the other allegations. 
XIV. 
Answering paragraph 2.17, these defendants admit that plaintiff, through his 
counsel, claimed that AlA Services Corporation was in default and deny all the other 
allegations. 
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xv. 
Answering paragraph 2.18, these defendants deny that they have failed to 
comply with the agreements as amended and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.18. 
XVI. 
Answering paragraph 2.19, these defendants admit that plaintiff attempted 
to schedule a special shareholder meeting for December 26, 2006, a date on which the 
offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., were scheduled to be closed, admit that no special 
shareholders meeting was held, and deny all ofthe other allegations of paragraph 2.19. 
XVII. 
These defendants deny paragraph 2.20 and allege that none of them is in 
default under the terms of any of the agreements as amended. 
XVIII. 
Answering paragraph 2.21, these defendants admit that AlA paid 
$1,510,693.00 to purchase Series C Preferred Shares in AlA Services Corporation from 
an entity in which John was the single largest shareholder but allege that the stated value 
of the Series C Preferred Shares, together with mandatory accumulated dividends likely 
exceeded $3,000,000.00 and that the transaction was substantially beneficial to AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. These defendants admit that the 401 (k) 
plan of AlA Services Corporation held Preferred C shares and that no shares were 
purchased or redeemed from the plan and deny all the other allegations of paragraph 2.21. 
XIX. 
Answering paragraph 2.22, these defendants admit that John purchased a 
parking lot and rents the parking lot to AlA Insurance, Inc., for $1,250.00 per month and 
denies all the other allegations in paragraph 2.22. 
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Answering paragraph 9.2, these defendants admit that as of2002 or 2003 John 
owed AlA Services Corporation $307,271.00 and allege that in 2002 or 2003 John and 
plaintiff entered into an agreement to extinguish John's debt to the corporation and to reduce 
the corporation's debt to Reed by an amount of $307,271.00 and other sums, as a part of a 
proposed transaction between Reed, John and AlA Services Corporation which Reed later 
repudiated and refused to complete, and denies all the other allegations in paragraph 9.2. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
On July 1, 1996, plaintiff, AlA Services Corporation and Donna 1. Taylor 
entered into a SERIES A PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT which provides 
that no principal payments may be made by AlA Services Corporation to plaintiff until the 
entire redemption price due Donna Taylor is paid in full. The redemption price due Donna 
Taylor has not been paid in full. Therefore, no principal payments are due to plaintiff. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
At different times since the written agreements were executed, plaintiffs and 
some defendants have orally modified the written agreements. The modifications include, 
without limitation, an agreement that the interest payable to plaintiff from AlA Services 
Corporation would be paid in installments of $15,000.00 per month (together with the 
assumption of responsibility for other expenses). AlA Services Corporation has paid 
plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 per month and has assumed responsibility for the other 
agreed expenses in accordance with the modified agreement since they were entered into and 
plaintiff has accepted those payments. None of these defendants is in default of the modified 
agreements with plaintiff. 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The claims of the plaintiff are barred by applicable statutes of limitation, 
including Idaho Code §§ 5-216,5-218,5-224 and 5-237. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting his claims against these defendants. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has waived his right to assert claims against these defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff s claims against these defendants are barred by the equitable doctrine 
of unclean hands. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims in his THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION violate Rule 9(b) 
LR.C.P. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff s claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. 
These defendants counterclaim against the plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
In 1995, plaintiff was the majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation. 
AlA Services Corporation was the sole shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
In 1995, AlA Services Corporation redeemed plaintiffs interest in AlA 
Services Corporation through a corporate redemption of the plaintiff s stock. 
After the purchase of plaintiff s stock, plaintiff intentionally undertook a course 
of action to injure AlA Insurance and to devalue the businesses of AlA Services Corporation. 
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Plaintiff s intentional course of action included intimidating the management of the 
businesses of AlA Services Corporation, inducing AlA Insurance, Inc., employees and agents 
to terminate their employment and contracts with AlA Insurance, Inc., and to accept 
employment and contracts with plaintiff and/or his controlled organizations. Plaintiff, with 
the former employees and former agents of AlA Insurance, Inc., engaged in business 
competitive with AlA Insurance, Inc., and seriously damaged the business and value of AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and the value of the businesses of AlA Services Corporation. 
Because ofplaintiffs intentional injury to the business of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
AlA Services Corporation was unable to pay plaintiff all of the amounts of money due at the 
times due, prior to the amendment of the agreements. Before the agreements were amended 
plaintiff threatened to sue AlA Services Corporation and to foreclose and take over AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and threatened and coerced these defendants into employing friends and 
relatives of plaintiff and paying plaintiff s friends and relatives salaries and compensation 
substantially in excess of the value of their services. Plaintiff also told those friends and 
relatives that they were not obligated to report to or take direction from these defendants' 
management. 
Plaintiffhas intentionally breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in the agreements with these defendants and has damaged these defendants in 
amounts to be proved at trial. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Plaintiff has intentionally inflicted emotional distress on John Taylor and 
damaged John Taylor in an amount to be proved at trial. 
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THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE 
ECONOMIC ADV ANTAGE/INTENTIONAL INDUCEMENT 
OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS WITH COMPANIES 
OWNED IN PART BY R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Plaintiffhas damaged these defendants by intentionally causing businesses to 
terminate contracts with companies owned in part by these defendants and therefore 
diminishing the value of these defendants' investment in those companies. Plaintiff has 
damaged these defendants in an amount to be proved at trial. 
FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM 
DECLARATION OF INVALIDATION OF PROXY 
The written agreements provide that plaintiff will have an irrevocable proxy 
from AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA Insurance, Inc., in the event and 
only in the event of an uncured default by AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiff claims that AlA Services Corporation is in default and has thus 
claimed the right to act as AlA Services Corporation proxy and to vote its shares in AIA 
Insurance, Inc. Defendants deny that AlA Services Corporation is in default. 
Plaintiffhas stated in writing his intention to vote AlA Services Corporation's 
shares in AlA Insurance, Inc., to remove all of the current directors of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and then to cause new directors to be appointed to remove all of the officers of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
The immediate removal of all of the directors and officers of AlA Insurance, 
Inc., would result in catastrophic losses to AlA Insurance, Inc., all to the substantial 
detriment of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation. 
A proxy is an agent of his principal and owes a fiduciary duty to his principal. 
Plaintiff seeks to act as a proxy for AIA Services Corporation but has announced his 
intention to do serious and catastrophic damage to his principal, AlA Services Corporation. 
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Because of plaintiff s announced intention to violate his fiduciary duty to AlA 
Services Corporation and to take actions which will result in catastrophic losses to AlA 
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Court should find, order and determine 
that plaintiff does not have a right to act as a proxy for AlA Services Corporation in the 
voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 24,2007, without notice to 
any defendants, plaintiff and several individuals entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., 
and AlA Services Corporation at III Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. 
Accompanying plaintiff and his security personnel was a locksmith whom 
plaintiff directed to begin to change the locks on the offices of AlA Services Corporation and 
AlA Insurance, Inc., for the purpose of preventing access to those offices by their current 
management and employees. 
The action and conduct of plaintiff and his associates constituted a trespass 
upon the property of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., which, if it had been 
successful, would have caused irreparable injury to both AlA Services Corporation and AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing and/or interfering with the 
management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
AlA Services Corporation without the express permission of John Taylor. Plaintiff should 
be enjoined from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
Plaintiff should be enjoined from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee 
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of AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written 
communications. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO AMEND 
These defendants hereby give notice of their intention to request the Court to 
permit them to amend these counterclaims to include a claim for punitive damages. 
WHEREFORE, these defendants request the Court: 
1. To dismiss the First Amended Complaint ofthe plaintiff, with prejudice and 
to award these defendants their costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 
2. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in the amounts proved at triaL 
3. To award these defendants damages for plaintiff s intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, in the amounts proved at triaL 
4. To award these defendants damages for plaintiffs intentionally causing 
businesses to terminate contracts with companies owned by him in amounts to be proved at 
trial. 
5. To find, order and declare that plaintiff did not have a right to act as a proxy 
for AlA Services Corporation in the voting of its shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
6. To enjoin the plaintiff from harassing and/or interfering with the 
management of the business known as AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA Services Corporation 
and to enjoin the plaintiff from entering upon the premises of AlA Insurance, Inc., and AlA 
Services Corporation, without the express permission of John Taylor and to enjoin the 
plaintiff from acting or attempting to act as a director or officer of AlA Insurance, Inc., and 
to enjoin the plaintiff from harassing or annoying, directly or indirectly, any employee of 
ANSWER OF AlA SERVICES 
CORPORATION, AlA INSURANCE, 
INC., AND R. JOHN TAYLOR -10-
AlA Services Corporation or AlA Insurance, Inc., in person, by telephone, or by written 
communications. 
7. For such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just. 
Dated: March 15,2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
By: 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY 
These defendants demand a trial by jury of all of the issues in this case that are 
triable to a jury. 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
X U.S. MAIL 
-- --HAND DELIVERED 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
----TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, WA 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
Michael E. McNichols 
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Michael E. McNichols 
Cleme~ts, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13 Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. 
and R. John Taylor 
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Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and John Taylor, 
submit this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Preliminary Injunction. 
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'147 
I. Introduction 
Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration is little more than a re-argument of the 
same issues he presented to the Court leading up to and at the preliminary injunction 
hearing. This memorandum will not repeat Defendants' position with regard to the issues 
that were fully briefed by both sides leading up to and at the preliminary injunction 
hearing. The Court has already ruled on the various issues re-raised by plaintiff, and 
Defendants will not re-brief those issues here. The only new argument, that Defendants 
lack standing to seek injunctive relief, is both erroneous and moot. 
II. Argument 
A. Defendants Have Standing To Seek Injunctive Relief 
1. Rule 65( e) Allows For The Relief Sought By Defendants 
Plaintiff focuses only on Rule 65( e)( 5) and its "upon filing a counterclaim" 
language. As an initial matter, plaintiff waived this argument by not bringing it in 
opposition to Defendants motion for Preliminary Injunction. If plaintiff thought 
Defendants lacked standing to seek injunctive relief, he should have raised the issue in 
his opposition brief rather that waiting until now. Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of 
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a motion for reconsideration 
"may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they 
could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation"). 
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Moreover, the relief Defendants sought and obtained is expressly provided for in 
Rule 65(e)(6), which, without any mention of the need for filing a counterclaim, 
provides: 
The district courts, in addition to the powers already 
possessed, shall have power to issue writs of injunction for 
affirmative relief having the force and effect of a writ of 
restitution, restoring any person or persons to the possession 
of any real property from the actual possession of which the 
person or persons may be ousted by force, or violence, or 
fraud, or stealth, or any combination thereof, or from which 
the person or persons are kept out of possession by threats 
whenever such possession was taken from them by entry of 
the adverse party on Sunday or a legal holiday, or in the 
nighttime, or while the party in possession was temporarily 
absent therefrom. The granting of such writ shall extend only 
to the right of possession under the facts of the case, in 
respect to the manner in which the possession was obtained, 
leaving the parties to their legal rights on all other questions 
the same as though no such writ had issued: provided, that no 
such writ shall issue except upon notice in writing to the 
adverse party of at least five (5) days of the time and place of 
making application therefor. 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, Rule 65 specifically contemplates injunctive relief in instances where a 
party attempts to take possession of property "on Sunday" ... in the nighttime, or while 
the party in possession was temporarily absent therefrom." This is precisely the type of 
activity that can only be remedied by a court taking action to preserve the status quo. 
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2. The Issues Raised By Defendants Are The Same Issues Already 
Raised by Plaintiff 
Plaintiff s initial Complaint only raised the issue of whether Defendants are in 
default under the terms of the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
Restructure Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. The initial complaint did not 
raise the issues of whether plaintiff was entitled to vote all of the AlA Services 
Corporations' shares in AlA Insurance and take physical control of the AlA offices. 
Rather than allow the court to make the detennination, plaintiff took the matter into his 
own hands and, in the middle of the night, attempted to change the locks. That act is 
what brought about the need for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo. 
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants lack standing to obtain injunctive relief merely 
because Defendants had not yet filed a counterclaim at the time Defendants sought and 
obtained injunctive relief. This argument, however, ignores the fact that plaintiff has 
sought injunctive relief on the exact same issues raised in Defendants motion for 
preliminary injunction. Plaintiff asked the Court to determine that he has the right to vote 
the AlA Services shares and take control of AlA Insurance; plaintiff asked the Court to 
order mandatory injunctive relief allowing plaintiff to alter the status quo. Defendants 
took the opposite position, i.e., that the court should not take the premature step of 
resolving the issues on the merits now, but rather should preserve the status quo by 
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prohibiting plaintiff from taking the matter into his own hands in the way he had already 
covertly attempted. 
Plaintiff sought the Court's equitable remedies, and is now disappointed in the 
equitable remedy fashioned by the Court. However, he should not now complain that the 
Court lacked the authority to consider the same issues he had also brought before the 
Court. 
3. The Standing Issue Is Moot 
Plaintiffs position is that Defendants lack standing because no counterclaim had 
been filed at the time injunctive relief was sought. That issue, if it ever existed, has now 
been cured. Defendants have now filed a counterclaim seeking the injunctive relief 
already granted by the Court. Plaintiff s argument would do no more than require the 
Court to start over and hold another preliminary injunction hearing in which the exact 
same witnesses would undoubtedly present the exact same testimony and evidence. 
There would be no reason for the Court to reach any different conclusion other than the 
conclusion it has already reached that the status quo should be maintained until the Court 
is able to judiciously consider the issues. 
4. The Court Has The Inherent Authority To Grant Injunctive 
Relief To Maintain The Status Quo 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants somehow lack standing to obtain injunctive relief 
merely because Defendants had not yet filed a counterclaim at the time Defendants 
sought and obtained injunctive relief. Plaintiffs argument ignores the inherent power of 
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the Court to preserve the status quo by ordering injunctive relief and is no more than an 
attempt to divest the court of its authority to grant injunctive relief. The court has 
inherent authority to grant injunctive relief, especially where injunctive relief is the only 
way to preserve the status quo. As explained in Baldwin v. Idoni, 944 So.2d 426, 426 
(Fla. App. 2006): 
Where there was a legitimate dispute as to the ownership of 
the vehicle, the trial court had the inherent authority to grant 
an injunction so as to preserve the property until a final 
resolution of the case. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Moreover, Idaho courts hold that a party is entitled to injunctive relief where 
actions fall within a "subject" that is proper for investigation by the court of equity: 
In order to entitle a party to an injunction pendente lite, it is 
not necessary that such a showing should be made as would 
entitle him to the relief prayed for upon final hearing. It is 
sufficient to show a state of facts that makes the transaction a 
proper subject of investigation by a court of equity, justifying 
the protection of property during the pendency of the action. 
White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Mining Co., 55 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho 1936). 
Here, plaintiff attempted to surreptitiously wrest control of AlA Insurance from its 
current management. Rather than allow the court to reach a final resolution in a timely 
and judicious manner, plaintiff took the matter into his own hands. The Court clearly has 
the inherent authority to preserve the status quo by allowing AlA Insurance to remain 
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under its current management until the issues can be resolved by the by the Court after a 
trial. 
B. Plaintiff Miscomprehends The Nature Of The Relief Sought By 
Defendants 
Plaintiffs assertion of errors committed by the Court demonstrates his 
misunderstanding of the nature of injunctive relief. At page 3 of his motion, he 
complains that: 
The Court did not make critical findings that: (1) the 
Promissory Note had been orally modified; (2) a Default does 
not exist; (3) Reed Taylor did not have a right, as the sole 
shareholder, to vote the shares of AlA Insurance. Instead the 
Court merely stated: "[ w ]hich party is likely to prevail on the 
question of default and voting rights has yet to be 
determined." Opinion and Order, p. 6. Such a finding is 
insufficient to support granting a Preliminary Injunction to 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the purpose of a preliminary injunction hearing is not hold a 
trial on the merits. Such is especially the case where the relief requested is merely to 
maintain the status quo rather than to create irreparable harm by altering the status quo. 
The Court properly determined that this is a case where Plaintiff s acts warrant injunctive 
relief because of the irreparable injury they would cause. See I.R.C.P. 65(e)(2). The 
Court clearly recognized the difference between temporary injunctive relief and a trial on 
the merits when it explained that "which party is likely to prevail on the question of 
default and voting rights has yet to be determined." 
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Moreover, plaintiff continues to miscomprehend that injunctive relief to maintain 
the status quo is much more easily obtained than the type of mandatory injunctive relief 
that seeks to alter the status quo. See Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1979) ("A mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status 
quo pendente lite [and] is particularly disfavored.") (citations omitted). 
Moreover, the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff, an order allowing him to take 
control of AlA Insurance, would effectively give plaintiff the relief he seeks without 
bringing the case to trial. Idaho Courts do not allow for such a result: 
A temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its 
effect is to give the plaintiff the principle relief he seeks, 
without bringing the cause to trial; neither should a 
preliminary injunction be dissolved where its effect would be 
such as to give the defendant the relief he seeks without 
bringing the cause to trial. The granting of a preliminary 
restraiJ;ling order is not a matter of right but rests in the sound 
discretion of the court. 
Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 233 P. 869,872 (Idaho 1925). 
C. There is a bond. 
Though the plaintiff claims that the Preliminary Injunction was issued 
without a bond, the same bond that was posted as a condition for issuing the 
Temporary Restraining Order remains on deposit with the Court as security for the 
payment of costs and damages, including reasonable attorney fees that may be 
incurred if the plaintiff is found to have been wrongfully enjoined. 
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III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, these Defendants ask the Court to deny plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
BY:~C1JJ4Q,~~.~~~~ 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
X U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERED -----
____ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
____ TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
~~ 
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Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
(208) 743-9295 (Facsimile) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 






Defendants AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and R. John 
Taylor submit this MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
The Court should deny plaintiff s motion on the grounds and for the reasons 
set forth in the Court's OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION entered on March 8, 2007, in which the Court found that 
"The key question on which all other issues hinge is whether the Defendants are in default 
of the redemption agreement made with Plaintiff Reed Taylor." Page 5. 
The Court then held that "Given the substantial risk offinancialloss that all 
of the parties will suffer if this matter is not addressed with a greater degree of composure 
and temperance, the Court finds irreparable harm is likely ifplaintiff's conduct is not kept 
in check while the critical issues are researched and resolved." Page 6. 
The Court then determined that a preliminary injunction should be issued 
against the plaintiff to restrict the conduct of the parties until they had had opportunity to 
complete discovery and the issues, including the issue of any default would be decided 
at a trial on the merits. 
The relief that plaintiff seeks is totally contrary to and inconsistent with the 
Court's OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS 'MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION and should be denied for the reasons stated by the Court in the OPINION 
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
Plaintiff argues that the defendants are in default, but the Court has already 
determined that the issue of whether the defendants are in default is the critical issue in 
the case and should not be decided by the Court until after the parties have had an 
opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence at a trial on the merits. 
It is clear that, if the defendants are not in default, the plaintiffis not entitled 
to a preliminary injunction or any of the other relief sought. 
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DATED this 19th day of March, 2007. 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNTCHOLS, P.A. 
BY:~~~~~~· ~_ 
MICHAEL E. McNTCHOLS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3 100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
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David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
~ -cc 
RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB #2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TA YLOR, a single person, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an 
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR, 
individually and the community property 
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN, 
a single person; and JOLEE DUCLOS, 
a single person, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-07-00208 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
2 Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Second Amended Complaint against the 
--(!) Defendants alleging as follows: -.cr.: 
c;:) SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT - 1 
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1.1 Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed") is a single person and a resident of 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.2 Defendant AlA Services Corporation ("AlA Services") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. 
1.3 Defendant AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance") is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business is located in Lewiston, Nez Perce County, 
Idaho. AlA Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of AlA Services. 
1.4 Defendants R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor, were husband and wife 
during most of the relevant times (collectively "John") and are residents of Lewiston, 
Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.5 Defendant JoLee Duclos ("Duclos") IS a single person residing III 
Clarkston, Washington. 
1.6 Defendants Bryan Freeman ("Freeman") is a single person residing in 
Lewiston, Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
1.7 The District Court has jurisdiction over this matter under I.C. § 1-705. 
1.8 Venue is proper in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Nez 
Perce County pursuant to I.e. § 5-404. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 R. John Taylor is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance. John is the majority shareholder in AlA Services. 
III 
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2.2 R. John Taylor and Connie Taylor were divorced through an Interlocutory 
Decree filed on December 16, 2005, under which only a portion of their community 
assets were divided and other property remains undivided. This action involves 
transactions, debts, claims, and/or causes of action which accrued prior to R. John Taylor 
and Connie Taylor's dissolution and property subject to their dissolution and this action 
remains undivided. R. John Taylor's actions were taken on behalf of the community. 
2.3 Duclos is, and was at all relevant times, an officer and director of AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance. Duclos is a shareholder in AlA Services. 
2.4 Freeman is, and was at all relevant times, a director of AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance. Freeman is a shareholder in AlA Services. 
2.5 Reed was the founder and majority shareholder of AlA Services. In 1995, 
John desired to redeem Reed's 613,494 shares of common stock in AlA Services through 
a stock redemption agreement. Upon the closing of the transaction of AlA Services' 
redemption of Reed's shares, John became the majority shareholder in AlA Services. 
2.6 AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA Services, is wholly owned by AlA 
Services and where virtually all of AlA Services' revenues are derived. AlA Insurance is 
lessee of the office building located at 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho. 
2.7 On or about July 22, 1995, AlA Services and Reed entered into a Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement. Under the 
terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement and related agreements, AlA Services agreed 
to execute promissory note to timely pay Reed $1,500,000 Million in 90 days ("Down 
Payment Note") and $6,000,000, plus accrued interest due and payable monthly at the 
rate of 8'14% per annum ("Promissory Note"). 
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2.8 The Promissory Note was executed by John on behalf of AlA Services on 
or about August 1, 1995. Under the terms of the Promissory Note, AlA Services was 
required to timely pay all accrued interest monthly to Reed and the principal amount of 
$6 Million was due and payable on or before August 1,2005. 
2.9 Under the terms of the Stock Redemption Agreement, AlA Services and 
AlA Insurance also agreed to contemporaneously execute a Security Agreement and 
Stock Pledge Agreement, among other agreements and documents. The Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement were all 
either authorized by the Board of Directors of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance and/or 
approved by a shareholder vote. 
2.10 When AIA Services was unable to comply with the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement, and Security Agreement, John (on behalf of AlA 
Services) entered into negotiations with Reed regarding restructuring the obligations. In 
1996, AlA Services, AlA Insurance and Reed agreed to modify the Stock Redemption 
Agreement and executed the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement ("Restructure 
Agreement"). Contemporaneously with the execution of the Restructure Agreement, the 
parties executed an Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement ("Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement") and an Amended and Restated Security Agreement ("Amended 
Security Agreement"). The Down Payment Note remained unpaid at this time and AlA 
Services was in default. 
2.11 Under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, the terms of the 
Promissory Note remained unchanged and were not modified (including the $6,000,000 
principal amount, due date, and required monthly interest payments). Under the terms of 
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the Amended Security Agreement, Reed received a security interest in all of AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance's commissions and AlA Services and AlA Insurance were 
required to have a Lock Box for all commissions for the benefit of Reed. 
2.12 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services 
pledged all the outstanding shares in AlA Insurance to Reed as partial security for AlA 
Services' indebtedness to Reed under the agreements. Under the terms of the Amended 
Stock Pledge Agreement, AIA Services' failure to timely pay Reed interest or principal 
under the Promissory Note or Down Payment Note constituted an Event of Default. In an 
Event of Default for failure to timely pay interest or principal under the Promissory Note, 
AlA Services' insolvency, or AlA Services' failure to maintain the required Lock Box 
(among other Events of Default), AIA Services right to vote the pledged shares of AlA 
Insurance ceased and terminated and vested exclusively in Reed. 
2.13 Under the terms of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Reed was 
required to be a member of the board of directors of AlA Services until Reed was paid in 
full or sufficient security was posted to ensure the payment of the Promissory Note. AlA 
Services never posted bonds or other security for the payment of the Promissory Note. In 
excess of six years, AlA Services, John, Duclos andJor Freeman have intentionally 
refused to appoint Reed to the Board as required. Despite Reed's demands and AlA 
Services' contractual obligations to keep Reed on the Board, AlA Services, John, Duclos 
andJor Freeman have refused to appoint Reed to the Board of Directors of AlA Services 
as required. Because Reed has not been on the Board as required, all actions taken by 
AlA Services' Board were not properly authorized and, therefore, not ratified by AlA 
Services; and such acts are the personal actions of John, Duclos andJor Freeman during 
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their tenure on the Board of AlA Services. 
2.14 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, AlA Services agreed to not 
loan money to any affiliate other than a wholly owned subsidiary. AlA Services has 
loaned money to or provided other services or benefits to affiliates and other parties in 
violation of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and such loans or benefits were made 
during times in which John, Duclos and Freeman were Board members. 
2.15 During all relevant times, Reed was the largest and only significant 
creditor of AlA Services. Because AlA Services has failed to timely and properly pay 
Reed as required during all relevant times, John, Duclos and/or Freeman owe Reed 
special obligations because of his status as AlA Services' largest creditor. 
2.16 During all relevant times, the value of AlA Services was less than the 
aggregate amount of its debts, which constitutes AlA Services' insolvency. During all 
relevant times, AlA Services was in default of various provisions of the agreements with 
Reed, insolvent and/or unable to timely pay its debts to Reed. During all relevant times, 
AlA Services has failed to comply with the terms of the Promissory Note. 
2.17 Instead of timely paying Reed as required, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos, and/or Freeman utilized funds that Reed had a security interest in to make 
investments in, transfer assets to, or loan money to, or provide services on behalf of John 
and/or entities operated and/or partially owned by John. 
2.18 On or about December 12, 2006, Reed provided AlA Services written 
notice of default under various provisions of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement, including, without limitation, 
AlA Services' failure to pay principal and interest due under the Promissory Note, failure 
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to maintain the Lock Box, loaning money to non-wholly owned subsidiaries (including 
guaranteeing the $15 Million revolving line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, 
Inc.), failure to provide and timely provide all required financial information, among 
other defaults. AlA Services and AlA Insurance have failed to timely cure the defaults 
and all applicable cure periods have expired. As of the date of this Second Amended 
Complaint, the principal owed to Reed under the Promissory Note of $6,000,000, plus 
accrued interest of over $2,000,000 had not been paid in full as required. 
2.19 Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, 
and/or Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of the Restructure Agreement, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, and Amended Security Agreement. Under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the right to vote all of AlA Insurance's shares ceased 
and terminated for AlA Services and became vested in Reed when AlA Services failed to 
timely pay the required monthly interest payments due under the Promissory Note and its 
subsequent failure to pay the $6,000,000 principal due under the Promissory Note on 
August 1, 2005, as well as when AlA Services committed other Defaults under the 
various agreements. AlA Services was in default long before Reed demanded to exercise 
his right to hold a special shareholder meeting to vote the shares to appoint a new board 
of directors for AlA Insurance. 
2.20 On December 12, 2006, Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a 
special shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance for the purpose of removing and 
appointing new board members on December 26, 2006. AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos and/or Freeman refused to comply with Reed's demand for a special 
shareholder meeting by representing that AlA Insurance's offices were closed on 
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December 26, 2006. 
2.21 Through a letter dated January 3,2007, John stated "I fully recognize that 
[Reed) Taylor may take actions he deems appropriate, including calling a special 
shareholders meeting." 
2.22 On or about January 25, 2007, Reed hand delivered another demand for a 
special shareholder meeting for the removal and appointment of the board of directors for 
February 5, 2007, pursuant to his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
Through a letter from Duclos, AlA Insurance refused Reed's request and denied that he 
had the right to call a meeting to vote the AIA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AlA 
Insurance refused to hold a special shareholder meeting. 
2.23 Despite Reed's demands, AlA Services and AlA Insurance failed to cure 
the numerous Defaults under the terms of the Restructure Agreement, Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement and Amended Security Agreement, among other obligations (as 
described above).· Through the date of this Second Amended Complaint, AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance's Defaults were not timely cured and they remained in Default. 
2.24 On February 22, 2007, Reed exercised his right to vote the pledged shares 
by executing a Consent in Lieu of Special Shareholder Meeting of AlA Insurance 
removing John, Duclos and Freeman from the Board of Directors and appointed himself 
the sole Board Member, pursuant to his right to vote the pledged shares under the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. Because AlA Services' right to vote the pledged 
shares had ceased and terminated when it became in Default and failed to cure such 
Defaults, the right to vote the pledged shares in AIA Insurance vested exclusively in 
Reed and he exercised his right to vote the pledged shares pursuant to the Amended 
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Stock Pledge Agreement and the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Insurance. Because 
the shares pledged to Reed account for all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, Reed 
had the authority to waive the notice requirement, notice period, and the formality of 
holding a shareholder meeting. 
2.25 In the weeks leading up to the filing of this action, Reed discovered that 
more than one transfer of assets occurred during the time in which AlA Services had 
failed to service its debt to Reed. In 2004, AlA Insurance paid $1,510,693 to purchase 
Series C Preferred Shares in AIA Services from Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., an 
entity in which John was the single largest shareholder (John holds approximately 40% of 
the outstanding shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.). This transaction 
inappropriately and/or fraudulently transferred $1,510,693 of AlA Insurance's funds to 
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. when such funds should have been tendered to Reed 
and/or used to pay the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services. This 
$1,510,693 transfer occurred at a time in which AlA Services was insolvent and when it 
was in Default on the monthly payments of interest due to Reed under the Promissory 
Note. This $1,510,693 transfer also occurred at the same time that AlA Services' 401(k) 
Plan (the "Plan") held over $750,000 in Preferred C Shares in AlA Services. No shares 
were purchased or redeemed from the Plan, even though John and Duclos were the Co-
Trustees of the Plan at the time of the transfer. 
2.26 Reed also discovered that John had purchased a parking lot and entered 
into a lease agreement with AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to lease the parking lot 
from him for $1,250 per month. This transaction was also the transfer of funds to John, 
funds which should have been paid to Reed during a time in which AlA Services was 
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unable to service its debt to Reed and was otherwise insolvent. The parking lot is not 
even utilized by AlA Insurance or AlA Services. There are other transfers and/or 
transactions which Reed will itemize and detail at trial. 
2.27 Based upon the above-referenced acts, transfers and transactions, together 
with transactions referenced in the foot notes to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's 
financial statements, there are other unauthorized and inappropriate transfers, loans, 
payments, advances and other actions which occurred during times AlA Services defaults 
and inability to timely pay Reed and at times in which AlA Services was insolvent. 
Upon information and belief, Reed believes that forensic accounting and further scrutiny 
of AlA Insurance and AlA Services books and records will reveal additional improper 
activities. 
2.28 John has used AlA Services and AlA as his personal source of funds 
and/or assets, including, without limitation, acts in which John has transferred assets to 
their name; taken advances that John never paid back; transferred assets and/or funds to 
other entities partially owned or controlled by John; entered into transactions which 
constitute a violation of AlA Services' Articles of Incorporation; made transfers and/or 
entered into transactions which benefited John and/or anyone or more of the other 
Defendants; and provided services for entities partially owned by John and/or anyone or 
more of the other Defendants without such actions being arms-length transactions. The 
above acts occurred when John, Duclos, and Freeman were directors and/or officers of 
AlA Services and AlA Insurance. All of the above acts occurred during times in which 
AlA Services was not current with payments to Reed under the Promissory Note, In 
Default of other provisions, and insolvent. 
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2.29 On February 22, 2007 (after executing the Consent in Lieu of Special 
Shareholder Meeting), Reed executed a Consent in Lieu of Board Meeting to terminate 
all officers, the employment of John, authorize the change of locks, and take such other 
actions deemed appropriate. When Reed attempted to take action in accordance with the 
Consents described above, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman 
refused to abide by the Consents. 
2.30 Donna Taylor, the holder of the Series A Preferred Shares in AlA 
Services, subordinated all of her rights to payment of the redemption of her shares in 
favor of the Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor. 
III. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-BREACHES OF CONTRACT 
3.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
3.2 AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or omissions and 
failure to pay Reed the amounts owed and/or comply with the Promissory Note, 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security Agreement and Restructure 
Agreement constitute a breach of their contractual obligations owed to Reed. AlA 
Services, AlA Insurance, and/or John's acts and/or omissions constitute the breach of 
obligations owed to Reed under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, Restructure Agreement, Amended Security Agreement, and monies owed to 
Reed. 
3.3 As a result of AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or John's acts and/or 
omissions which constitute numerous breaches of contractual obligations, Reed has 
suffered and is entitled to damages of $6,000,000, plus accrued interest in excess of 
$2,000,000, in an exact amount to be determined at trial to be allocated between the 
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defendants as the evidence and claims show at trial. In addition, Reed is entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory Note, Amended Stock Pledge 
Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
IV. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
4.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
4.2 The Defendants' actions constitute fraudulent transfers and/or 
conveyances under I.C. § 55-901, et seq. and/or the common law doctrine of Fraudulent 
Conveyances. 
4.3 As a result of John, Duclos and/or Freeman's participation III the 
fraudulent transfers, John, Duclos and/or Freeman should be personally liable for all 
fraudulent transfers, plus accrued interest, in an amount to be proved at trial. All 
fraudulent transfers should be avoided and/or rescinded, and all assets placed In a 
constructive trust for the benefit of Reed. 
V. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-MISREPRESENTATIONSfFRAUD 
5.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
5.2 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Freeman, and/or Duclos made 
statements of fact regarding pay, finances, transfer(s), loan guarantees, and/or services 
provided to other entities, transaction(s), payment of debts to Reed, and/or rights granted 
to Reed by AlA Services or AlA Insurance; such statements of fact were false; such false 
statements were material; AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman 
knew or should have known the falsity of such statements; AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
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John, Duclos and/or Freeman intended to induce reliance; Reed was ignorant to the 
falsity of such statements; and Reed relied on such statements; Reed had a right to rely on 
such false statements. 
5.3 As a result of AlA Services, AlA, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's acts, 
false statements, and/or omissions, Reed was damaged as consequence or proximate 
result of such acts, false statements, and/or omissions. 
VI. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONVERSION 
6.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
6.2 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's conduct 
constitutes the willful interference with Reed's property and money which should have 
been paid to him, without lawful justification, which deprived Reed of the possession of 
such money and/or property. 
6.3 As a result of the AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or 
Freeman's acts and/or conduct, Reed has been severely damaged and is entitled to 
damages proven at trial. 
VII. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ALTER EGO 
7.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
7.2 Because of the fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts and/or 
omissions of John, Duclos, Freeman and/or other shareholders of AlA Services, the 
corporate veil of AlA Services should be pierced thereby holding John, Duclos, and/or 
Freeman and/or certain shareholders of AlA Services personally liable for all 
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indebtedness to Reed as equity requires such action. 
VIII. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION-EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION 
8.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
8.2 Donna Taylor is the holder of Series A Preferred Shares in AlA Services, 
and such shares were issued to her as a result of a dissolution action between her and 
Reed. If not for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos, and/or Freeman's 
fraudulent, wrongful and/or inappropriate acts, Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares 
would have been redeemed by AIA Services and/or AlA. As of the date of this Second 
Amended Complaint, over $500,000 must be paid to Donna Taylor to redeem her Series 
A Preferred Shares. 
8.3 Reed is entitled to be equitably indemnified by AlA Services, John, 
Duclos and/or Freeman for any sums owed to Donna Taylor because of AlA Services' 
failure to timely redeem her Series A Preferred Shares as required. 
IX. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ACCOUNT STATEDIMONIES DUE 
9.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
9.2 In or about 2002 or 2003, John owed AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance 
at least $307,271. In order to extinguish John's liabilities to AlA Services and/or AlA 
Insurance, John debited Reed's Promissory Note with a payment of at least $307,271 and 
credited John's indebtedness with a payment of at least $307,271. John did not obtain 
Reed's approval or consent to transfer funds between John's indebtedness and Reed's 
Promissory Note and John has not tendered payment of these funds to Reed. This debt 
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constitutes a personal loan from Reed to John. This account stated and/or debt remains 
unpaid, along with any others which may have occurred but which Reed is unaware of at 
this time, the dates and exact amount of which will be proven at trial. 
9.3 Reed is entitled to the payment of all amounts owed by John as a result of 
all transfers between Reed's Promissory Note and John indebtedness from AlA Services 
and/or AlA Insurance. Reed is also entitled to pre-judgment interest on all amounts owed 
to him by John for all such accounts stated and/or debts from the date of such transfers 
until payment in full is made to Reed. 
9.4 As a direct and/or proximate result of John's acts and/or omissions, John 
are in breach of their obligations to pay Reed and Reed is entitled to damages. 
X. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
10.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
10.2 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman have retained 
the benefit of their fraudulent, wrongful, improper and/or overreaching conduct and/or 
transfers. 
10.3 John and/or anyone or more of the other Defendants would be unjustly 
emiched if allowed to retain the benefit of the assets, securities, loans, advances and/or 
other services received through AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, all of which funds 
should have been paid to Reed. 
XI. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
11.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
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11.2 Reed has a valid security interest in AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's 
commissions, among other security interests. AIA Services, AIA Insurance, John, Duclos 
and/or Freeman fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly used funds, which should 
have been paid to Reed, for investments, personal use, inappropriate transactions, loans, 
advances, self-dealing, and/or other wrongful and/or inappropriate purposes. 
11.3 AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acts and/or 
omissions resulted in John, Duclos and/or Freeman's acquisition of money, securities 
and/or services which should have been paid to Reed but through their fraud, 
misrepresentation(s), bad faith, and/or overreaching activities; and AlA Services, John, 
Duclos, Freeman, and/or other entities' retention of the money, investments, securities 
and property would be unjust. 
11.4 Reed requests the imposition of a constructive trust for his benefit to 
recover the proceeds of all such fraudulent, overreaching, improper, self-dealing, 
wrongful and/or inappropriate transfers, acts and/or omissions. 
XII. NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION-DIRECTOR LIABILITY 
12.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
12.2 John, Duclos and Freeman should be held personally liable for all 
fraudulent, wrongful, improper, overreaching transactions, transfers, loans, advances, 
loan guarantees and fraudulent conveyances which occurred during their tenure as 
member of the Board of Directors and as officers of AlA Service and AlA Insurance. 
III 
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XIII. TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION-ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS 
13.1 Reed re-alleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in 
other paragraphs necessary to support every claim under this cause of action. 
13.2 Under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and Restructure Agreement, Reed is entitled to vote the pledged shares of 
AlA Insurance (and all ancillary rights, including, without limitation, to vote the shares to 
remove the board and take all actions related in any way to his right to vote the pledged 
shares), sell the shares of AIA Insurance at public or private sale, judicially sell the 
pledged shares in AlA Insurance, entitled to timely receive audited financial statements 
and financial information, andJor seize all of the AlA Insurance and AlA Services' 
commissions in the required Lock Box. When AlA Services became in Default, it lost its 
right to vote the pledged shares of AlA Insurance and the right vested exclusively in 
Reed. 
13.3 Despite Reed's demands for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, John, Duclos 
andJor Freeman to comply with the provisions in the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
Amended Security Agreement and Restructure Agreement, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, 
John, Duclos andJor Freeman have refused to comply. Reed is entitled to the relief 
afforded to him or reasonably contemplated under the foregoing agreements and such 
other rights, remedies andJor relief as may be available under Idaho Code, including, 
without limitation, any action or order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. andJor 
Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho Code. 
13.4 Reed is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred, at or 
before trial, in enforcing any provision of the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, 
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Amended Security Agreement, andJor Restructure Agreement for relief sought before or 
at trial. 
XIV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Without waiving any claims, rights andJor remedies under any of the above-
referenced agreements, Reed respectfully requests the following relief: 
14.1 For a judgment against AlA Services for the principal of $6,000,000, plus 
accrued pre-judgment interest in excess of $2,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at 
trial. 
14.2 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the 
Defendants from preventing Reed from exercising his right under the Amended Stock 
Pledge Agreement to vote the pledged shares in AlA Insurance and taking any ancillary 
actions which relate in any way to voting the pledged shares, including, without 
limitation, removing the board of directors of AlA Insurance and appointing a revised 
board and such other actions he deems appropriate in his sole discretion as the exclusive 
person entitled to vote all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance. 
14.3 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining any of the 
Defendants from interfering with the actions taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, 
Consent in Lieu of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Insurance and the actions 
taken pursuant to the February 22, 2007, Consent in Lieu of Meeting of Board of 
Directors of AlA Insurance. 
14.4 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants and 
any entity owned, partially owned or operated by anyone or more of them from 
interfering with, disturbing, and transferring any of AlA insurance's customers, contracts, 
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agreements and business. 
14.5 Until such time that Reed Taylor's vote of the pledged shares is honored 
and he is permitted to operate AlA Insurance, Reed Taylor requests a preliminary and 
permanent injunction against the Defendants as follows: 
III 
(a) Enjoining the Defendants from utilizing, transferring or disposing of 
any funds, assets, labor, facilities or services of AIA Insurance for any 
other person, entity or business, unless such transactions are arms-
length and payment is received by AlA Insurance prior to providing 
such funds, assets, labor, facilities or services (e.g., no credit 
arrangements for such activities). 
(b) Enjoining the Defendants from disposing of, usmg, transferring or 
utilizing any of the funds received from the lawsuit entitled In re: 
Universe Liquidator Grain Growers Trust, et at v. Idaho Department 
of Insurance a/k/a GGMIT suit. All funds from the foregoing should 
be held in trust until further notice from the Court. 
(c) Enjoining the Defendants from negotiating or entering into any loans, 
credit arrangements, credit facilities, or borrowing any funds under 
any loan, line-of-credit, credit facility, open account and the like for 
which AlA Insurance is a guarantor or a signatory, unless utilized for 
the exclusive benefit of AlA Insurance to provide funding for AIA 
Insurance and approved by Reed Taylor or such other party appointed 
by Reed Taylor or the Court. 
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(d) Enjoining the Defendants from destroying, altering, deleting, purging, 
and/or removing any documents (including drafts, proposals, 
electronic files, email, back-up media and the like), property, 
computers and the like from AlA Insurance's office. 
(e) Enjoining the Defendants from advancing or lending any funds, assets 
or services to R. John Taylor, 10Lee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie 
Taylor or AlA Services without first obtaining written consent from 
Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(f) Enjoining the Defendants from entering into or negotiating any 
substantive contracts or agreements without first obtaining approval 
from Reed Taylor or the Court. 
(g) Enjoining the Defendants from holding, calling or participating in any 
shareholder meetings, board meeting, and/or executing any Consents 
in Lieu of the foregoing without permitting Reed Taylor to vote the 
pledged shares or take such other action permitted to him as the holder 
ofthe right to vote all outstanding shares of AlA Insurance. 
(h) Enjoining the Defendants from using or transferring any funds, assets, 
or services of AlA Insurance for the purpose of providing any retainers 
or payments for the legal services for R. John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, 
10Lee Duclos, and Connie Taylor. 
(i) Enjoining R. John Taylor to only be entitled to reasonable 
compensation for work performed for AlA Insurance. R. John 
Taylor's time expended for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and any 
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other entities partially owned by him shall be paid by the appropriate 
entity and not AlA Insurance or AlA Services. 
G) Enjoining the Defendants from not having AlA Insurance and AlA 
Services accurately and properly itemizing every employee's daily 
time sheet to reflect the number ofhour(s) performed for AlA Services 
and AlA Insurance and such other unrelated entities such as Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Sound Insurance. 
(k) Enjoining the Defendants from such other actions as may be 
reasonably contemplated from this Second Amended Complaint, the 
Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended Security Agreement, 
the Restructure Agreement and/or which would otherwise protect Reed 
Taylor's interests. 
14.6 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants 
requiring them to timely and promptly provide Reed Taylor with all financial information 
required under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement. 
14.7 For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining John from entering 
the offices of AlA Insurance, if necessary. 
14.8 For such other relief or Court orders as Reed may request before or at trial 
to enforce his rights under the Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, Amended Security 
Agreement, and/or Restructure Agreement, including, without limitation, any action or 
order authorized under I.C. § 30-1-701 et seq. and/or Chapter 9 of Title 29 under Idaho 
Code. 
III 
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14.9 For the avoidance of the improper and/or fraudulent transfers of funds, 
assets and/or services from AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance to John, entities partially 
owned by John, and/or any other party who received such transfers under I.C. § 55-916, 
et seq. and/or other applicable legal authority. 
14.10 For judgment against John for $307,271, plus accrued interest for the 
money he owed AlA Services which was improperly paid by transferring his 
indebtedness to Reed's Promissory Note. 
14.11 For a judgment against John for all amounts, plus pre-judgment interest, in 
an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
14.12 For judgment against John, Duclos, and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, 
for all funds, assets, services, property and/or any other benefit fraudulently transferred 
and/or fraudulently conveyed, and which such transferred may not be avoided, rescinded 
and/or paid to Reed. 
14.13 For judgment against John, Duclos and/or Freeman, jointly and severally, 
for amounts owed to Reed in an amount to be proven at the time of trial because AlA 
Services and AlA Insurance are alter egos of John, Duclos and/or Freeman. 
14.14 For the imposition of a construction trust for the benefit of Reed on all 
funds, investments, loans, advances, securities, property, transactions, services and/or 
self-dealing which were fraudulently, wrongfully and/or improperly made for the benefit 
of AlA Services, AIA Insurance, Duclos, Freeman, John, and/or other parties or entities, 
which sums should have been paid to Reed. 
14.15 For a preliminary and permanent injunction against the Defendants from 
transferring, encumbering or otherwise disposing of any improperly and/or fraudulently 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT - 22 481 
obtained and/or transferred assets under I.C. § 55-916, et seq. and/or other applicable 
legal authority. 
14.16 For judgment and/or relief for all claims which conform to the evidence 
obtained through discovery and/or forensic accounting. 
14.17 Foran award of Reed's attorneys' fees and costs as under the Promissory 
Note, Amended Stock Pledge Agreement, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121. 
14.18 For such other relief as Reed may request before or at the time of trial 
and/or that the Court may find just, equitable, or warranted before or at the time of trial. 
DATED this y"}/day of March, 2007. 
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC 
AHLERS & CRESSMAN PLLC 
BY.AI~~r----
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Roderick C. Bond 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ned A. Cannon 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, Reed 1. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this 
Second Amended Complaint, know the contents of this Second Amended Complaint, and 
believe that the facts in this Second Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .2iotay of March, 2007. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: LOffJ 6@ 
My commission expires: lI24/2/)12 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Second Amended Complaint on the following 
parties via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Via: 
( ) )1.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(vJ Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(if Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Jonathan D. Hally Via: 
Clark & Feeney ( ) ):1.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 285 (J/f Hand Delivered 
Lewiston, ID 83501 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor ( ) Facsimile 
Signed thiS$a:y of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
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Michael E. McNichols 
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. 
321 13th Street 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-6538 
Facsimile: (208) 743-9295 
Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services 
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. 
and R. John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the ) 
community property comprised thereof; ) 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and ) 




Case No: CV 07-00208 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Defendants AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and John Taylor submit this 
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 




Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is based on the previously filed 
Emergency Motion (1) to Enforce Shareholder Vote and board of Directors' Resolutions, and (2) 
to confirm Termination of Counsel for AIA Insurance, Inc. (the "Emergency Motion"); the 
previously filed affidavits; and the testimony already received at the March 1, 2007 hearing on 
ALA's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
These defendants have already filed their memorandum in opposition to the 
Emergency Motion, and that briefing is hereby incorporated by reference. Moreover, Reed 
Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeks relief on the exact same issues upon which the 
Court has already granted injunctive relief. In the March 8, 2007 Opinion and Order on 
Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court entered a preliminary injunction as 
follows: 
Order, p. 6. 
restrammg the Plaintiff, Reed Taylor, from harassing and/or 
interfering with the management of the businesses known as AIA 
Insurance, Inc. and AIA Services Corporation without the express 
permission of Defendant John Taylor, nor act or attempt to act as a 
director or officer of ALA Insurance Inc. Reed Taylor is also not to 
harass or annoy, directly or indirectly, any employee of ALA 
insurance Services Corporation or ALA Insurance Inc., in person, 
by telephone, or by written communications. 
In reaching that decision, the Court weighed the likelihood of success on the 
merits and the potential for irreparable harm. 
Reed Taylor's Motion for Preliminary injunction seeks to obtain the exact 
opposite relief as that already granted by the court, i.e., mandatory injunctive relief permitting 
him to vote the shares of ALA Insurance and permitting him to take over operation of ALA 
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Insurance. The Court's previous decision that the injunctive relief standard weighs in favor of 
preserving the status quo pending resolution of the issues on the merits necessarily means that 
Reed Taylor cannot satisfy the preliminary injunction requirement to obtain the mandatory 
injunctive relief he seeks. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Reed Taylor Continues To Improperly and Prematurely Seek Final Adjudication on 
the Merits. 
Although he calls the motion a "Motion for Preliminary Injunction," it is clear 
that Reed Taylor is seeking much more than injunctive relief. Unlike injunctive relief to 
maintain the status quo -- as the Court has already granted -- Reed Taylor seeks to disrupt the 
status quo, a result that is particularly disfavored. Moreover, Reed Taylor continues to 
miscomprehend that injunctive relief to maintain the status quo is much more easily obtained 
than the type of mandatory injunctive relief that seeks to alter the status quo. See Anderson v. 
United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A mandatory injunction goes well beyond 
simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite (and] is particularly disfavored.") (citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, Reed Taylor is not asking the Court to simply weigh the risk of 
irreparable harm against the likelihood of success on the merits. Rather, he is asking the Court to 
now issue a final ruling on the merits. This is evident in the proposed order granting preliminary 
injunction he has submitted to the court. That proposed order makes the following Conclusions 
of Law: 
1. AIA Services is in default of the obligations owing to Reed 
Taylor pursuant to the agreements and contracts identified in 
paragraph 4 of the above Findings of Fact. 
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2. Reed Taylor, as the holder of the right to vote all of the 
outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, was and is entitled to vote all 
of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance without holding a 
meeting pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-704 .... 
3. Defendants, AlA Services, AlA Insurance, R. John Taylor, 
JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freemen, have no right to interfere with 
the corporate actions taken pursuant to such Consents. 
A motion for preliminary injunction is not the right time for a court to make such 
determinations on the merits. These issues can only be resolved after discovery and an 
opportunity to fully brief the issues in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Reed Taylor Improperly Seeks to Obtain the Relief He Seeks in His Complaint 
Without Bringing the Case to Trial. 
On a related note, the injunctive relief sought by Reed Taylor -- an order allowing 
him to vote lAI Services shares and take control of AlA Insurance -- would effectively give 
plaintiff the relief he seeks without bringing the case to trial. Idaho Courts do not allow for such 
a result: 
A temporary injunction will not usually be allowed where its effect 
is to give the plaintiff the principle relief he seeks, without 
bringing the cause to trial; neither should a preliminary injunction 
be dissolved where its effect would be such as to give the 
defendant the relief he seeks without bringing the cause to trial. 
Rowland v. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 233 P. 869,872 (Idaho 1925). 
C. The Preliminary Injunction Standard is Not Satisfied 
As set forth in more detail in AlA's prior briefing, Reed Taylor cannot meet the 
preliminary injunction standard. The Court has already found that there is significant risk of 
irreparable harm if the status quo is not maintained pending resolution on the merits. Moreover, 
significant complex questions must be addressed before Reed Taylor can establish that he is 
entitled to the relief he seeks, including the central questions of whether AlA is in default and 
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whether Reed Taylor has any right to vote the Shares of AIA insurance. See Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 993-994 (1984) ("the substantial likelihood of 
success necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot 
exist where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt") (emphasis 
added). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants ask the Court to deny Reed Taylor's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of March, 2007. 
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CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
MICHAEL E. McNICHOLS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Ned A. Cannon 
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-8421 
Paul R. Cressman, Jr. 
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, W A 98104-4088 
Facsimile: (206) 287-9902 
____ u.S. MAIL 
____ HAND DELIVERED 
____ OVERNIGHT MAIL 
__ .X TELECOPY (FAX) 
David A. Gittins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Facsimile: 758-3576 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Facsimile: 746-9160 
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PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISB #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TA YLOR and 
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1 
Case No.: CV 06-02855 
AFFIDA VII OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S 




COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
I, Reed Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I make this Affidavit on my personal 
knowledge. 
2. JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and John Taylor are attempting to obtain 
funds from AlA Insurance, Inc. to pay their legal fees and costs through a shareholder 
vote of AlA Services Corporation. Under the Bylaws of the corporations, they are not 
permitted to get their fees paid because they did not comply with various requirements 
and my claims against them involve failed obligations and duties as directors and officers 
of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. A vote from AlA Insurance, Inc. 
must be obtained before money can be transferred from AlA Insurance, Inc. to AlA 
Services Corporation. 
3. Attached as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copIes of the following 
documents which I obtained from Kay Hanchett, who is presently a shareholder of AlA 
Services Corporation and a former employee of AlA Insurance, Inc.: 
(a) Letter from AlA Services Corporation to Shareholders dated March 
16,2007; 
(b) Notice of Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services 
Corporation dated March 16, 2007; 
(c) Letter from R. John Taylor dated March 1,2007; 
(d) Letter from JoLee Duclos dated March 16,2007; 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERA nON 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
(e) Resignation Letter from 10Lee Duclos from the Board of AlA Services 
Corporation dated February 22, 2007; 
(f) Resignation Letter from 10Lee Duclos from the Board of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. dated February 22,2007; 
(g) Letter from Bryan Freeman dated March 16, 2007; 
(h) Resignation Letter from Bryan Freeman to the Board of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. dated February 22, 2007; and 
(i) Resignation Letter from Bryan Freeman to the Board of AlA Services 
Corporation dated February 22, 2007. 
4. In the past, AlA Insurance, Inc. has leased an automobile for 10hn Taylor. 
I have seen 10hn Taylor driving a brand new Porsche Cayenne. I have also seen the 
Porsche Cayenne parked in 10hn Taylor's reserved parking space at AlA Insurance, Inc. 
when I have driven by there running errands. I researched the price of Porsche 
Cayenne's and the starting base price is over $60,000 as advertised by various dealers on 
the internet. This illustrates what 10hn Taylor is doing with money that should be paid to 
me and at times when AlA Services is insolvent if the vehicle is being paid for by AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
5. The Defendants' attempts to unlawfully and inappropriately obtain funds 
from AlA Insurance, Inc. to pay for their legal fees and costs and to fund the lease or 
purchase of the new Porsche Cayenne illustrates that the status quo is inappropriate and 
unlawful and further illustrates the ramifications associated with the Court's erroneous 
injunction issued against me. The Defendants are utilizing funds which I have a valid 
security interest in for inappropriate purposes. The Court also has many exhibits and 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3 
testimony which supports the inappropriate corporate actions at AlA Services 
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
6. I respectfully demand that the Court orders the Defendants be required to 
post a bond or cash security of $2,450,000 to protect me from damages and attorneys fees 
and costs which I will incur from being VvTongfully enjoined. As seen by the Court in my 
recent Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, the Defendants will be fighting me 
on every legal issue simply to fight and for no valid reason. This will result in additional 
attorneys' fees and costs to me and the Defendants will also incur additional fees and 
costs, which could be paid by AlA Insurance, Inc. to my detriment. The above security is 
based upon John Taylor's testimony regarding the value of AlA Insurance, Inc. being 
$2,000,000 plus, together with attorneys' fees and costs estimated to be over $450,000, 
i.e., the Court must ensure that there is sufficient security to cover my legal fees and 
costs, and all legal fees and costs paid by AlA Insurance, Inc. for Bryan Freeman, JoLee 
Duclos and John Taylor. 
DATED: This 26th day of March, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 4 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: Le..un '8tm 
My commission expires: 1/2"1/20 i 2. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction and Plaintiff s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes) indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN 
SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 5 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
AlA Services 
March 16, 2007 
Dear Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation. 
AlA Services Corporation 
One Lewis Clark Plaza 
PO Box 538 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501·0538 
(208) 799·9000 FAX (208) 746·8159 
As President and Chairman of AlA Services Corporation, I am calling a special meeting 
of the shareholders. I ask you for your support in defending the Company, its wholly-
owned subsidiary, AlA Insurance, Inc., its directors and shareholders from a lawsuit that 
has been filed by the former majority shareholder, Reed J. Taylor. 
The former majority shareholder has filed suit in the 2nd District Court of Idaho against 
the Company, AlA Insurance, Inc., directors, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and me. 
The former majority shareholder alleges that the company is in default of its obligations 
to him, that the directors have thwarted his efforts to allow him to legally take control of 
AlA Insurance, Inc., and for other acts that have allegedly diminished the assets of AlA 
Insurance to his detriment. 
The Company and other defendants deny the accusations and have pledged to 
vigorously defend the Company and themselves against the allegations. The Company 
intends to file counterclaims against the plaintiff for damages for his continuous and 
nefarious interference with the operations of the Company, inappropriate and damaging 
actions with regard to the Company's agency force, and for slander against the business 
to the public and the associations which we represent. 
This special meeting has been called to authorize payment of attorneys' fees for the 
current Board of Directors, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman. Since the 
former majority shareholder has sued all the current directors, we are asking for 
shareholder authorization to expend corporate funds to defend against the action. 
Idaho Code 30-1-853 provides that a corporation may advance funds to pay the 
reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to a proceeding because 
he/she is a director. Usually this authority to advance funds for defending against 
lawsuits is granted by the disinterested directors of the Board of Directors. In this case, 
the entire Board is named in the suit. Therefore, through this vote of the shareholders, 
we ask for your support of the resolution. 
If you would like a copy of the complaint filed in this matter, please contact me at 
208.799.9000. Thank you very much. 
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AlA SERVICES CORPORATION 
111 Main Street 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 
TO BE HELD March 28, 2007 
10:00 a.m. (Pacific Time) 
To Shareholders: 
A Special Meeting of Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation will be 
held at the offices of AlA Insurance, 111 Main Street, Lewiston, Idaho, in the 
second floor conference room, at 9:00 a.m. (pn on Wednesday, March 28, 
2007, for the following purpose: 
1) Authorization of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 30-
1-853(3)(b) for R. John Taylor, JoLee K. Duclos and Bryan 
Freeman. . 
9;~t~S:~~ 
JoLee K. Duclos 
Corporate Secretary 
March 16,2007 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
March 1, 2007 
AlA Services Corporation 
P.O. Box 538 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
2020 Broadview 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Re: Reed 1. Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et. al. 
TO: Directors and Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation 
I'm writing this letter pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1-853 and the Articles of 
Incorporation and ARTICLE XI of the By-Laws of the corporation. I have been named 
in this litigation as a defendant in my capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services 
Corporation. 
I'm writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code § 30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases that my conduct was never opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, that indemnification is permissible under the Articles 
ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation and with respect to any employee plan, that 
I reasonably believed that my actions were in the best interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries of the plan. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under § 30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under § 30-1-854 or 30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in § 30-1-851, Idaho 
Code. 
Very truly yours, 
r" 
.' 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERA TION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
March 16, 2007 
TO: R. John Taylor 
JoLee K. Duclos 
2345 Reservoir Road 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Services Corporation 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AIA Insurance, Inc. 
Dear Sirs: 
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents: 
);> Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and 
);> Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a 
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this 
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of 
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my 
capacity as an officer and director of AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the 
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-8S1, Idaho 
Code. 
Sincerely, 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Services Corporation 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation, 
effective 5:00 p.m. Pa~ific Standard Time, February 22,2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Insurance, Inc. 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc .• effective 
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
J~{(:J~oJ 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Gol 
March 16,2007 
TO: R. John Taylor 
Bryan Freeman 
425 Crestline Circle Drive 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Services Corporation 
The Board of Directors & Shareholders of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
Dear Sirs: 
I have enclosed a copy of the following documents: 
}> Resignation as a Director of AlA Services Corporation; and 
}> Resignation as a Director of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
As you are aware, the above corporations, as well as me individually, are defendants in a 
lawsuit filed in Nez Perce County under Case number CV-07-00208. I am writing this 
letter pursuant to Idaho Code §30-1-853 and the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of 
the above corporations. I have been named in this litigation as a defendant in my 
capacity as an officer and director of AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. 
I am writing to affirm my good faith belief that I have met the relevant standard of 
conduct described in Idaho Code §30-1-851; any conduct in my official capacity was in 
the best interest of the corporation and in all cases my conduct was never opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation; and that indemnification is permissible under the 
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I promise to repay any funds advanced for my defense if I am not entitled to mandatory 
indemnification under §30-1-852 and it is ultimately determined under §30-1-854 or §30-
1-855 that I have not met the relevant standard of conduct described in §30-1-851, Idaho 
Code. 
Sincerely, 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Insurance, Inc. 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Insurance, Inc., effective 
5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22, 2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
Bry Freeman 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Resignation as Director of 
AlA Services Corporation 
TO: The Board of Directors of AlA Services Corporation 
I hereby tender my resignation as Director of AlA Services Corporation, 
effective 5:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time, February 22,2007. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
Bri n Freeman 
AFFIDAVIT OF REED TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
RECONSIDERATION AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
RODERICK C. BOND 
NED A. CANNON, ISB No. 2331 
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
508 Eighth Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-9428 
Fax: (208) 746-8421 
PAUL R. CRESSMAN, JR., ISBA #7563 
Ahlers & Cressman PLLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
999 Third Avenue, Suite 3100 
Seattle, Washington 98104-4088 
Telephone: (206) 287-9900 
Fax: (206) 287-9902 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho 
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN T AYLOR and 
CONNIE TA YLOR, individually and the 
community property comprised thereof; 
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and 
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERlCK C. BOND - 1 
Case No.: CV 06-02855 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND PLAINTIFF'S 




I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years, am competent to testify in court, and 
am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff Reed Taylor. I make this Affidavit on my 
personal knowledge. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the certified transcript 
of the hearing on the Defendants' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this action which 
was held on March 1, 2007. I ordered this transcript on March 7, 2007, and did not 
receive it until March 23,2007. 
3. On or about March 22,2007, my client provided me copies of a letter from 
AlA Services signed by John Taylor (and related documents) which were mailed to 
shareholders of AlA Services Corporation requesting approval for the company to pay 
the attorneys' fees and costs of the directors in this action. Because of the nature of this 
case and the accounting issues going back over a decade, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and 
Bryan Freeman's attorney fees and costs will easily exceed $250,000. These funds paid 
from AlA Services Corporation would be obtained from AlA Insurance, Inc. as AlA 
Services Corporation's sole source of funds to Reed Taylor'S detriment. In addition to 
having the right to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc., Reed Taylor has a valid 
security interest in all commissions of AIA Insurance, Inc. It is also significant to be 
mindful of the fact that John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman are not requesting 
a shareholder vote from AlA Insurance, Inc.-the corporation where the funds will be 
obtained to pay their attorneys' fees and costs. 
4. In addition, John Taylor testified that the value of AlA Insurance, Inc. in 
terms of shareholder equity should be $2,000,000 plus (See Exhibit A, p. 126, 11 1-2). 
5ot, 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 2 
Based upon the value provided by John Taylor, any preliminary injunction granted which 
enjoins Reed Taylor from voting the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. should include 
sufficient security to protect Reed Taylor for damages, attorneys' fees and costs should 
he ultimately set aside such an injunction. I believe that Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees 
and costs which he has incurred and will incur because of being enjoined will exceed 
$200,000. In addition, the longer that Reed Taylor is prevented from voting the shares 
and operating AlA Insurance, Inc., every dollar spent for inappropriate purposes is a 
dollar that could have been paid to Reed Taylor. 
5. If the Court grants a preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, the Court 
should set security in an amount sufficient to cover Reed Taylor'S damages (the present 
value of AlA Insurance, Inc.), his attorneys' fees and costs and the attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred by John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman because such funds 
would never had been tendered for their defense but for a preliminary injunction 
preventing Reed Taylor from taking any actions relating to his vote of the shares and 
from being an officer and board member of AlA Insurance, Inc. Thus, the Court should 
set a bond or cash deposit of $2,450,000 as security for any preliminary injunction 
preventing Reed Taylor from taking any action pursuant his vote of the shares of AlA 
Insurance, Inc. 
DATED: This 26th day of March, 2007. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RODERlCK C. BOND - 3 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and 
correct copy of the Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Preliminary Injunction on the following party(s) via the methodes) 
indicated below: 
David A. Gittins 
Law Office of David A. Gittins 
P.O. Box 191 
Clarkston, W A 99403 
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman 
Michael E. McNichols 
Clements Brown & McNichols 
321 13th Street 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, Inc., and R. John Taylor 
Jonathan D. Hally 
Clark & Feeney 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorney for Defendant Connie Taylor 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Signed this 26th day of March, 2007, at Lewiston, Idaho. 
Roderic 
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MARCH 1,2007, 1:30 P.M. 
THE COURT: Good morning everybody, we are on the 
record this morning in CV 07-208 entitled Reed Taylor versus 
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance Incorporated, 
R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos. 
This matter came before the Court last Monday on first of all a 
motion filed by certain defendants for a temporary restraining 
order which I granted, and due to some scheduling problems, had 
to schedule the hearing for the preliminary injunction for 
today's date. 
Also on Monday there was filed a motion by the 
Plaintiff Mr. Reed Taylor which was entitled an emergency 
motion seeking certain relief which I also in essence agreed on 
short notice to hear at the same time as this preliminary 
injunction hearing. As I stated in court on Monday, J did not 
have a great deal of familiarity with this file at that time, I 
received a number of submissions and J have now received a 
number of additional submissions in anticipation of this 
hearing. So J feel J have a little bit more familiarity with 
it today than I did on Monday. 
At this time Mr. McNichols is present having entered 
appearances on behalf of AlA Services Corporation, AlA 
Insurance, and R. John Taylor. Mr. Hally is present having 
entered a Notice of Appearance on behalf of the Defendant 
5 
Connie Taylor. The other two defendants, Bryan Freeman and 
JoLee Duclos are represented by Mr. Gittins who was present on 
Monday for our hearing but is not present today. The Plaintiff 
Mr. Reed Taylor is present along with his attorneys of record 
Mr. Bond and Mr. Cressman. I should note the presence of the 
Defendant Mr. John Taylor as well in the courtroom. 
Mr. McNichols, are you ready to proceed this morning? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the court please, I am ready to 
proceed on certain of the motions that are pending, but I'm not 
ready to proceed on the Plaintiffs emergency motion. 
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. 
Mr. Hally, you have recently entered an appearance 
on behalf of Defendant Connie Taylor and I have also seen the 
submission that you made. I'm not gOing to ask you if you are 
ready to proceed. 
Mr. Cressman and Mr. Bond, which one of you is 
going to be carrying the ball this morning? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, I will, your Honor, most of 
the way. We also have a preliminary matter, and that is we had 
filed a clarification with regard to the emergency motion 
indicating that it was as was indicated in footnote 10 and in 
the balance of the motion, also a motion for injunctive relief. 
Just to clarify that, to the extent necessary, we filed a 
motion to shorten time. I will point out, I think it's 
evident, the two issues that are before the Court today, namely 
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one, was there default, and, two, did Mr. Reed Taylor have the 
right to vote the shares are absolutely identical to all the 
matters before the Court. 
THE COURT: I did get that filing, Mr. Cressman, 
and I also should note at this time because J intend to take 
this up, Mr. McNichol's Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs 
Emergency Motion and Motion to Reconsider That Order Granting 
the Motion to Shorten Time, Mr. McNichols· supported that with a 
memorandum and also a request to shorten time to hear that, so 
I guess I'd like to take that up first. Mr. McNichols. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, one more thing I want 
to make clear as a preliminary matter. We received six 
affidavits yesterday afternoon and I don't have a written 
motion to strike but we will be moving to strike the 
declarations of Duclos, McFarland and Peterson on various 
grounds including the fact that it's not relevant, that they 
are conclusionary statements without foundation, that there is 
hearsay. We will be moving to strike all but paragraph 5 of 
the declaration of Aimee Gordon under the same grounds. And 
the dec -- excuse me, I call them declarations, affidavits of 
John Reed for some of the same grounds. 
And also we understood this was an evidentiary 
hearing, Mr. Reed is present here today. Rather than making 
objections to the lengthy affidavits, I think Mr. Reed should 
testify, Mr. John Reed should testify -- I'm sorry, 
7 
John Taylor. I do have problems with names sometimes. 
THE COURT: I'm going to have the same situation. 
MR. CRESSMAN: So we would as that Mr. -- all my 
remarks if I said "John Reed," I meant "John Taylor," should 
testify because we understood this was -- and then we can 
cross-examine him on the affidavit or whatever his testimony 
is, we can object to the relevancy or the lack of foundation to 
hearsay, et cetera. 
THE COURT: I understand. Well, might as well --
I guess I'll get to that objection in a little while, 
Mr. Cressman. Just so, I guess, preliminarily, Mr. Taylor, 
Mr. Taylor, I don't know either one of you real well, but I'm 
going to be making some comments today and I'm going to have to 
be identifying both of you. If I call you by your first names, 
I am not intending any disrespect to either of you. I'm simply 
trying to keep you straight. So it's not normally something I 
normally do, but it's probably the only way I'm going to be 
able to keep everything straight today. So just as 
Mr. Cressman just had problems, I'm going to try to avoid that 
during the course of the day. 
With that, Mr. McNichols, I guess I'd like to take 
up your motion to strike the Plaintiffs emergency motion and 
the motion to reconsider the Order granting the Motion to 
Shorten Time. It is my intention to hear that at this time, so 
in terms of the motion to order -- for an order shortening 
6/2-
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time, I grant that, Mr. MCNichols, and I'm going to allow you 1 
2 to proceed on your motion at this time. 2 
3 MR. MCNICHOLS: Thank you, your Honor. If it 3 
4 please the Court and Counsel, we ask the Court to strike the 4 
5 Plaintiff's Emergency Motion because it is not a motion 5 
6 recognized by or authorized by the Idaho Rules of Civil 6 
7 Procedure. It is not a motion for judgment on the pleadings 7 
8 and cannot qualify as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 8 
9 It is not a motion for summary judgment because it does not 9 
10 even allege that there are no genuine issues of material fact, 10 
11 and as the Court now knows from the all the affidavits, there 11 
12 are numerous genuine issues of material fact. 12 
13 It is also not a motion for a preliminary 13 
14 injunction for a number of reasons, but I think primarily 14 
15 because it does not request injunctive relief. It requests, 15 
16 quote, "Enforcement of shareholder vote and board of directors 16 
17 resolutions." That's the first thing it requests. And the 17 
18 second thing it requests is, quote, "Confirmation of the 18 
19 termination of Michael J. McNichols," and my firm, et cetera, 19 
20 as counsel. So that's what it requests. 20 
21 And it's unusual, and I think evident that they 21 
22 are not requesting injunctive relief because they say that 22 
23 there is no reason for a bond. It's hard for me to imagine any 23 
24 injunctive relief that could be granted that would not require 24 
25 the issuance of a bond. 25 
9 
1 The next reason that the motion should be stricken 1 
2 -- the next reason -- excuse me, let me -- sorry. If it were a 2 
3 motion for preliminary injunction which we say it Isn't, but if 3 
4 it were, it should be denied because, A, as I said a minute 4 
5 ago, it doesn't seek injunctive relief. B, if it does seek 5 
6 injunctive relief, it's not negative relief, it's not to 6 
7 preserve the status quo, It's mandatory relief which is almost 7 
8 never granted particularly in a preliminary injunction. C, the 8 
9 third reason why, If it is a motion for preliminary injunction, 9 
10 it would have to be denied is because it involves extremely 10 
11 complex issues of fact and law. And preliminary injunctions 11 
12 are almost never granted where complex issues of fact and law 12 
13 exist because the Court is unable on three days notice to make 13 
14 a determination that the moving party is clearly entitled to 14 
15 relief on the merits. 15 
16 And it's interesting, your Honor, that both 16 
17 parties rely on the Idaho Supreme Court case of Harris versus 17 
18 Cassia County. And that -- It's not a brand new case either, 18 
19 it's a 1984 case, but the Court said there in part, "The 19 
20 substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that 20 
21 appellants are entitled to relief they demanded, cannot exist 21 
22 where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free 22 
23 from doubt." 23 
24 So if there are complex issues of fact and law, 24 
25 the courts do not grant motions for preliminary injunction. 25 
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The reason is pretty similar because you cannot be sufficientiy 
confident that they are right. And only if you are 
suffiCiently confident that they are right and they would win 
on the merits, can you grant a mandatory preliminary 
injunction. 
Now, I have another point and it's not in the 
brief because I didn't think about it until this morning. And 
that is the Plaintiff here seeks equitable relief of a 
mandatory preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff is not entitled 
to equitable relief because the Plaintiff has unclean hands. 
The plaintiff and his aSSOCiates at 3:00 o'clock on a Sunday 
morning entered the offices of AlA Insurance, Inc., with a 
number of people including a locksmith and proceeded to change 
the locks. The police were called -- were called by the 
building manager, Mr. Courtney, whose affidavit you have. And 
Mr. Courtney asked the police to arrest the Plaintiff. And the 
police asked the Plaintiff who he was, and he said he was 
John Taylor. 
I have the police report that's been marked as an 
exhibit, your Honor, and I would like to offer that. I have a 
copy for counsel if they don't have it. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, at this point I'm going 
to object to any exhibits here. This is a -- it appears that 
counsel is arguing the merits of whether the Plaintiff is 
entitled to a preliminary injunction or not. I understood he 
11 
was trying to strike our motion. 
THE COURT: I agree. I'm not gOing to accept any 
evidence at this point in time, Mr. McNichols, so I'll sustain 
Mr. Cressman's objection to the submiSSion of that exhibit at 
this pOint. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'd like to make then an offer of 
proof, your Honor, with this exhibit. May I at least offer and 
hand it to the clerk so -- and I would tell your Honor that it 
represents -- that it includes a statement by the officer that 
he asked who the person was, and he said it was John Taylor, 
and I won't go any further. 
The third point I would like to make in support of 
our Motion to Strike the Emergency Motion Is that hearing that 
motion would be in excess of your jurisdiction. The motion is 
totally outside of the pleadings. The pleadings in a civil 
action in our state consist of the complaint and an answer, 
perhaps a counterclaim and a reply. The complaint controls the 
discovery in the case and controls the relevance of the 
evidence to be admitted In the case. The hearing of the 
Plaintiff's motion is essentially a trial on the merits. It's 
not some preliminary relief, it's a decision on the merits of a 
claim that is not included in the pleadings of a claim that was 
first asserted 72 hours ago, as to which there has been no 
opportunity for discovery, and as to which we have not had 




















































And we suggest to your Honor that the holding of a 
trial on the merits in response to a so-called emergency motion 
would be outside of your jurisdiction. And 50 for those 
reasons, we ask your Court to reconsider your earlier order to 
hear that motion today, and instead of hearing it, to strike 
it. 
Now, as an alternative, as we mentioned in our 
brief, if your Honor determines not to reconsider your deCision 
to hear that motion and if you deCide to hear it, we would ask 
your Honor to give us a period of ten days within which to 
apply to the Supreme Court for a writ to determine whether your 
Honor has the jurisdiction to hear an emergency motion raising 
a claim that is not in the pleadings which essentially is --
the deCision in which would be a trial on the merits after 72 
hours after the motion is filed with no chance for an 
opportunity to conduct discovery or prepare. 
So, your Honor, we would ask you to reconsider 
your motion, to shorten the time for hearing that motion, and 
to strike it. Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McNiChols. 
Mr. Hally, do you have anything that you'd like to 
say relative to that motion? 
MR. HALLY: Your Honor, especially looking at the 
time, we would join in motions filed by Mr. McNichols. I would 



























requested that the hearing if you do not grant the motion to 1 
strike, to at least stay the hearing for sometime. Although in 2 
addition to allowing for a writ to be pursued to determine 3 
whether or not you have jurisdiction. With regard to 4 
Miss Taylor, to date we have not received formal notice of 5 
today's hearing. We heard it through the grape vine that 6 
hearing was occurring today. Miss Taylor is down in Boise. 7 
haven't even had time to review all the documents that have 8 
been filed, so we stand at a very precarious position of being 9 
able -- if we move forward, we are simply not prepared. 10 
And I have a hearing before Judge Stegner in this 11 
courthouse on another -- on a summary judgment argument, and so 12 
I cannot stay if this hearing goes beyond 10:00 o'clock. So we 13 
would at least request if you do not grant the motion to 14 
strike, to not allow the hearing to move forward today and 15 
reschedule for another date. Thank you. 16 
THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Hally. 17 
Mr. Cressman. 18 
MR. CRESSMAN; Yes, your Honor. First with 19 
respect to Mr. -- counsel, the comments by Connie Taylor here 20 
this morning. She was served with the pleadings, her counsel 21 
was served with our pleadings Monday. They were served with 22 
the brief -- 23 
THE COURT: You are talking about Monday's 24 
pleadings? 25 
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MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, they were served Monday with 
the emergency motion and the declarations. They were served 
yesterday with our notice -- or the day before that with a 
Notice for Clarification and the Motion to Shorten Time setting 
forth the hearing date on Tuesday. Yesterday they were served 
with the same papers the Court got yesterday which included the 
two volumes of exhibits and the memorandum. I might also add 
that, you know, Mrs. Taylor is not germane to the matters 
before us. She had no right to vote the shares of AlA 
Insurance, all those shares were owned by -- the right to vote 
was either held by Mr. Reed Taylor or AlA Services. She had no 
right to get notice of any meetings of shareholders. And, 
frankly, I don't understand what the purpose of her 
participation would be in this hearing. 
Second, getting now to the motion that was raised, 
the Motion to Strike, this motion was cobbled together on a 
very rapid basis when we understood that something was coming 
down the pike. If I'd a had more time, your Honor, it would 
have been done more artfully. We did put in footnote 10 the 
relief that the same -- of the motion under the same reasoning, 
Reed Taylor's also entitled to a TRO pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65, and all of the above arguments in evidence 
submitted in support of his motion fully supports and 
authorizes such relief. And we also address the bond issue 
there because no cost, damages, or attorney's fees would result 
15 
in issuing a TRO in favor of Reed Taylor, the Court would not 
be required to order security to be posted for Reed Taylor. 
And I would also add on the bond issue, because this 
man's owed eight million dollars, any damages that might be 
accrued against him would be significantly less than that if he 
was to be found to have wrongfully acted and under prevailing 
Idaho law, no bond should be required. 
In order that there be no mistake on this issue, 
we filed what was called a Notice of Clarification making it 
very clear on Tuesday that our motion should be considered, one 
for injunctive relief, and our injunctive relief should be 
construed to maintain the status quo. 
Now, we have a very different view of what the 
status quo is than Defendants. The status quo here is the 
result of shareholder action. It's not before the vote taken 
by Mr. Reed Taylor, it's after the vote. And I might add, it's 
after two notices of a shareholder meeting that under Idaho law 
are required can be called by 20 percent of those holdings, the 
voting rights, not the shares, the voting rights which the 
Defendants denied him the opportunity. 
Now, so No.1, Plaintiff's motion, I believe, is 
proper before the Court under the equitable jurisdiction of the 
court which is broad and sweeping. And in that connection, 
I'll call the Court's attention to the Idaho case of Smith 
versus Dickerson. It's the Idaho cite is 50 Idaho 477 PaCific 
5Jtj 



















































cite 297, Pacific 402 which addresses is the broad equitable 
powers of the court. It's also proper under CR 65 as indicated 
in the motion originally and as indicated by the Notice of 
Clarification which we have -- out of an abundance of caution, 
we sought a motion to shorten time on that. 
Now, there's a question that we are somehow not 
within the scope of the pleadings, and I would beg to differ. 
And I would point out before I read the key portions of the 
amended complaint to the Court that there is no pleading on 
which the Defendants relief rests. They have no answer. And 
that is the nature of a preliminary injunction, there happened 
to be a pending case and that's why they filed their situation 
and events transpired, and that's why we are asking for 
equitable relief here as well under the auspices of the 
preliminary injunction statute. 
And the complaint, just so they had adequate 
notice, and I wanted to address the notice of these issues that 
the Defendants had, because it could not be farther from the 
truth that the Defendants did not have full and complete notice 
for more than three months -- or almost three months of the 
exact issues that are going to be heard by the Court today, and 
I will address that in a minute. But first the amended 
complaint, and I'm going to read sections beginning on 




























THE COURT: I do and I have reviewed both the 1 
original complaint and the first -- 2 
MR. CRESSMAN: The complaint in 2.8 skipping a 3 
couple of words, "AlA Services Corporation and AlA also agreed 4 
to contemporaneously execute a security agreement and a stock 5 
pledge agreement among other agreements and documents." 6 
Paragraph 2.9, second sentence, "Contemporaneously with the 7 
execution of the restructure agreement, the parties executed an 8 
amended and restated stock pledge agreement." Amended stock 9 
pledge agreement, that's -- that's one of the first issues that 10 
we are going -- well, did he have a right to vote the stock, 11 
second issue. First issue was there a default. 12 
Paragraph 2.11, "Under the terms of the amended 13 
stock pledge agreement, AlA Services Corporation pledged all of 14 
the outstanding shares in AlA to Reed as partial security for 15 
AlA Services Corporation's indebtedness to Reed under the 16 
agreements. The amended stock pledge agreement also provided 17 
that upon the occurrence of a default which was not timely 18 
cured, all of AlA Services Corporation's rights to vote the 19 
pledge shares, and AlA terminated and became immediately vested 20 
in Reed. In addition to other means, the failure to timely pay 21 
Reed under the promissory note or down payment note constituted 22 
a default." 23 
Paragraph 2.15, last sentence. "During all 24 
relevant times, AlA Services has failed to comply with the 25 
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terms of the promissory note, i.e., they are in default." 
Paragraph 2.17, "On or about December 22" -- and 
the evidence will show that's really December 12, 2006, "Reed 
provided AlA Services Corporation with a written notice of 
default under various provisions of the restructure ag reement, 
amended stock pledge agreement and amended security agreement 
for the failure of AlA Services Corporation to pay amounts due 
under the promissory notice required. AlA Services Corporation 
and AlA have failed to cure the default." Another issue here 
today, there is a default. "As of this date of the first 
amended complaint, the principle amount owed to Reed under the 
promissory note plus accrued interest of over two million 
doliars has not been paid in full as required." 
The principle default, 2.18. "Despite Reed's 
demands, AlA Services Corporation, AlA, John Freeman and/or 
Duclos have failed to comply with the terms of restructure 
agreement, amended stock pledge agreement," and skipping, "and 
amended security agreement." Under the amended stock pledge 
agreement, the right to vote all of AlA's shares terminated for 
AlA Services Corporation and became vested in Reed upon the 
occurrence of a defau It. AlA Services Corporation was in 
default long before Reed demanded to exercise his right to vote 
the shares, to appoint a new board of directors for AlA. 
The second issue, default, 2.19. "On December 
2006 Reed timely provided notice of his demand for a special 
19 
shareholder meeting of AlA for December 26, 2006. AlA Services 
Corporation, AlA, and/or John refused to honor Reed's request 
by representing that AlA's offices were closed on 
December 26th, 2006. On or about December 19,2007, Reed hand 
delivered another demand for a special shareholder meeting for 
February 5 pursuant to his rights under the amended stock 
pledge agreement. Through a letter from DuClos, AlA refused 
Reed's request and denied that he had the right to call a 
meeting to vote the AlA shares. Despite Reed's demands, AlA 
refused to hold a speCial shareholder meeting." 
Now, with regard to the relief sought, injunctive 
relief was sought in paragraph 13.17 for an injunction against 
the Defendants from transferring, encumbering or otherwise 
disposing of or improperly or fraudulently obtained and/or 
transferred assets, and/or under Idaho Code 5519, that's Sec, 
and/or any other applicable legal authority. 
Paragraph 13.8, "For judgment and/or relief for 
all claims which conform to the evidence obtained through 
discovery." 
Paragraph 13.10, "For such other relief as Reed 
may request at or before trial and/or that the Court may find 
just, equitable or warranted at or before trial." 
Under Idaho law, notice pleading is at issue, the 
operative facts were there, default, right to vote the shares. 





















































Monday, I believe, the notice of default letter dated 
December 12 which is Exhibit F of Plaintiffs both to the 
affidavit of Mr. Reed Taylor and to the Plaintiff's, exhibits 
for this hearing today what is set forth --
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the court please, I think I 
should pose the same objection to counsel offering the exhibits 
that he posed to my offer of exhibits. 
MR. CRESSMAN: The point here is to indicate the 
notice that the Defendants have had of these very issues. 
THE COURT: Well, I believe that that's accurate. 
This dispute did not just come up, I mean this has been 
ongoing, I think, between the parties, and I understand that, 
Mr. Cressman. So go ahead, but I understand that this is not 
been --
MR. HALLY: If I may --
THE COURT: Mr. Hally, do you need to go attend 
your other hearing? 
MR. HALLY: I do need to leave and Miss Taylor did 
file her affidavit citing her objections and her interest in 
this. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, you are excused, Mr. Hally. 
Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Cressman, but you can go 
ahead with your argument. But I want you to understand, I now 
have had the last couple of days to review a lot of this stuff, 



























have reViewed this stuff so I know that this has been subject 1 
of some discussion for a few months. 2 
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit H indicates the issue that 3 
Mr. Reed Taylor demands to vote the shares. Any demands to 4 
vote the shares as of December 12 for the purpose of removing 5 
the directors and thereafter withhold a meeting of directors to 6 
remove the officers. Accompanying that on December 12th was a 7 
notice of special shareholders meeting scheduling a meeting to 8 
that effect, which notice said the same thing, the meeting to 9 
be held December 26th. Thereafter on late January, another 10 
notice was presented for a shareholder meeting on February 5, 11 
the notice was identical, it required the same relief. 12 
So the notice of the right to vote whether there 13 
was a default and whether there was a right to address whether 14 
Mr. Reed Taylor had a right to vote the shares was much in the 15 
issue. In fact, it was addressed by correspondence by 16 
John Taylor in response to his brother's demands. And, in 17 
fact, he addressed, one, whether there was a default and, two, 18 
whether Reed had a right to vote the shares. 19 
So we were not asking that this be heard on the 20 
merits today, although I will call the Court's attention to the 21 
eVidence that will be heard today will be considered on the 22 
merits pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) which 23 
addresses consolidation of the hearing -- preliminary 24 
injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. And it says, 25 
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"Before or after the commencement of a hearing of an 
application for a preliminary injunction, the Court may order 
the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and 
consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when 
this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon 
an application for preliminary injunction which would be 
admissible in the trial of the merits becomes part of the 
record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial." 
And so I believe the motion to strike is inappropriate. 
There was notice both in the pleadings and actual notice for 
almost three months of the two issues. Other than the right to 
injunctive relief namely, has there been a default and, two, 
does Mr. Taylor have the right -- Mr. Reed Taylor have the 
right to vote the share. And there's a lot of other material 
here but we can argue about who is making this more complicated 
or not, but those are the two major issues, and that's what we 
are here today, that's what we were here to talk about on 
Monday, and so I don't see any prejudice to the Defendants. 
was somewhat taken a back by their threat to take this matter 
to the Supreme Court, so be it, but I believe the motion is 
completely appropriate by Mr. Reed Taylor and should be 
considered today as the Court indicated Monday. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cressman. 
Mr. McNichols, anything else? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, your Honor, I will be brief. 
23 
First Amended Complaint was filed on February 5th of 2007, and 
the purported shareholder and director action was taken on 
February 22nd, 2007, 17 days later. And the interesting thing 
is that I think that the extent of Counsel's argument on the 
issue of whether the emergency motion is within the pleadings 
is essentially an admission by him that it has to be within the 
pleadings or it's in excess of your jurisdiction. 
Now, is it the same to say that you -- that you 
might do something in the future as to say you have done it in 
the past and we want that past action, quote, "enforced" and, 
quote -- it says "enforcement and confirmation." It is, of 
course, impossible for the shareholder action to have been a 
part of a complaint that was filed 17 days before the 
shareholder action was taken. 
Could they in their first amended complaint have 
said that Reed Taylor has voted himself to be the sole 
director, it certainly wouldn't have been true because it 
wasn't done until 17 days later. Could they say that he might 
do that in the future, perhaps, but to say that he has done it 
and he now asks the Court through some motion without number, 
without description, without category in the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that he now wants your Honor to enforce that 
action that had not yet been taken. 
The emergency -- you know, they don't -- we 
complain that they don't tell us what number it's under, they 
5Jv 




















































still don't tell us what number it's under and that's because 1 
there isn't any number for such a motion. It does not exist, 2 
it is not recognized by our procedure, it is -- and I say this 3 
with the most respect, it is outside of the jurisdiction of the 4 
rou~ 5 
So we would ask your Honor to determine that it is 6 
outside the pleadings and therefore outside your jurisdiction, 7 
and the motion -- our motion should be granted and the 8 
emergency motion should be stricken. 9 
Thank you for your attention. 10 
THE COURT: Well, as I said, I have a little bit 11 
more confidence in my familiarity with some of the facts and 12 
circumstances today than I did on Monday when we convened, but 13 
I'm not going to say that I have the confidence that I would 14 
like to have at the point and time when this may ultimately end 15 
up in a trial situation. But the more that I have the 16 
opportunity to review the initial complaint that was filed, the 17 
amended complaint, and now the pleadings with the supporting 18 
documents that I have reviewed, I guess the more I question my 19 
decision to hear the Plaintiff's motion and I guess the more 20 
decisions get made in haste or often times incorrect, I think, 21 
and that's where I basically come out in terms of this motion 22 
from the Plaintiff. I mean I'm a judge, I'm here to serve and 23 
I try to certainly be accommodating, but in looking at this 24 
motion that is sought by the Plaintiff, I guess even if hearing 25 
25 
that motion is appropriate, I at least have a question in my 
own mind as to whether or not I would have the jurisdiction to 
grant that motion as requested by the Plaintiff. 
The bigger problem that I guess I have is that the 
only thing that made this what could be described as an 
emergency was the actions that were taken by Plaintiff 
Mr. Reed Taylor over the course of the weekend, I guess, is 
what I'll describe it as, and those were actions that I think 
certainly Mr. Taylor knew that was not going to be uncontested, 
and it was going to have to be in front of a court at some 
point in time. 
As I said having reviewed this, I know that this 
dispute's been ongoing for a while, I guess there's going to be 
various theories on when default has taken place if it has at 
all, that's been gOing on for quite sometime. But the bottom 
line to me is, and this is frankly based upon the fact that I 
have been corporate counsel, corporate management governs 
decisions like this I think require a great deal of thought and 
a patient approach. 
Now, I am certain that Mr. Taylor, 
Mr. Reed Taylor, was frustrated by the attempts that he had 
made over the course of recent months, and frankly that 
frustration on behalf of Mr. Reed Taylor is not inappropriate. 
But Mr. Reed Taylor is before the Court today really calling 
upon the Court's equitable powers to act and sustain, confirm 
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this action that has taken place over the course of the last 
weekend, and decision that I guess I'm reaching today is that I 
don't think that I as a Court should be in the position of 
being asked to sustain that and especially being asked to 
sustain it on such short notice and on decisions of such 
magnitude as I'm being requested to do. 
The Plaintiffs actions are what is being relied 
on to make this an emergency for the Court, and I just simply 
do not want to participate in that because I think if I did so, 
I'm in essence inviting some escalation on behalf of 
Mr. John Taylor in the area of self help and I want to avoid 
that. 
Especially where there exists provisions in the 
law where shareholders who feel that their request for a 
special meeting is not being honored, there is provisions in 
the law for that shareholder to make application to a court to 
seek an order that the corporation hold a special meeting. And 
if that became an issue, I think that would have been the 
proper approach for the Plaintiff to take in this case. That 
was not attempted. 
I guess the best analogy that I can draw here is 
that, if Mr. Reed Taylor had come to me last Thursday and said 
this is what I've got in mind for this weekend, can I go ahead 
and do this, I would certainly not have granted that request. 
And what in essence the Plaintiff is asking me to do at this 
27 
point in time is bless this after the fact, and to do it on 
very short notice, and I'm not going to do that. I don't feel 
that that would be appropriate on my part because, in essence, 
that will be asking me on the limited familiarity that I have 
with this at this point in time or could gain through a short 
hearing, because I don't intend to be here for days on end 
trying to sort through this on this temporary relief that's 
being sought at the outset of litigation, I don't feel that I 
would be comfortable in setting forth a decision that basica lIy 
takes this multimillion dollar corporation, turns it on its 
head and shakes it all about which is, in essence, what I think 
the Plaintiff is asking me to do. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, may I comment on a 
couple of things here? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. 
THE COURT: I do not want to make hasty decisions 
in any case and I do not especially want to make hasty 
decisions where those deCisions have consequences of the 
magnitude that could happen in the management of this --
management and operation of this corporation. For that reason 
I think I made a mistake in deciding to hear this, the 
Plaintiff's motion that was entitled an "emergency motion" 
seeking confirmation of certain actions. You go to judge's 




















































have power to do this, and I didn't ask that question because I 
began to consider that possibility as I was able to review this 









So with that, I think I made a mistake and I'm 
going to correct that mistake and I'm going to reconsider my 
decision to hear the Plaintiffs motion on short notice. I'm 
reversing that decision to hear the Plaintiffs motion on short 
notice and I do not intend to hear it today. 
I'm not going to strike it, Mr. Cressman, I mean 9 
if the Plaintiff wants to proceed with that or perhaps -- I 10 
mean I know you have been working hard on this for the last 11 
couple days too, if you want to formalize that with a little 12 
more work, Mr. Cressman, and resubmit it to the Court, perhaps 13 
in an amended matter and on appropriate notice, I would 14 
certainly hear it. I'm not going to strike the Plaintiff's 15 
motion but I'm not going to hear it today on short notice. 16 
So what that leaves us today with is a hearing on 17 
the Defendant's preliminary injunction since I have to have 18 
that heard once I issue the temporary restraining order. 19 
Well, I'm just going to ask, I think I've got a 20 
lot of intelligence in this room, would you guys like to take a 21 
few minutes and discuss this and see whether you can reach some 22 
agreement on how things ought to stand today for the near 23 
future. Mr. McNichols? 24 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'd be happy to, your Honor. 25 
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THE COURT: Mr. Cressman? 1 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, just a couple points of 2 
clarification. We had asked that our motion be conSidered a 3 
motion for preliminary injunction and we filed a motion to 4 
shorten time to hear that today along with Defendant's motion 5 
for preliminary injunction. Has the Court addressed that yet? 6 
THE COURT: Well, I think I have by saying that 7 
I'm not going to consider the Plaintiffs motion in whatever 8 
form you want to say that -- 9 
MR. CRESSMAN: The other issue, just so I 10 
understand, you are not striking the motion, we could note it 11 
again? 




MR. CRESSMAN: Next week or whatever we can be 15 
back arguing it again, and, you know, that would -- you know, I 16 
don't -- so I understand that and that's fine. Thank you. 17 
THE COURT: Okay. As to my request as to whether 18 
you guys want to take a few minutes and discuss this, 19 
Mr. Cressman? 20 
MR. CRESSMAN: Sure. 21 
THE COURT: Alright. Well, I've got nothing else 22 
going today, so -- and this is the courtroom that we are going 23 
to be in, so if you guys would just like to take a few minutes, 24 
you can be either be in here, or if you'd like to go to the 25 
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jury room to talk about it. Mr. McNichols, you know where I'm 
at and just let me know when you need me to come back, and I 
guess I'd like to -- no, I won't say that. I won't put any 
time limit. I'm going to be here, if you want to go ahead with 
the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, come and 
get me. Okay. We are in recess for awhile. 
(Thereupon, a recess was taken at 10: 17 a.m. to 
10:35 a.m.) 
THE COURT: We are on the record in CV07-208, 
Taylor versus AlA Services, Corporation and other defendants. 
Mr. McNichols. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, Counsel met 
with Mr. Reed Taylor, the Plaintiff, and Mr. John Taylor, one 
of the Defendants, and discussed a resolution and we are unable 
to reach an agreement. 
THE COURT: Alright. Are you ready to proceed 
then on the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. McNichols? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I am, your Honor, with one 
reservation, and that is that we had a subpoena served on the 
author of the police report and he hasn't arrived, so I don't 
know exactly what we can do about that. I have a copy of the 
subpoena and a copy of the return of service. I don't know 
whether counsel truly doubt the authenticity of the exhibit or 
not. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Is that a question? 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: The judge doesn't permit us to ask 
questions of each other. We ask questions of the court. 
MR. CRESSMAN: That's why I asked your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's a question for me, 
Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, your Honor, No.1, before I 
address that, we had some preliminary matters with regard to 
the affidavits. 
THE COURT: I'm going to take those up in a 
minute. 
MR. CRESSMAN: And we can take those up. But I 
don't want -- one, I don't understand why that issue is 
relevant. I mean we agree that Mr. Reed Taylor was present on 
-- sometime after 3:00 o'clock in the morning on Sunday and he 
made an effort in conformity with the consent of the directors 
to change the locks of the building after he had elected 
himself as the sole officer of the corporation. 
Now, I don't know if they are trying to say that 
he identified himself as John Taylor, Mr. Reed Taylor disputes 
that. If that's Significant, then I think we are going to have 
the officer testify so he cannot make the same mistake that I 
made a few minutes ago. And the other -- I don't see how it's 
relevant. The issues that I see clearly are, one, is there a 
default and, two, did Mr. Taylor -- Reed Taylor have the right 
to vote the shares, and if so, he was acting legally at that 
Sii 




















































But we admit, you know, that that event took place 
but it was precipitated by events and frustration and we 
believe it was legally taken under the vote and the failure to 
vote and under the code of Idaho that allows for these things. 
But if it's important to know whether Mr. Reed Taylor described 
himself as John Taylor or Reed Taylor, then I guess we are 
going to have the officer. 
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, you were seeking to 
have the officer testify for purposes beyond just identifying 
the document, I take it? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, to say that -- to say that 
he had met the person who identified himself as John Taylor and 
he now is the person that appears to be Reed Taylor. 
I have a suggestion, your Honor. May I make a 
suggestion? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Let me -- and I don't have copies 
of this, I'm sorry, let me give the Court my subpoena, the copy 
of the subpoena and a copy of the return, and then let me ask 
the Court to reserve a ruling as to whether that evidence, if 
it were admitted, would cause you to make a decision different 
from what you would otherwise make. Does that make sense? 
Marginal, perhaps. 
THE COURT: I understand what you are asking, 
33 
Mr. McNichols. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: That's what I would ask to do and 
if I may, should I give this then to --
MR. CRESSMAN: I understand and I have no reason 
to believe he wasn't subpoenaed, the question is, is it 
relevant, No.1, and if it is relevant, then we would like the 
officer here because we understand the intent is to have 
someone identify that Mr. Reed Taylor told somebody he was 
John Taylor, and I don't think that's relevant anyway. But I 
mean they were down there, they were changing the locks in the 
building. 








































THE COURT: No. 14 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, there were other people 15 
there that knew Mr. Reed Taylor present including 16 
Shane Courtney, who is in the courtroom. I mean it doesn't 17 
make a lot of sense for Mr. Reed Taylor to tell somebody -- I 18 
mean people who are down there that know who he is, but in any 19 
event -- 20 
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, I really don't -- I 21 
don't think that would be of much relevance to me in terms of 22 
my consideration on the preliminary injunction. 23 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Alright. 24 
THE COURT: I mean what was actually said there is 25 
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not -- is not going to be of particular relevance to me. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Okay. We then would like to 
submit our motion for preliminary injunction on the affidavits 
that were filed with the temporary restraining order and on the 
subsequent affidavitS. And we have one more point to make, 
your Honor, and that is we perceive that the Court and the 
Plaintiff might be concerned that John Taylor and the 
management of the business might do something improper. And so 
we are willing to voluntarily -- he and AlA Services, Inc., is 
willing to voluntarily submit to a consent order. And I have a 
proposal -- a proposed consent order for your Honor's 
consideration, and I gave a copy of that proposed consent order 
to counsel during our recess. 
The consent order essentially orders Mr. Taylor to 
conduct the business in a good and business like manner, not 
engage in any action or transaction not in the ordinary course 
of business, and not to permit it to do certain itemized things 
here pending the continuance of the preliminary injunction. So 
we would offer -- John Taylor offers and the corporation offers 
to submit to that order in support of our request for the 
preliminary injunction. And could -- if someone could give 
that to the Court, I would very much appreciate it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, with that, I'd like 
to hear from you as to your -- sorry, I'm scrambling for a 
cough drop here -- I'd like to hear from you as to your 
35 
objections as to any of the affidavits filed by the Defendants. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Okay. Well, I will take them one 
at a time. 
THE COURT: Yeah, please do. I have been through 
them. 
MR. CRESSMAN: And I will start with the affidavit 
of Miss Duclos and don't have any problem with the first two 
paragraphs. Third paragraph, this gets into the issue of Crop 
USA and AlA Insurance, and it also the last sentence, it's 
my understanding that the companies allocate salaries. I mean 
there's no foundation, there's no proper testamentary 
knowledge, and Crop USA is not a party in this litigation. 
It's not a party to the contracts with Mr. Reed Taylor, and, 
you know, whatever AlA Services or AlA Insurance has done with 
Crop USA, it's just not appropriate and not relevant. 
Second paragraph, you want me to take these -- go 
through them serially? 
THE COURT: Please, just as you are doing, 
Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Paragraph four, you know, talking 
about the respect for John Taylor and then she took a poll. 
Well, the poll's hearsay, it's not relevant any way. I mean I 
guess what they are arguing is this man's not entitled to be 
paid his eight million dollars if people don't like him. The 





















































completely inappropriate, it's hearsay, it's not relevant to 1 
the issues before the Court. 2 
NO.5, the same thing is for Paragraph No.5, 3 
talking about what these trusts would do, a director being -- 4 
on one or more occasion a director of one of the trusts being 5 
extremely angry about contact made by the Plaintiff, no 6 
foundation, no identification, clearly hearsay. Again, what 7 
relevance does that have to whether Mr. Taylor is entitled to 8 
vote the stock when -- as part of his security arrangements for 9 
payment of eight million dollars that's owed to him. You know, 10 
it seems like it's very farfetched, no foundation, not proper 11 
testimonial knowledge, hearsay. 12 
Paragraph 6 says -- she just says I don't believe 13 
him that he's going to do it appropriately. Well, "I have 14 
witnessed many of the business ideas over the last several 15 
years and have seen them fail" doesn't explain it, no 16 
foundation, what's she talking about. In reality, your Honor, 17 
this man built up these companies, he was paid very significant 18 
sums for his stock in 1995. He was the major shareholder of 19 
AlA services, he obviously did something right. They had 20 
twenty -- they had two hundred employees when he was there, now 21 
they have twelve. He wasn't responsible for that, someone else 22 
was. He obviously had something going for him and these type 23 
of statements. The last sentence, "Plaintiff has burned so 24 
many bridges in the past, I do not believe he can overcome the 25 
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problems created by that conduct and operate AlA Insurance in 
its best interest." I mean absolutely no foundation, no 
discussion, inappropriate, irrelevant. 
Let's see, then she says she's resigned because 
she's afraid of the Plaintiff in paragraph 7. Again, whether 
she's afraid of him or not I think is irrelevant. I can't 
believe she's afraid of him, but I guess -- you know, I guess 
-- well, I don't want to be sarcastic, that's not a good ground 
for denying Mr. Reed Taylor the rights -- the contractual 
rights he has because Miss DuClos is afraid of him. 
Now she goes into alteration of documents and she 
refers to a meeting with Mr. Gittins that she didn't attend, 
she wasn't even at the meeting, she doesn't have testimonial 
knowledge, she has no personal knowledge. And with regard to 
this, again, I don't know how it's relevant. I will tell you 
that in Paragraph 5 of the declaration of Aimee Gordon, she 
indicates about this reversing entry and she says she was 
instructed by John to reverse the entry in the fourth quarter 
of 2006. Well, obviously it was reversed following the notice 
of default on December 12th, 2006, sent by Attorney Pat Moran 
to Mr. John Taylor. He realized he better clean that up. 
There's a proper statement of what happened. Miss Duclos' 
comments are irrelevant, without foundation and should be 
denied. I'm not even sure what she means by this spread sheet 
because no spread sheet's attached. The best evidence rule 
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require they at least produce what they are talking about. 
So on those basis, we would ask, with the 
exception of the first two paragraph of Miss Duclos' affidavit, 
her affidavit be stricken. 
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, would you like to be 
heard as to Miss Duclos' affidavit? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, and 
particularly if there are going to be objections to the rest of 
them, what I would suggest is that your Honor take the motions 
to strike portions of the affidavit under advisement pending 
the consideration of all the affidavits and all of the evidence 
today and then rule appropriately. 
THE COURT: Well, I think in order to get this 
going, Mr. Cressman, I guess I'd just like you to go ahead and 
state your objections to the various affidavits, and I agree 
with you that there is some irrelevant hearsay information 
contained in there, but rather than me trying to go through 
these one at a time and tell me what I'm considering and what 
I'm not, why don't you just go ahead and state your objections 
and then I will -- I will kind of go through -- when I 
ultimately rule on this, I'll go through and identify what I'm 
considering and what I'm not because I agree with you there is 
some irrelevant --
MR. CRESSMAN: Next affidavit is Aimee Gordon. We 
do not have the objections to the first two paragraphs. We 
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object to -- well, as a foundational -- as to the third 
paragraph, other than the fact that I understand the statement 
that there's been an audit every year for the last five years 
to be correct, I don't have -- I think if she's going to talk 
about the income, we have got the income statements, the 
financial statements in the record, I think those should be 
utilized rather than whatever she's stating here in -- you 
know, that's a simple matter. I know John Taylor provided 
those directly to Mr. Bond and we have listed those in the 
exhibits. 
You know, I don't know what the relevance is on 
No.4, Mr. John Taylor obviously received a significant income 
from this company or these companies, all the while his brother 
isn't being paid, we seriously object to that and certainly 
under status quo matter. 
We don't have any objection to the 5th Paragraph 
-- we don't have any objection to Paragraph 5. In the 
Paragraph 6, "In the past years, Plaintiff has charged AlA for 
the use of his airplane." I think that's right but we don't 
know what years they are talking about. I mean, again, I don't 
see what relevance charges for his airplane is and we'd ask 
that be stricken. 
Paragraph 7, the fact that some of 
Mr. Reed Taylor's sons have been employed in the past or are 
now employed, apparently one of his sons is employed by 
52& 
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Crop USA. Again, I don't know what relevance that has to 1 
2 anything. So we'd ask that Paragraph 7 be stricken. 2 
3 Next affidavit is Stephanie MCFarland. I assume 3 
4 -- really don't have any objection to the first two paragraphs. 4 
5 The rest of it I think is completely irrelevant, about a 5 
6 vagrant wandering around and a can of pepper spray. And then 6 
7 when Reed Taylor made his demands, she doesn't explain how she 7 
8 became aware of that, what she -- why she was threatened and 8 
9 she moved the can of pepper spray to the front of her desk in 9 
10 plain sight I think is completely ridiculous without 10 
11 foundation. 11 
12 Paragraph 4, she was afraid of Reed, and that 12 
13 the -- this clearly indicates into the extent that she's afraid' 13 
14 of Reed, we believe that's inappropriate and not relevant. 14 
15 With regard to the scheduled meeting on Monday the 5th, she 15 
16 said it was unscheduled, the evidence will show it was clearly 16 
17 scheduled. Gem State Security was hired to sit behind her desk 17 
18 and the door was locked and the only access, so they clearly 18 
19 barred Mr. Reed Taylor from holding the meeting that he had 19 
20 scheduled, the second meeting on February 5th. So I guess we 20 
21 don't have any problem to the last sentence, last two sentences 21 
22 of that paragraph. 22 
23 Paragraph 5 that she's afraid, again, doesn't want 23 
24 John Taylor, I mean that's completely irrelevant. Will attempt 24 
25 -- she thinks he will attempt illegal action. I mean no 25 
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1 foundation, completely inappropriate. Paragraph 6, physical 1 
2 force, and then her 6 and 7 are completely irrelevant. I will 2 
3 not work, great, I mean what difference does that make, because 3 
4 Stephanie McFarland won't work for him, he should not be paid 4 
5 his eight million dollars is absurd. 5 
6 Let's see here, Kent Peterson is the next one. 6 
7 Mr. Peterson is with Crop USA and, again, he's saying that 7 
8 something bad's going to happen to Crop USA if Mr. Taylor is 8 
9 running AlA Insurance. I don't understand that. Crop USA is 9 
10 not a party to this litigation, they are not a party to any of 10 
11 these contracts with Mr. Taylor, and for that reason I think 11 
12 that it's completely irrelevant and inappropriate that this 12 
13 affidavit be considered. 13 
14 And Paragraph 9, Mr. Peterson indicates that 14 
15 Reed Taylor has no interest in Crop USA and Crop USA is not a 15 
16 party to this lawsuit but must protect its property located at 16 
17 the Lewis-Clark Plaza. Well, they could do that independently. 17 
18 I mean if there's something that happens, then they can take 18 
19 that, but they are not even a party here and the Court clearly 19 
20 does not have jurisdiction over them. So those would be our 20 
21 objections to those four affidavits. 21 
22 Now, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on 22 
23 Monday and we understood that the Court intended to put the 23 
24 moving party to their test of establishing the very high burden 24 
25 for a preliminary injunction, and late yesterday afternoon we 25 
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received two lengthy affidavits from John Taylor. And it was 
not our intent that affidavits be considered, but because 
Mr. Taylor's here and because of the combination of 
inappropriate information contained in his declarations, we 
believe that if these affidavits are considered, it would be 
simply more -- much easier for us to control what's right and 
appropriate and make appropriate objections if he testifies and 
we can cross-examine him here today. 
If that's not acceptable, I will go through these 
which are much longer and make the similar objections to the 
pertinent parts that are objectionable like the other four. 
THE COURT: Well, I understood Mr. MCNichols was 
not wishing to submit it on the basis of the affidavits, I'm 
not, I guess, going to require Mr. McNichols to present 
evidence if he doesn't wish to. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright, then I'll make my 
objections to those now and we will call Mr. John Taylor our 
self. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I will tell you that if you want 
-- given the volume of information contained in John Taylor's 
affidavits, if you wish to call him to the stand to inquire as 
to the information of those affidavits, I'll certainly permit 
that. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yeah. Well, I intend to call him 
for some other reasons as well, but I will object --
43 
MR. MCNICHOLS: May I be heard for a moment, your 
Honor? Do we need to do both? Does both --
THE COURT: I guess I don't want to hear your 
objections to the affidavit if you are going to examine him as 
well. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I am going to examine him, I don't 
know that I'm going to examine him on these pOints, but counsel 
can certainly examine him. 
THE COURT: Well, why don't we -- why don't we go 
ahead and if are intending to call Mr. John Taylor, why don't 
we take up your motions to strike relative to his affidavits 
after you are done with your examination. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Very good. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
Mr. McNichols, I do intend to take under 
advisement the issues that have already been raised as to the 
affidavits of Miss Duclos, Miss Gordon, Miss McFarland and 
Mr. Peterson and only consider those portions of those 
affidavits that I conSider relevant, so I have got those under 
advisement. Any other evidence that you wish to submit at this 
time? 
present? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McNichols. 




















































MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, we would call John Taylor, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, if you'd come forward, 
please. 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, relating to said cause, 
testifies and says: 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Would you state your name and residence address for the 
record, please. 
A. My name is R. John Taylor, 2020 Broadview Drive, 
Lewiston, Idaho. 
Q. What is your employment, Mr. Taylor? 
A. I'm president of AlA Insurance and AlA Services Corp. 
Q. Any other employment? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you an officer of Crop USA? 
A. Yes, I am president of Crop USA. 
Q. Are you a director of Crop USA? 
A. I am. 
Q. And what percentage of shares in Crop USA do you own? 
A. Under 40 percent. 
Q. Slightly under 40 percent? 
A. Slightly under 40 percent as I recall. 
Q. Are you the largest single shareholder of Crop USA? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are a director of both AlA Services and AlA 
Insurance? 
A. I am. 




O. What is your -- give me your educational background if 
you would, please? 
A. I graduated with an undergraduate degree in accounting, 
I passed the CPA exams in 1972, then worked for an accounting 
firm. And then went to law school in 1973 to 1976 and 
graduated from law school and am currently a member of the bar, 
although I'm not a CPA any longer. 
O. What undergrad school did you go to? 
A. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
O. Where did you go to law school? 
A. Washington and Lee University. 
O. That's in Washington DC? 
A. It's in Lexington, Virginia. 
O. Virginia. Has AlA Insurance borrowed any money held in 
trust for others for itself? 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, this really 
has nothing to do with the preliminary injunction. Counsel is 
-- I don't know where he's going, but I object on the grounds 
that it's irrelevant. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, quite the contrary, your 
Honor, if these folks have borrowed money inappropriately, it 
goes to the question of whether there's a default, and the 
obligation's owing to Mr. Reed Taylor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: But your Honor--
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you both right 
now, I am very uncomfortable on this limited hearing that I 
intend to have today. I am very uncomfortable on trying to 
reach a ruling on whether there's been a default and who has 
the power to vote shares. I'm going to tell you both that. 
There has -- I have issued the temporary restraining order on a 
limited number of areas -- well, what I'm -- I guess I'm going 
to have to address the provisions of that temporary restraining 
order as they would apply to the preliminary injunction. I'm 
going to overrule your objection, Mr. McNichols. Go ahead, 
Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
O. Do you recall the question? 
A. No. 
O. Has AlA Insurance borrowed any funds from trust 
accounts of others, held for others? 
A. It may have, yes. 
Q. It may have or it has? 
A. It has in the past, yes. 
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Q. And how much money has it borrowed from such trust 
accounts? 
A. Various amounts from probably a low, maybe four hundred 
thousand. 
Q. Four hundred thousand. And you understand such 
borrowing to be illegal, do you not? 
A. I do not. 
O. It's legal to borrow money from trust accounts? 
A. I'm not sure what you mean by a trust account. The 
trust accounts of the insurance ind ustry is separate from the 
trust accounts I think you are probably referring to, but the 
accounts owned by trust are -- I think is what you are 
referring to. 
O. Okay. You borrowed -- AlA Insurance has borrowed money 
from those trusts? 
A. Those are Grain Growers and Association of American Soy 
Bean Grower Association Trust which all transactions are 
GZZ-




















































reported to and audited each year. And those are not in the 
nature of a trust that you would probably think of, but in the 
nature of a business organization. 
Q. Have any board members of AlA Insurance complained of 
that practice? 
A. Have any board members? 
Q. Of the trust, excuse me. 
A. Boy, I can't recall right now. 
Q. You can't recall any? 
A. I can't recall right now, no. 
Q. So you don't know whether they have or they have not? 
A. I can't recall right now. 
THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Cressman. That 
question was whether or not any board members of those trusts 
had complained? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
A. Oh, his question was whether or not anybody from AlA 
had -- AlA board had questioned that? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm sorry I didn't -- I'm having 
trouble hearing you. 
THE COURT: I guess I have a different 
understanding of what Mr. Taylor just had. Why don't you ask 
that question again, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. Well, let me ask it both ways. Did anyone from AlA 
Insurance or AlA Services object to AlA Insurance borrowing 
funds from trusts? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Has anyone associated with the trusts from which the 
moneys were borrowed, the four hundred thousand dollars that 
you testified to, complained about that practice? 


































one of our trust board meetings which we have one on Saturday 9 
in Tampa, Florida, the Commodity Classic. We have those 10 
account and balances between AlA advances or advances to the 11 
trust are discussed at every quarterly meeting, There is a lot 12 
of discussion on the issue. And there's a lot of discussion on 13 
why it occurred or why and how it would be corrected. 14 
In fact, the balances on the trust now that are owed to 15 
-- that AlA owes to the trust are advances for legal fees on 16 
the Grain Growers and a lawsuit against the State of Idaho on 17 
some reserves that has been going on for about ten years. And 18 
the -- I think the balance has been on there probably, God, I'm 19 
going to guess right now, sir, but probably nine years, eight 
years since the lawsuit was initiated. And over the years in 
order to finance that lawsuit, we did not feel it was 
appropriate that the trust bear the entire burden for that, so 
AlA prosecuted that lawsuit from 1997 forward, and that is at 
the Supreme Court hearing now. If we win the lawsuit, if the 
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lawsuit is ultimately in our favor, AlA would receive part of 
those proceeds and those -- the final 140 thousand would be 
returned to Grain Growers at that time. If we do not win the 
lawsuit, they will end up eating that amount. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike his nonresponsive. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Ask the question again, 
Mr. --
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, I asked you if anyone associated with the 
trust complained of your practices of borrowing money from 
their accounts? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who? 
A. One of the board members from North Dakota. 
Q. From who? 
A. A board member from North Dakota. 
Q. What is the name of the board member? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Any others? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Now, in July of 1995 --
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, could I ask a question 
now rather than try to remember this until the end when we --
none of us will remember any of this testimony, could I ask a 
question about this trust business? I think Counsel is going 
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to a different subject. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I am going to a different subject. 
THE COURT: No, Mr. Cressman's going to be allowed 
to proceed, Mr. McNichols. 
Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. In 1995 did you purchase your brother'S shares in AlA 
Services? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How was the transaction structured for the purchase of 
the shares? 
A. It was structured as a redemption of shares by AlA 
Services Corporation of Reed Taylor's shares. 
Q. And because of that redemption, you then became the 
majority shareholder of AlA Services? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was the intent of the transaction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were lawyers involved in that transaction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who represented Mr. Reed Taylor and who represented 
AlA Services? 
A. Oh, I think Eberle, Berlin, a Boise based law firm 
represented Services and did much of that work. I'm not -- and 






















































Q. That represented who? 
A. You know, I'm not sure. AlA paid the bills, I don't 
know if it represented the underwriter or the specific parties. 
Q. How much were the legal fees associated with that 
transaction for AlA services? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court please, I object on 
the grounds of irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, the issue here --
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Take a look at Exhibit A, would you please, in 
Volume 1. Is that the promiSSOry note dated August 1, 1995, in 
the amount of six thousand dollars that remains unpaid to your 
brother? 
A. It appears to be a copy of the original promissory 
note. 
Q. And do you agree with the statement contained in 
Aimee Gordon's declaration that the entire principle of six 
million dollars remains owing? 
A. Yes, I do. By Services, yes. 
Q. . Dovou -also-agree-thai: Tii addition to the prln-c1ple~ at 
least according to her calculations, $2,189,614 in accrued 
interest is also owing as of the end of December 31, 2006? 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can go ahead and 
answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
A. I believe that's probably an accurate representation, 
yes. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Does that include the interest on the three hundred and 
seven thousand dollars that was earlier credited against 
prinCiple but reversed by you in late December of 20067 
A. Yes, it does. For all time periods, yes. 
Q. I beg your pardon? 
A. The interest accrued as if -- is the entire six million 
dollars. 
Q. Alright. Do you contend in these proceedings that this 
agreement was orally modified or this promissory note was 
orally modified? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object, your Honor, 
here we go into the default issue again and it's just not 
relevant to the question of whether the preliminary injunction 
should be issued. We are asking to enjOin him from doing the 
things that are the subject of the TRO. And your Honor has 
already announced you are not intending to make a deciSion on 
whether there is a default or not, so it's irrelevant, the 
question is irrelevant. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I don't know how these 
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folks -- if Mr. Taylor -- Reed Taylor was rightful in his 
action of voting the shares that he had a hundred percent 
interest in and he was rightful because there was a default and 
he was rightful in voting himself into the directorship and 
officer, that's -- those key elements must -- if those are 
proved by Mr. Reed Taylor, then he had every right to go down 
there and do what he did. And they are trying to attempt to 
ask us not to be able to prove those key issues. There was a 
default, he rightfully voted those shares, those are the two 
things we intend to prove to establish that they had no -- they 
have no right to a preliminary injunction and that the TRO was 
wrongfully issued. 
And if the issue's too complicated for the Court, 
then the motion for preliminary injunction should be denied, 
but this is -- we maintain it's very clear. In fact, we 
maintain that the evidence is such without question and with 
the clarity on those issues that a preliminary injunction could 
and shou Id be issued in favor of Reed Taylor. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. Go 
ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Could the court reporter read the 
question back for the witness, please. 
- \Tfiere-upon;tfie-requestea qiJeSti6n\¥as reaClbacK 
by the court reporter.) 
A. I think that yes, yes, I do. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Would you read out loud the last paragraph of the 
promissory note, please. 
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to read from 
documents. Documents are in front of me. I can read. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright, thank you. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. Did you understand that the promiSSOry note barred any 
oral modification? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question -- object to the question, your Honor, it calls 
for a legal conclusion. And, again, he's asking him to 
essentially read the document again. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Why do you feel you were entitled to orally modify this 
note? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. For several reasons. One is Reed and I have been 
working together, had a great relationship for several years, 
we put together retirement program and we modified our 
agreements from 1995 on several occasions. We have modified 
6"2Lf 




















































the agreement not only with documents but also with carrying 
out the terms of those agreements from time to time, and as 
they were modified from time to time. And Reed and I had a 
relationship that we did not have to at that time have to have 
everything in writing. 
Q. Any other reason you believed you were entitled to 
orally modify the terms of the promissory note? 
A. No, I think I just said what I -- that those are the 
reasons. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Now, your Honor, I want 
to be careful here that we get these documents into evidence, 
and what I would do is I would move that all of the exhibits in 
the two binders that we have provided be admitted into 
evidence; and if there are any that are objectionable, I will 
take those up specifically. 
THE COURT: Mr. McNichols, I guess I would take 
the same approach to the exhibits as I have taken towards the 
affidavits, and that is that I'm only going to be considering 
those for whatever relevance and permissible purpose they may 
be. With that, do you have any objection to the exhibits 
contained in the -- identified as A through, I guess, AX. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I do, your Honor, because I don't 
know what they all are. I got them late yesterday afternoon 
and did not review them. I have looked at the table of the 
contents this morning, but I haven't looked at the documents. 
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So, you know, the note looks to be the note, I don't know 
whether the note was amended or not. I thought the note was 
amended and maybe it wasn't, but some of these documents I'm 
sure were amended. But I just don't know where they were and 
so I guess I object on the grounds that I have not have had an 
adequate opportunity to read them and to look at them. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Well, before I close, 
your Honor, I'll ask him to identify each of the exhibits. 1 
guess I have tried to shortcut that, maybe Counsel could assist 
me and we can speed that along. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I thought also we weren't going to 
have exhibits today. When I tried an exhibit earlier on, 
Counsel raised this objection about exhibits. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to consider what you 
guys want to submit. If that includes exhibits, that's what 
it's going to be. 
Mr. Cressman, it sounds like you are going to go 
ahead and have each identified. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Alright. Well, Exhibit A has been 
identified, we'd move that it be admitted. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Is the representation that it 
wasn't amended? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, the witness has testified 
that was the note, and I as far as I know it hasn't been, but I 
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don't know that I have to represent anything but I will so 
represent. 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: The witness said that that was the 
original note, that was my reason. If that's -- if that's the 
only note then, then I have no objection to it. 
THE COURT: Exhibit A is admitted. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Let me just run through some of 
these then. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, take a look at Exhibit B. Is that the stock 
redemption restructure agreement dated July 1st, 1996, which 
bears your signature? 
A. I have no ability at this time to give whether or not 
this is the true and correct copy of the original redemption 
agreement. I haven't had time to review any of these 
documents. 
Q. Well, take a look at it. 
A. And you want me to recall from memory something that I 
signed twelve years ago? 
Q. Isn't that what I stated, sir? 
A. What did you say? 
Q. Isn't that the stock redemption restructure agreement 
you signed dated as of July 1, 19967 You Signed on behalf of 
AlA Services Corporation with Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor. 
A. You know it appears to be a stock redemption agreement 
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signed by me, yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to Exhibit B, 
Mr. McNichols? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit B's admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit B was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. "Now with regard to this exhibit and with regard to your 
testimony and apparently that you orally modified some 
arrangements, taking a look at page 10 of Exhibit B, can you 
tell us how much in attorney's fees were paid -- well, let me 
ask you this way. Is it true, sir, that AlA Services paid 
fifty-five thousand dollars of Mr. Reed Taylor's attorney's 
fees in conjunction with this restructured agreement that was 
entered into one year after the original agreement was entered 
into in July of 1995? 
A. I believe that's right. 
Q. Okay. Exhibit C, is that the amended restated stock 
pledge agreement dated as of July 1, 1996, that you executed? 
A. This letter, yes. 
Q. Exhibit C? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: We move to admit Exhibit C. 




















































THE COURT: Exhibit C is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit C was admitted into evidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: And attached to Exhibit C is 
Exhibit A3, correct, sir? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No, it's Exhibit D, Counsel. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Attached to Exhibit C is Exhibit 
A3, correct, sir? 
A. Yes. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Just a minute. Just a minute. 
Oh, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: You are talking about the last page of 
Exhibit C, Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, sir. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I'm sorry, your Honor, because 
Exhibit D also is entitled "Exhibit A-3." 
THE COURT: Alright. Just look at the last page 
of Exhibit C, Mr. Taylor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have it now, your Honor. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is that your signature on that assignment separate from 
certificate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And by that assignment separate from certificate, you 
were assigning and transferring to Reed Taylor six hundred --
excuse me, six thousand two hundred nineteen shares of AlA 
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Insurance stock; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Document speaks for itself, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Showing you Exhibit D, does that also bear your 
signature as an assignment separate from certificate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Dated as of July 22, 1995? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit Exhibit D, your 
Honor. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit D is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit D was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Exhibit E, is that the amended and restated security 
agreement dated as of July 1, 1996, signed by you on behalf of 
AlA Services? 
A. Yes, appears so. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, my copy is to both 
Exhibit Band E. The top it says Exhibit B and the bottom it 
says Exhibit E. 
MR. CRESSMAN: The bottom is the controlling 
desig natio n. 
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THE COURT: That is to be identified then as 
Exhibit E. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, please look at Exhibit Z. We have just gone 
through the amended and restructured documents for the 
transaction that took place in July of 1996. I'm now going to 
ask you to identify the initial documents beginning with 
Exhibit Z and I'll ask you is that the original stock 
redemption agreement pertaining to the redemption of your 
brother's shares dated July 22, 1995, signed by you? 
A. Yes, it appears to be. 
Q. Exhibit AA, is that the stock pledge agreement dated as 
of July 22, 1995, for the original stock redemption transaction 
between AlA Services and your brother signed by you? 
A. It appears to be, yes. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibits Z and Exhibit AA or admitted. 
(Thereupon, Deposition Exhibits Z and AA were 
admitted into eVidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Take a look at Exhibit AB, is that the secured 
agreement dated as of July 22, 1995, pertaining to the original 
stock redemption transaction with your brother signed by you? 
A. Yes. 
evidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AB is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AB was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Exhibit AC, is that a certification by you as of 
August 15, 1995? 
A. Yes, it appears to be. 
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MR. MCNICHOLS: That's technically the 16 by 
interlineation. 
MR. CRESSMAN: It's what? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: It's interlined to the Sixteenth, 
I believe, above the signature. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I was looking only at the first 
page, but if the sixteenth is where the signature, that is the 
case. Move to admit, your Honor. 




MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AC is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AC was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 5U 



















































Q. Exhibit AD, is that an addendum to stock redemption 
agreement, the original stock redemption agreement? 
A. It appears to be, yes. 
Q. Signed by you on or around July 22, 1995? 
A. Yes. 
evidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AD is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AD was admitted into 
By MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, at the time a year later this after the original 
transaction in July of 1995, in July of 1996 you amended the 
transaction; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the reason it was amended was because the company 
couldn't pay Mr. Reed Taylor? 
A. I don't recall that. There is --
Q. Okay. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Excuse me, he didn't finish his 
answer, Counsel. 
A. I believe the reason it was amended and restated is 
because Mr. Taylor decided that he did not want to retire. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Because he what? 
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A. Did not want to retire, wanted back in the company. 
Q. How did having an amended allow him to be back in the 
company? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Documents speak for themselves, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think he's talking about the reasons 
why the documents were done. I'm going to overrule the 
objection. You can go ahead and answer that, Mr. Taylor. 
A. Well, as my understanding that at the time he decided 
that he did not want to retire, and so he wanted to restructure 
everything and this is what we ended up with. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. As of the -- there was a down payment note of a million 
five with the original transaction; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that payment was not due whether it was Obligated 
to be paid before July 1996; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to that question. 
can't understand it. 
THE COURT: You need to redo that one, 
Mr. Cressman. I don't understand that either. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, I can. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. In addition to the six million dollar note that's at 
issue now that remains unpaid per your earlier testimony and 
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the two million in interest, the original transaction also 
involved a note for a million and a half; did it not? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
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Q. And that note had -- was -- had a maturity to be paid 
before July 1 of 1996; correct? 
A. I don't recall the date of that. 
Q. You don't recall that it had a date and that the date 
-- by that date it was not paid? 
A. I do not recall that. 
Q. You do not -- is it true, sir, that the reason the 
restructured agreement took place was so you could address the 
nonpayment of that note? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, it's been asked and 
answered. He already asked him what the reason was and he said 
the reason was his brother didn't want to retire any more. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, we already indicated that AlA Services paid 
fifty-five thousand of Mr. Reed Taylor's fees associated with 
the restructured documents. How much in fees were paid by AlA 
Services to its counsel for that transaction? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Now, you have indicated you believed that you have 
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amended the transaction with your brother orally; correct? 
A. Orally and in writing, yes. 
Q. And when was that -- when was the last amendment that 
you made with your brother? 
A. The last -- we had a long period of renegotiation and 
all these documents and these entire loan documents from 2000, 
2001 to clear to 2003. We finally settled on a deal in March 
of 2003, and that's the deal we have been working under ever 
since. 
Q. Okay. And as of 2003, you had a deal with your 
brother? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that deal memoria Iized in writing? 
A. No, not to the extent of these type of documents, no. 
Q. In any extent? 
A. Yes, I believe that we will show that at trial. 
Q. Okay. What documents, sir? 
A. I don't recall those right now. 
Q. After 2003, did you ever amend that agreement again? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. So after --
A. Not in any material way. 
Q. Well, in any way, sir? 
A. I don't believe -- I don't believe we remanded that in 



















































Q. Alright. Either orally or in writing? 1 
A. I don't recall of any right now. 2 
Q. Well, is it your testimony that after year 2003 you 3 
never amended the agreement with your brother either orally or 4 
in writing? 5 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, asked and answered. 6 
THE COURT: Sustained. 7 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 8 
Q. Do you know Mr. Ernie Dantini, sir? 9 
A. Yes, I do. 10 
Q. Who is he? 11 
A. He used to be an accountant here in town. I think he 12 
may have worked for AlA briefly but he worked for Reed to some 13 
extent and continues practicing in Seattle as a CPA. 14 
Q. Was he Reed's accountant? 15 
A. I believe he was -- he had been Reed's accountant over 16 
the last sometime. 17 
Q. Okay. Now, let's go back here and take a look at 18 
Exhibit A, the promissory note. That promissory note was due 19 
in full on August 1, 2005; correct, sir? 20 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, objection, he's asking 21 
him now to interpret the written document. He's already 22 
testified that the agreement was modified. 23 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, this is -- 24 
MR. MCNICHOLS: The document speaks for itself. 25 
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THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that objection. 1 
The document does speak for itself, Mr. Cressman. 2 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 3 
Q. In October of 2005, do you recall having any 4 
discussions with Ernie Dantini about revising the arrangement 5 
between AlA Services a nd your brother? 6 
A. Since 200S I have probably talked to Reed or his 7 
advisors on a weekly or monthly basis on revising the 2003 8 
agreement. 9 
Q. So the answer to my question is? 10 
A. I can't recall the specific date, but I recall talking 11 
about reVising the agreement on numerous and numerous 12 
occasions. 13 
Q. Okay. Do you reca II discussing that with Mr. Dantini 14 
that subject? 15 
A. I don't recall that specific day, but I recall 16 
discussing variations of settlement or payoff or changing the 17 
2003 deal on numerous occasions. 18 
Q. None of Which were consummated; correct? 19 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object to that, your Honor, it 20 
calls for a legal conclusion. 21 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, he's already -- 22 
THE COURT: Overruled. Mr. Taylor, you can answer 23 
that. 24 
A. Yes, none of _. no, none of which have been consummated 25 
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because each time we had a deal made, Reed raised the bar by 
another million or half million dollars. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. What were the terms of the deal in '03? 
A. Terms of the deal in '03 is that the company would dig 
itself out of the hole, work together to dig itself out of the 
hole with Crop USA, rebuild its agency force. 1 think I 
indicated in my affidavit, rebuild it's agency force and that 
we would likely be able to begin catch-Up on the interest as 
soon as we hit around thirty million of premium. And that we 
would again be able to restructure and begin paying off AlA and 
this debt as soon as we hit sixty to seventy million in premium 
and that was our goal. 
Q. Any other terms? 
A. We would pay Reed fifteen thousand dollars a month plus 
continuing paying for about ten thousand dollars in other 
expenses during that interim period. And we would continue to 
pay Donna, I think, four thousand a month which we would have 
been now been able to raise that recently to, I think, ten 
thousand a month. 
Q. Okay. Any other terms? 
A. Those are all I recall right now. 
Q. So that was the deal between your brother and AlA 
Services in 2003? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that deal reached? 
A. March of 2003. 
Q. And where was it reached? 
A. Here. 
Q. Where? 
A. At our Headquarters. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. Reed and I. 
Q. Anybody else? 
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A. Ernie Dantini was intricately involved off and on 
giving tax advice and other advice. I don't think -- but there 
would be no one else. 
Q. So it's your testimony that in March of 2003 you and 
your brother sat down in your office and orally made that deal? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. I'd like you to take a look at Exhibit AI, please. Do 
you recognize that exhibit as an e-mail from you to 
Ernie Dantini dated October 7, 2005? 
A. It indicates it is. I don't remember. 
Q. I didn't hear the answer, I'm sorry. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think he's taking some time to 
read the exhibit, Counsel. 
MR. CRESSMAN: That's fine. 
A. During 2005-2006 we had extensive discussions on 
restructuring. 5'2.'8 



















































MR. CRESSMAN; Move to strike as nonresponsive, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT; He's just asking if you recogn ize the 
document, Mr. Taylor, as --
A. I do not recognize the document. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN; 
Q. Is that an e-mail fromyoudatedOctober7.2005.to 
Ernie Dantini --
A. I do not recognize this document. 
Q. You don't recognize it? 
A. No, I don't. It's on the wrong type of format for my 
type of e-mails. 
Q. Well, take a look and read it and see if that refreshes 
your recollection. 
A. I have read it, I do not remember sending this 
document. 
MR. CRESSMAN; Okay. We are going to have a 
problem, your Honor, getting Mr. Dantini over here today. 
didn't anticipate that this would be an issue. But this is 
obviously a critical document because it indicates that there 
was no deal. It talks about a deal three years ago that was 
never consummated, and I think it's very significant in terms 
of --
A. I think--



























MR. CRESSMAN: If the witness doesn't recog -- 1 
refuses to recognize the document, then I need to bring the 2 
recipient of it to identify it. And I don't have -- he's in 3 
Kirkland right now, your Honor. Unless he -- 4 
THE COURT; What are you asking? 5 
MR. CRESSMAN; Well, I'm just advising the Court 6 
that under the time schedule that we have today, it's probably 7 
impossible to get Mr. Dantini here. 8 
THE COURT; Alright. I understand. 9 
MR. CRESSMAN; So -- and I also can't examine or 10 
use this document that's not admitted but it -- as the Court -- 11 
it's obviously a critical document. 12 
THE COURT: Well, go ahead, Mr. Cressman, you've 13 
made inquiry ofthe witness so -- 14 
MR. CRESSMAN; Yes, there is, your Honor. 15 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 16 
Q. But you do recall having discussions with Mr. Dantini 17 
in 2005 or on or around October concerning restructuring your 18 
brother's deal; is that a fair statement, sir? 19 
A. I think that I have testified that I have had extensive 20 
discussions, almost weekly discussions on re-doing the 2003 21 
deal before and after the 2003 deal. 22 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive. 23 
THE COURT: Sustained. 24 
MR. CRESSMAN: Would you read the question back to 25 
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the witness, please. 
(Thereupon, the requested question was read back 
by the court reporter.) 
A. Yes, that would be a fair statement. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And did you send e-mails to Mr. Dantini in connection 
with those discussions? 
A. I'm sure I did, yes. 
Q. And do you recognize Exhibit AI as one of those e-rnails 
that you sent to Mr. Dantini? 
A. I do not. 
MR. MCNICHOLS; Asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN; 
Q. Mr. Taylor, let's me ask you to take a look at 
Exhibit H please -- excuse me, Exhibit F, I'm sorry, F. Is 
that a letter that you received addressed to you from an 




MR. CRESSMAN; Move to admit Exhibit F, your 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT; Exhibit F is admitted. 
MR. MCNICHOLS; May I re -- no objection, sorry, 
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(Thereupon, Exhibit F was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN; 
Q. And that letter advises of default? 
MR. MCNICHOLS; Objection, the letter speaks for 
itself, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And you consider this letter as a notice of default; 
did you not? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, your Honor, it's 
irrelevant what he conSiders it. It speaks for itself. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. Do I consider this a notice of default from --
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes. 
A. Yes, but I don't consider us being in default. I think 
the letter's inaccurate. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Okay. And as of the time you received that letter, 
isn't it true that over a million and a half in interest was 
delinquent on the promissory note according to its terms 
Exhibit A? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It was not? 




















































Q. Okay. Under the original terms of the promissory note 
Exhibit A, was interest in excess of a million five owing? 
A. Under the terms -- if you had calculated interest paid 
based upon the original, yes; based on the agreements made in 
2003, no. 
Q. And after the letter of December 12th was received by 
you, how much in interest has been paid by AlA Services to your 
brother? 
A. We continue to pay about twenty-five thousand a month 
on -- each month. 
Q. Okay. And after December -- the December 12th letter, 
has any portion of the principle been paid to your brother? 
A. No, it's not due yet. 
Q. When is it due per your 2003 agreement? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
that, your Honor, because he's asking him now -- oh, I'm 
sorry -- well, there is more to it than that. I don't know 
exactly how to make this objection because the 2003 amendment 
is not the only agreement that determines when it is due. 
There is another document. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
the speaking objections of Counsel. 
THE COURT: I'm going to overrule your -- I'm 
going to take that as an objection and I'm going to overrule 
it, Mr. McNichols, because I think Mr. Cressman's question was 
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related to the 2003 agreement. Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: AI rig ht. I'll overrule the objection. 
I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Taylor, but go ahead and answer 
that question. 
A. Based upon current assumptions and the marketing plan 
that we put together back in 2003, it would be due and payable 
about two thousand -- August 2009. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. About or exactly or how? 
A. Well, the payment of both the, A, preferred shares 
which has to be paid first and the -- this note is payable upon 
the ability to finance the -- based upon the amount of premium 
that is written and under our current plans and under our 
current projections, that would be August of 2009. 
Q. When you made this agreement in 2003 with your brother 
in March, did you discuss when this would take place? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, I don't know what the 
"this" is. There's a pronoun --
MR. CRESSMAN: When the payment would take place. 
A. Originally we had the plan that the payment would take 
place in 2007, but because of the -- but we have not achieved 
the premium goals that we had originally had thought we could 
have in 2003. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
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Q. So your agreement in 2003 was based upon -- the 
assumption was that he would be paid in 20077 
A. No, it was based upon the assumption that we would be 
paid when we hit in the sixty to seventy million dollar premium 
range. 
Q. Okay. And the "we" would be? 
A. Crop and AlA. 
Q. Crop and AlA. How was money from Crop going to be used 
to pay your brother? 
A. It is always under the assumption that the two 
companies would be put back together and that the companies 
would be able to be -- to purchase that note or retire that 
note whether or not AlA or Crop, and depending on how this 
agreement was structured. The specifics I can't say now but 
the -- when we say "we," we mean both Crop and AlA has to hit 
those premium goals, otherwise there's no money to pay it. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Reed Taylor doesn't have any interest in 
Crop USA; correct? 
A. No, he doesn't. 
Q. AlA Insurance, Inc., doesn't have any interest in Crop 
USA, does it? 
A. No, it doesn't. 
Q. And AlA Services, Inc., doesn't have any interest in 
Crop USA, does it? 
A. No. 
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Q. So this is a completely separate entity; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I'm trying to understand was there or was there not 
a fixed date when your brother was going to be paid in your 
agreement with him in March of 2003? 
A. I will repeat again based upon the budgets we presented 
in 2003 and as modified more recently, they were -- it was --
he was to be paid when we hit sixty million dollars in premium. 
Q. And what was he to be paid? 
A. The balance of his note six million plus accrued 
interest. Any unaccrued interest. 
Q. Now, there was a lock -- there's a lock box agreement 
under the restructured agreements; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you describe for the Court what a lock box 
agreement is? 
A. A lock box agreement is a place where premiums are 
deposited into a -- essentially a bank who then deposits money 
into accounts, and then tells the insurance company how much 
has been received on an individual basis. 
Q. And one of the terms of your brother's contracts was 
that the commissions would be deposited into a lock box 
account; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: If the Court, please, I'd object, 
the agreement speaks for itself. And I want to object also on 
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the relevance. And this is going to lead us and waste a whole 
bunch of time because there's been no lock box for ten years as 
is shown, I believe, in one of Mr. Taylor's affidavits. 
THE COURT: Where are we going with this, 
Mr. Cressman? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm trying to establish 
a default for failure to maintain the lock box arrangement as 
required by the documents that were executed in July of 1996. 
I think Counsel's comment, I assume it was for the record, 
indicates that they failed to keep the lock box arrangement. 
was going to inquire of the witness if that was the case. 
THE COURT: Alright. I'm going to go ahead and 
let you inquire as to that. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Do you agree with your Counsel's statement? 
A. We have discontinued -- we had discontinued the lock 
box in 1997 at the -- with the consent of Reed Taylor and 
Ernie Dantini to -- because it was no longer necessary because 
beginning December 1st, 1997, AlA collected all the premiums. 
We were no longer giving it to Centennial Life, it was a waste 
of money and we all agreed to that. 
Q. Where did you agree with that with Mr. Reed Taylor? 
A. Reed Taylor's conference room. 
Q. Who was present? 
A. Ernie Dantini and myself. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: And Reed Taylor? 
A. And Reed Taylor. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is it true at the time of your receipt of the 
December 12th letter, Exhibit F, that Reed Taylor was not a 
member of the board of AlA Services? 
A. He was not at that time. 
Q. And is it true that since that time, since that letter 
was received, he's not been made a member of the board? 
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A. Oh, I have offered to make him a member of the board. 
Q. Since December? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As part of the settlement arrangement or otherwise? 
A. Yes, as part of that at Rod Bond's office. I said he 
can join the board. And he's been --
Q. As part --
THE COURT: Hold it, hold it. I've got a court 
reporter here who's trying to take down everything that gets 
said, so I just need one person talking at a time. Okay. 
Ask your question, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Other than as part of settlement discussions with your 
brother which took place in attorney's offices, have you 
offered your -- or offered to or aPPointed your brother to the 
board of AlA Services? 
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A. Reed Taylor has served on the board of AlA and AlA, 
Inc., over the last ten or twelve years at his pleasure. He 
wanders on and off the board whenever he wants to. He can come 
on the board any time he wants. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to strike as nonresponsive. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Just -- Mr. Taylor, if you 
could just address yourself to the question of whether that 
offer has been made since December of 2006 other than as part 
of some settlement discussion. 
A. No. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And obviously he has not been apPointed to the board; 
correct? 
A. No. 
Q. And subsequent to the time you received the letter 
Exhibit F, you have not provided Mr. Reed Taylor with audited 
financial statements, have you? 
A. For which company? 
Q. For AlA Services. 
A. No. We discontinued having audited financial 
statements for AlA Services in 1990 because AlA Services has 
virtually no material assets except for AlA, Inc. 
Q. Did you since December 12th, 2006, have you provided 
Reed Taylor with audited financial statements of AlA, Inc? 
A. No. But the auditors will be here next week and the 
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audit will be prepared and sent probably by the end of March. 
Q. And over the last several years, have you -- is it true 
that you have not provided Reed Taylor with audited financial 
statements of AlA, Inc? 
A. That's not true. 
Q. It's your testimony that you have? 
A. Every year for the last 12 years. 
Q. Who were the auditors for AlA, Inc? 
A. Oh, God, it's -- this - for the last two years it's 
LeMaster and Daniels from Spokane. 
Q. Anybody new coming in this year? 
A. No, same as last year. 
Q. Alright. Since you received the letter of 
December 12th from Mr. Moran, have you provided monthly income 
tax statements for AlA Services to your brother? 
A. I don't know that. I have not personally, no. 
Q. Alright. Are you aware that anyone else has done so? 
A. I don't know that. 
Q. Since you received the December 12th letter, have you 
or anyone else provided Reed Taylor with weekly summaries of 
new business? 
A. No, sir, we don't do that. That's all on computer now. 
Q. Since your receipt of the December 12th, 2006, letter 
from Mr. Reed Taylor's lawyer, have you provided him with any 




















































A. I don't think so. 
Q. Is AlA Services current on the payments to 
Donna Taylor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you take a look at Exhibit R, please. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this a loan and security agreement for Crop USA 
Insurance Agency, Inc? 
A. Yes. 
Q. For the amount of fifteen million dollars revolving 
loan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which was guaranteed by AlA Insurance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you Signed it? 
A. Yes, I did. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit R is admitted. 
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(Thereupon, Exhibit R was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Was any consideration received by AlA Insurance, Inc., 
to guarantee this loan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What consideration? 
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A. The loan proceeds from this helps rebuild the AlA/Crop 




























Q. Explain that? 3 
A. In order to rebuild our agent force which had decimated 4 
in the early 2000 period, as I indicated in my affidavit, in 5 
order to rebuild this agency force, we need the funds to enable 6 
AlA and Crop agents to be in the field. Some of these guys are 7 
salaried and commissioned agents, some of them are agencies, 8 
independent agencies. And so we hire these guys, get them on 9 
board, regional managers especially, and through Crop's 10 
financing, we were able to finance that operation and to pick 11 
those guys up. 12 
Q. Were you aware that section 3.6 of the exhibit 13 
precluded the use of funds by anyone other than the borrower 14 
Crop USA? 15 
A. On -- of this document? 16 
Q. Yes. 17 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Again, your Honor -- I withdraw my 18 
objection. 19 
A. I am aware, yes. All of the expenditures by this 20 
agreement are according to the business plans that we filed and 21 
that they were reviewed by Surge, who is the lender, and all 22 
consistent with our agreement in 2003 with Reed. And because 23 
the original focus of the plan for Surge, Crop USA, and AlA is 24 
to rebuild an agency force to the extent that we had. 25 
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MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, I'm not sure --
A. And they are very aware. 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm not sure he answered my 
question. Let me restate it. I'm having a hard time hearing 
him, I'm sorry, with the air conditioner here. I don't have 
great hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter. You can have 
great hearing and it's still a problem in this courtroom. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Well, I do want to make an 
objection now because I think counsel has misled us by arguing 
that Section 3.6 says that the proceeds may be used solely for 
the borrower and that's not how it reads to me. It deals with 
specific debts for at least two other entities, and therein is 
the problem of asking a witness questions about a multi-page 
document. 
THE COURT: Well, if you want to ask your question 
again, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yeah. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. How much is owed on the obligation now? 
A. To this company? 
Q. Surge. 
A. Surge, I'm going to think it is five point two, 
somewhere in that range. 
Q. And if the loan is in default, AlA would have to pay 
it; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, calls for a legal 
conclusion. Also calls for construing this document. 
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THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer that, 
Mr. Taylor. 
A. Yes, I think that the -- AlA is the guarantor and if 
Crop USA was not able to pay, then they would come after AlA, 
sure, and me. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I think for the record we should 
correct the statement that you made about what that paragraph 
says. Are you willing to withdraw the statement you made? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, counsel I think has an 
opportunity to re-examine this witness and clarify anything he 
wants. I'm kind of -- it's very difficult when he's arguing 
and questioning during my portion of the examination. 
THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Taylor did at least 
respond to that question and didn't re-ask it. So if you wish 
to go back into that, Mr. McNichols, I guess you can, but I'm 
not going to correct any record at this point. 
Go ahead, Mr. Cressman. 
MR. CRESSMAN: The last question related to a 
default of the agreement and I think the witness answered that 
question? 
THE COURT: He did. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 532-



















































Q. Now, in Aimee Gordon's declaration paragraph 5, she 
refers to an entry she states that in 2002 the principle was 
reduced of the note, the note held by your brother, by 
$307,271, and then in December of last year you reversed that 
entry. Why did you reverse that entry? 
A. Because it was caJled to my attention by Pat Moran that 
the books were -- the actual amount due on Services books were 
different than the sub journal entry. And I'll tell you why 
the difference is if you are interested. 
Q. So after you received the notice of default from 
Me. Moran, you caused to make that correction; is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit AE, please. 
A. AE, okay. 
Q. Is that your response to the letter of Me. Moran 
exhibit -- his December 12th letter? 
A. Yes, yes, it is. 
eVidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Move to admit. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit AE is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit AE was admitted into 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And in that letter is it not correct that you 
acknowledged that Reed Taylor had a security interest and may 
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have the right to take the actions outlined in your letter? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the document speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Who drafted this letter, sir? 
A. I did. 
Q. And am I correct that in this letter you stated on the 
last page that if your brother withdrew his request for a 
shareholder meeting, you would agree to appoint him to the 
board? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And by this letter did you telJ your brother --
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection. Do I have to object 
every time he asks, your Honor? I'm sorry, I'm going to object 
to the question on the grounds that the documents speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: I have got to hear it first. 
Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, by the last paragraph of your letter, did 
you intend to refuse your brother the shareholder meeting that 
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he had requested for December 26, 20067 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Object, subject of intention of 
the witness is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead, Mr. Taylor, you 
can answer that. 
A. Yeah, Reed hasn't -- as long as we are not in default, 
Reed has no right to call a shareholder's meeting. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. And you understood the purpose of the shareholder's 
meeting that he was seeking to call was to elect and remove the 
existing directors and elect new ones; correct? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, your Honor, the 
understanding of the witness is irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, take a look at Exhibit G. You received a 
copy of this notice of special shareholder's meeting signed by 
your brother; correct? 
A. You know, I don't think I ever did. I think there was 
some that were faxed to the attorney's office at 4:00 in the 
morning or something like that, but I don't know that I ever 
saw the original. 
Q. Didn't it accompany Me. Miran's letter Exhibit F? 
A. The AG, is that what you are talking about? 
Q. No, GG. 
A. I thought you said AG, I'm sorry, G. 
Yes, I recall that document. 
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Q. And you got it on or around December 12th; correct? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Now in your letter to Me. Moran --
MR. MCNICHOLS: Can you give us the exhibit 
number, Counsel? 
MR. CRESSMAN: I'm looking for it. Exhibit AE. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. You were addreSSing potential settlement with your 
brother; correct? 
A. Yes, we had been discussing settlement of this matter 
for a year, over a year. 
Q. Isn't it true that -- strike that. Isn't it true that 
you advised Me. Moran that if an arrangement was reached, it 
would be memorialized by lawyers? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for 
itself, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Your Honor, we'd move to admit 
Exhibit G if we did n't cover that earlier. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I have no objection. That's the 
shareholder notice, I have no objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit G is admitted. 





















































THE COURT: Mr. Cressman, I'm going to need to 
take a recess now. I guess does counsel just prefer to take 
our lunch break at this time? Mr. McNichols? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Yes, that would be convenient, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. Why don't we just go ahead 
and take a lunch break, Counsel, and we will just reconvene at 
1:30. As I said, this courtrooms is going to be ours for the 
day so you can just leave your materials if you like to because 
I think it will probably be locked up during the lunch hour. 
Well, I'm sure that it will be locked up during the lunch hour 
so we will be back in session then at 1:30. 
(Thereupon, a lunch recess was taken from 12: 10 to 
1:30 p.m.) 
THE COURT: Back in session this afternoon in 
CV 07-208 Taylor versus AlA Services Corporation. We are in 
the midst of examination as part of the hearing for a 
preliminary injunction as sought by certain defendants and we 
are in the examination of Mr. John Taylor. 
Mr. Cressman, are you ready to proceed? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Before I commence with my 
examination of continuing examination of Mr. John Taylor, over 
the noon hour I have obtained an affidavit Mr. Ernie Dantini. 
THE COURT: I have received that. 
MR. CRESSMAN: You have received it? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. CRESSMAN: I had a working copy, but does the 
Court desire a working copy? 
THE COURT: No, that won't be necessary, I don't 
think. Thank you. 
MR. CRESSMAN: One other housekeeping matter, it 
appears that although we talked about Exhibit E, I did not 
offer it and it was not admitted, so I would move for Exhibit E 
to be admitted? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Just a moment, please, your Honor. 
MR. CRESSMAN: Exhibit E is the amended restated 
security. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: It says Exhibit B on the top and 
Exhibit E on the bottom, I remember it, and I have no objection 
to it. 
THE COURT: My notes indicate the same, that that 
was not previously offered or admitted, so Exhibit E is now 
admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit E was admitted into eVidence.) 
MR. CRESSMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Cressman. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, how many employees of AlA Insurance were 
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there in 1995? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cressman. 
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MR. CRESSMAN: Several reasons, your Honor. They 
are maintaining that Mr. Reed Taylor doesn't know how to run 
this business, and the testimony will show the number of 
employees then versus now. And in addition, it's relevant to 
the transfer of business from AlA Insurance to Crop USA which 
business could just as easily be performed by AlA Insurance but 
has been taken by John Taylor and his cohorts and is being run 
for the benefit of themselves to the detriment of AlA 
Insurance. 
THE COURT: Well, I think I'm going to sustain 
that as to the number of employees. Mr. Cressman, you may 
proceed. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. The business of AlA Insurance has significantly 
declined since 1995; has it not? 
A. As far as revenues, yes. 
Q. And Crop USA was formed when? 
A. 1999, I believe. 
Q. And its business has been increasing? 
A. Recently, yes. 
Q. And employees of AlA Insurance work for both AlA 
Insurance and Crop USA? 
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A. They perform services for both companies, yes. 
Q. Are all of the employees of AlA Insurance also 
employees of Crop USA? 
A. No. 
Q. Which employees of AlA -- excuse me, of Crop USA are 
not employees of AlA Insurance? 
A. There must be 20 people that are employees of Crop USA 
only. 
Q. Are there any salaried employees of AlA Insurance that 
are not also salaried employees of Crop USA? 
A. I don't understand your question. Say that again. 
Q. Are there -- am I correct that there are no salaried 
employees of AlA Insurance that are not also employees of Crop 
USA? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: I object to the form of the 
question. There's a double negative in it. 
THE COURT: I don't understand that either, 
Mr. Cressman. Are you asking if there's any employees --
salaried employees of AlA that only work for AlA? 
MR. CRESSMAN: Well, yes, we can ask it that way. 
Can you answer or his Honor's question. 
THE COURT: Did you understand my question, 
Mr. Taylor? 
A. Yeah, do any -- any AlA employees only work for AlA, 
I'd say no. 




















































BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Is the same answer for --
A. Well, no, that's not true. There are some that work 
only for AlA. 
Q. Of the AlA sa laried employees, which of them work only 
for AlA? 
A. The building people, people who maintain the building. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then we have two policy --
Q. Two what? 
A. Two policy holder service people who essentially do 
only AlA business. 
Q. And of the other salaried employees of AlA, how many of 
those are they in number, approximately? 
A. I would -- eight or nine. 
Q. And they work for both AlA and Crop USA? 
A. They are salaried with AlA but they perform services 
for both. 
Q. Is there any reason why the business of Crop USA could 
not be performed by AlA Insurance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why·- what? 
A. AlA Insurance does not hold any property casualty 




























Q. AssumIng they obtained those licenses, Is there any 1 
reason why AlA Insurance could not perform that work? 2 
A. Under that and having the right people running it, yeah 3 
-- no, sure it could always do it. 4 
Q. Okay. Are there any salaried employees of Crop USA 5 
that work only for Crop USA? 6 
A. ~~ 7 
Q. How many of those? 8 
A. Lots, you know, I can't remember how many employees we 9 
have, but there must be about 20 employees, most of whom work 10 
only for Crop USA. 11 
Q. Those are salaried employees? 12 
A. Yes. 13 
Q. And Is the number of employees of Crop USA more or less 14 
than the number of employees that AlA Insurance had In 1995? 15 
A. In numbers I'm not -- trying to think, it's probably 16 
about ha If and half now. The majority of the salaries are paid 17 
by Crop USA, yes. 18 
Q. Let me ask you this way. Are the number of employees 19 
of Crop USA today more or less than the number of employees of 20 
AlA In 1995? 21 
A. Than in 1995 -- no, there's less now. 22 
Q. Less employees now. Alright. Does Crop USA and AlA 23 
Insurance share a web Site? 24 
A. Yes, they do. 25 
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Q. And how long have they done that? 
A. For years. 
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Q. In your workday, how much of your time is spent working 
for AlA •• 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, relevance. 
MR. CRESSMAN: -- versus Crop USA? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection relevance. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. Depend. On some days I work almost all for AlA, other 
days I work almost all the time for Crop USA. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Overall 50 percent, approximately? 
A. I would guess so. 
Q. What is your salary from Crop USA? 
A. None. I take no salary for Crop USA. 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit F in Volume I 
of the exhibits in front of you. I'm sorry, that's the wrong 
exhibit. Bear with me here. 
Let me ask you .- I'm sorry the exhibit I had asked you 
to look at is Exhibit S. Is that a letter that you sent to 
Donna Taylor dated October 1st, 2001? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Donna Taylor being the wife or ex-wife of Reed Taylor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that letter did you advise her that you had 
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taken no salary that year? 
MR. MCNICHOLS: Objection, the letter speaks for 
itself. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at -- well, I'd move for 
the admission of Exhibit S. 
MR. MCNICHOLS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit S Is admitted. 
(Thereupon, Exhibit S was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. CRESSMAN: 
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at Exhibit T please. Is 
that the consolidated tax return for AlA Service Corporation 
for the calendar year which is also the fiscal year 2001? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or pertinent portions thereof, excuse me? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And on the second page It lists your compensation for 
2001; does it nnt? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. And it lists $224,139; correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Okay. Was your statement in the previous exhibit 
false? 
A. No. 535 
